Mary Stroode

AN

ESSAY

UPON

REASON,

AND THE

Nature of Spirits.

By *Richard Burthogge*, M. D.

LONDON:

Printed for **John Dunton** at the *Raven* in the *Poultrey*. 1694.

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To the Learned

Mr. JOHN LOCK,

Author of the

ESSAY

Upon

Humane Understanding.

SIR,

I *Take the Liberty of making a Present of the following* Essay *unto you, as to a Person who being ac-*

knowledged by all the Learned World *for one of the Greateſt Maſters of* Reaſon, *are therewithal allowed a moſt Proper and Competent Judge of any Diſcourſe concerning it. Whatever my Performance is, the* Deſign *I have is no ſmall one; ſince it is to ſhow the true way of Humane Knowledge, and by ſhewing that it is* REAL NOTIONAL, *to unite and reconcile the* Experimental, *or* Mechanical, *with the* Scholaſtical *Method. This Thought, Sir, affords me abundant matter of enlarging in many others; but I ought to remember, that I am*

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a ſtranger to you, and this my First Viſit, *and therefore I muſt make it ſhort, which I will do, by haſtning to own my ſelf among the* Croud *of thoſe who do admire you, and to aſſure you, that I am with great Reſpect,*

SIR,

Your very Humble Servant

RICH. BURTHOGGE.

ERRA-

ERRATA.

PAge 6. Line 3. for *Toubing*, r. *Touching*. p. 10. l. 25. for *preception*, r. *perception*. p. 25. l. 14. *for*, r. *or elſe*. p. 33. l. 25. for *do*, r. *doth*. p. 42. l. 22. for *diffuſiovum*, r. *diffuſivum*. Ibid. l. 28. for *eſt*, r. *&*. p. 52. l. 9. for *ſpect*, r. *reſpect*. p. 57. l. 7. for *or*, r. *of*. Ibid. l. 15. dele *time*. Ibid. l. 17. for *Appre*, r. *Apprehends*. p. 60. l. 24. r. *conceptions as are*. p. 62. l. 24. dele *the*. p. 74. l. 18. for *word*, r. *world*. p. 77. l. 21. dele *not*.

Of Human Reaſon.

The Firſt Part.

Chap. I. *Of Reaſon in general.*

SECT. I.

In what ſenſe Reaſon is taken and diſcourſed of here. A double account of it; the firſt, more Notional; the ſecond, more Real. Of the Agreements of Reaſon, Senſe, and Imagination. (1.) *That all three are Cogitative and Conceptive Powers. Cogitation what.* Monſieur des Cartes, *and* Honoratus Faber, *their Opinion, that Senſation is not Cogitation, conſidered,* (2.) *That Senſe, Imagination, and Reaſon are Mental and Spiritual, and not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers. The Differences of thoſe Powers; that all Senſation is Imagination, and what is commonly called Imagination, is but Internal Senſation. Intellection or Reaſoning, is Knowing without Imagination. Inſtances, ſetting out theſe ſeveral Notions. The power of Knowing without Imagining, why called Reaſon.*

REASON taken for Human *Mind*, or Understanding (which is the sense I take it in now) is defined by most, the faculty whereby a Man is said to be Reasonable, or Understanding; in like manner as *Sight* is defined, the faculty whereby a Living Creature is Denominated Seeing, or Visive, or Reason is that faculty whereby a Man does Exercise the acts of Reason, or doth Understand; as Sight, the faculty whereby a Man or any other Animal doth see, or discern Objects.

Nor are they altogether without Reason, who do so define and explicate it; for *Acts* of Perception properly so called, are not Known, or Knowable, but in and by themselves; we Know not, nor are capable of Knowing, what the Act of Seeing is, but by seeing; nor what that of Hearing is, but by Hearing; or what the Act of Understanding is, but by Understanding. And again, *Perceptive faculties* are not Known, or Knowable, but by their Acts: We Know not what the faculty or power of Seeing is but *relatively*, with relation to the Act of Seeing: Nor what the faculty or Power of Hearing is, but by the Act of Hearing; nor what the faculty or power of Understanding or Reasoning is, but by *Acts* of Understanding or Reasoning

ſoning: In a word, no Faculties, no Powers are Known, or Knowable, but by their reſpective Acts or Exerciſes, and therefore they cannot be defined or ſet out but by them. All this is certain.

However, ſince this is but a notional fruitleſs way of Explicating Reaſon, and too ſhort, too narrow to ſatisfie a Curious and Inquiſitive Mind; therefore to ſettle an *Idea* of it, that may be more to purpoſe, more real, and more edifying; I will ſhow, in the firſt place, the *Agreements* it hath with other Conceptive Cogitative faculties, what it holds in common with them; and afterwards, ſet out the *Differences* that do diſcriminate and divide theſe ſeveral faculties, each from other, and this particularly from the Reſt.

The *Conceptive Cogitative* Faculties that are in Man, (for ſo I call the Faculties by which he makes acquaintance with external Objects) are his external *Senſe*, *Imagination* (as it is called) and *Reaſon* or Underſtanding: *Three* Faculties which do all *Agree* and Concur in this, that they are *Conceptive* and *Cogitative*, and conſequently *Mental* and *Spiritual*, and not meerly *Mechanick* and *Material* Powers.

Firſt; All three are *Conceptive*, *Cogitative* Powers; Senſation and Imagination, as well as Reaſoning or Intellection, are

Cogitations. Cogitation is conſcious Affection; *Conſcious Affection*, is Affection with Conſciouſneſs of that Affection; and by another name is called *Knowledge.* Knowledge, as it has a double relation, ſo it may be conſidered two ways, to wit, either in reference to the *Object*, which is Known, and ſo, properly, it is *Apprehenſion* or Conſcious Perception; or, as it reſpects the *Image* and *Idea*, by means of which we do perceive or know that Object, and ſo it may be called *Conception.* Conception properly ſpeaking, is of the Image, or Idea; Apprehenſion, Knowledge, or conſcious Perception is of the Object, by means of that Idea, or Image: It is as proper to ſay, that the Senſe and Imagination do conceive, as that the Reaſon or Underſtanding doth; the former does as much conceive Images and Sentiments, as the latter does Ideas and Notions.

Conception and Cogitation, really are but one Act, and conſequently, all Conceptive are Cogitative Powers, and Cogitative Powers Conceptive. Only, to clear the Notion of *Conſciouſneſs*, by which *Cogitation* or Knowledge is diſtinguiſhed, tho' never divided, from *Conception*, we muſt further conſider the *Way* and Manner how Conſciouſneſs Ariſes. And it ſeems to me to *ariſe*, ordinarily, from the diſtinction

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and difference that is in Conceptions; for, ſhould any perſon have his Eye perpetually tied to one Object, without ever cloſing of, or turning it to another, he would no more be ſenſible that he *ſaw* that Object, or know any more what it was to *ſee*, than if he had been blind from his Birth. For ſince *Conſciouſneſs of Seeing* is nothing but a perceiving by the Eye, that one is Affected, or otherwiſe Affected than he was, with the appearance of Light, or Colour. If a perſon had never ſeen but one thing, and never but ſeen it, he could have no perceivance (that) he is ſo Affected, that is, he could not be ſenſible or conſcious (that) he did ſee. Thus, tho' in our Members the parts that do compoſe them are contiguous one to another, and do always touch, yet we do not feel them touch, that is, they touch, but we are not ſenſible they do, becauſe no difference being in the Affection, there is no Senſe, no Conſciouſneſs of it: But Diſlocation is ſoon perceived; as alſo it is when any part is preſſed unuſually. I conclude, that as difference of Conception ariſes from different Affections of the Faculties by Objects, ſo Conſciouſneſs, or Senſe of Conception, ariſes from the difference of Conceptions. Did we know but one thing, or had but one Act of Conception, we ſhould not know

that we did know that one, that is, that Conception would not properly be Cogitation, but would be, as toubhing without feeling. However, ſince there is ſo great a diverſity of Objects in the World, all-around us, and conſequently, ſo many various Impreſſions made upon the Mind, by thoſe Objects, ſo that its Conceptive Power cannot but be diverſly Affected, and moved, and the Mind alſo have a perceivance of that diverſity; hence it comes to paſs, that Conception is always Cogitation. In ſhort, Conception is Modification of Mind, and Cogitation is Conception with Conſciouſneſs of it. Conſciouſneſs of Conception is a ſenſe of the Alteration made in the Mind by that Conception (of which it is conſcious;) *ſi nihil* (ſays *Cotta apud Cicer. l. 1. de Nat. Deor.*) *inter Deum & Deum* differt, *nulla eſt apud Deos* cognitio nulla *perceptio*,

I know very well that Monſieur *Des Cartes*, the ingenious *Honorato Fabri*, and many others do differ from me, for denying (as they do) that Senſation is Knowledge, and conſequently, excluding both Conception and Conſciouſneſs from the Idea of it, they muſt alſo deny, that Senſe is a Cogitative or Conceptive Power. But then, it is hard to ſay, what that Idea is, that they have of Senſation. Beſides, 'tis

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moſt certain that in Men, Senſation is Concious Perception, for whatever Impreſſion is made upon our Eye by any Object, we do not for all that, diſcern, or ſee the Object, if we do not atend unto, as well as receive, the Impreſſion; that is, we do not diſcern or ſee, but when we Know we do. Then only we have a Senſation of Objects, when we are Conſcious that they do Impreſs us; that is, when our Organs being Impreſſed, there ariſe and ſpring up in us, by means of thoſe Impreſſions, certain Images or Conceptions, that (many of them) by a Natural deluſion do ſeem as really to Exiſt without us, in the Objects themſelves, as if they were indeed ſo many real Affections of them, or Inherent Accidents in them. And thoſe Images being but Modifications of Mind, ariſe not in us upon any Impreſſions but when the Mind Attends to them, for elſe they cannot Affect it.

But happily it will be told me, that this Conſciouſneſs of Impreſſions, which is in men, when they do ſee, or hear, or otherwiſe perceive Objects, by the Affections of their External Organs, Ariſes in them only from the *Concomitance* of the Underſtanding; becauſe in men, whatevet Affects the Senſe, is alſo perceived by the Underſtanding; but that there neither is, nor

can be, any ſuch thing in other Animals, which are as void of Conſciouſneſs of any Impreſſion made upon their Organs, as they are of that Reaſon and Underſtanding that makes it in Men. But as this may be ſaid, ſo it may be as eaſily Replyed to; for 'tis as impoſſible, that Men ſhould have any clear, or indeed any *Idea*, at all of Senſation, in other *Species* of Animals, but by that, which they have of their own; *as* it is certain, that Senſation in Men cannot be underſtood to be without Conception, nor Conception without Attention of Mind. *Attention of Mind*, is the Application of it unto Objects, and therefore in Men, is called *Minding*: Without Attention no Conception, and without Conception no Conſciouſneſs; Conſciouſneſs being (as I have ſaid) nothing but a Senſe of Alteration made in the Mind, by ſome new Affection of it, that is, by a new Thought or Conception. Beſides, there are many other things that do make for this Opinion, that all Animal Senſation is Cogitation; particularly, that great *Sagacity* that is in ſome Animals, which cannot be accounted for with any clearneſs, but by allowing to them a great degree of Knowledge and Conſciouſneſs.

And hence it follows, that Senſe and Imagination, as well as the Underſtanding

ing and Reaſon, are Mental and Spiritual, not meerly Mechanick and Material Powers By Mechanick and meerly Material Powers I underſtand ſuch as do reſult from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter; from Local Motion and Reſt, and from Size, Figure and Texture. By *Mental Spiritual* Powers, I underſtand ſuch as cannot be conceived to ariſe from Matter only, and the Modes of Matter, without the Influence of Mind; and in the number of theſe I reckon Senſe, and Imagination, as well as the Underſtanding or Reaſon. It is true, the term [*Mind*] is Appropriated, by way of excellency, to the Underſtanding or Reaſon, this being a faculty that hath the participation of Mind in a higher degree than the others have: But yet, there is Mind, and as much of Mind in all the Conceptive Cogitative Acts of Senſe or Imagination, as there is of Conception and Cogitation in them. Thus I have ſhewed how Senſe, Imagination, and Reaſon do *agree*, now I am to ſhew how they *differ*.

Senſe, (by which I mean the power of Seeing, of Hearing, of Taſting, of Smelling, and of Feeling,) is that by which we make acquaintance with External Objects, and have Knowledge of them by means of Images and Apparitions, or (which

(which is a better expreſſion, as being more General and Comprehenſive,) by *Sentiments* excited in the External Organs, through Impreſſions made upon them from Objects. *Imagination* is internal Senſe, or an (After) Repreſentation of the Images or Sentiments (that have been) excited before in the Senſe: This is the Baſis and Foundation of it; Compoſition, Diviſion, and Enlargement of Images, is but Acceſſory, but Superſtructure, and an Improvement of Senſe. *Reaſon* or Underſtanding, is a faculty by which we know External Objects, as well as our own Acts, without framing Images of them; ; only by *Ideas* or Notions. In ſhort, *Senſation*, properly, is Imagination, for every Senſe Imagines; and that, which commonly is called *Imagination*, is but Remembrance, or Recollection of Senſation. Imagination, is *Repetition* of Senſation made from within, Senſation, is Imagination occaſioned by immediate Impreſſions from without us. *Reaſon* or Underſtanding, is refined, Sublimated Senſation, that is, a conſcious preception of things by *Notions* or Ideas, and not by Images, or ſenſible Repreſentations. And thus, *all* the cogitative powers that are in Man, may be reduced to *Two*, to *Senſe* and *Reaſon*; the former comprehending the Imagination, which is but

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the power of Remembring Senſations, and of Amplifying them; and the Letter comprehending Intellectual Remembrance, which is only a recollection of Ideas or Notions.

But to make a Reflection of more light, it may be minded, that when we look on a *Book*, (to Inſtance in a thing that is next to hand,) and read any *Sentence* in it, as this, *God is a Spirit*, we have at that time in our Eyes the *Figures* of the *Letters* that compoſe the Words, and ſo do know by *them*, what the words are; and this is *Senſe*. But if putting aſide the Book we will endeavour to *Recollect* thoſe words, we muſt do it one of *two* ways; *either* by Retrieving in our thoughts the very Figures and Imagies of the Letters and Words before preſented to our Eyes; or (which we oftneſt do) by recalling the Words and Sentence, and ſaying to our ſelves, or unto others, *God is a Spirit*, without thinking in the leaſt, of any Figures of the Letters that do make the Words, or of the Images of the Words that compoſe the Sentence. In the former we do *Imagine* the Sentence, as raiſing again the Images of the Words that make it, and this is *Senſible* Remembrance; but in the latter, though, when we Recollect the Sentence, we muſt withal (ſome way

or

or other) mind again the words that compoſe it, yet we do it *without* Imagining them, and this is *Intellectual* Remembrance, or the act of the Reaſon. Add, that at the ſame time that we do ſee the Schemes and Figures of the Letters, and have the portraictures and draughts of the words preſented to our Eyes, which is *Senſe*, we have, or may have, in our minds the ſenſe and meaning of thoſe words, of which ſenſe or meaning however, we have neither Picture or Figure ; and this is *Underſtanding*: In the former we have *Images*, in the latter only *Ideas* ; we *See* the words, but underſtand the meaning This power of the Mind, (of perceiving without Imagining,) is called *Reaſon*, becauſe in thoſe Acts in which it does converſe with things by means of words (and thoſe are moſt of the Acts exerted by it) the ſenſe and meaning of the words is (as it were) Inferred and Reaſoned from them. What I have ſaid, ſuffices to make the Notion or Idea of Reaſon or Underſtanding conceivable, by men who uſe Attention, and do *think*, but nothing will be enough to explicate and ſet it out to ſuch as cannot endure that trouble, but will ſwallow all things without chewing.

SECT. II.

SECT. II.

Of Reaſon as taken for Contrivance, Contrivance, what, Sagacity what. Reaſon taken but for Contrivance, not Characteriſtical to Man. Of the Imaginative Contrivance in Irrational Animals. An Inſtance of it in a certain Hen. Apprehenſion, Compoſition, Illation, Acts of the Imagination, as well as of the Reaſon or Underſtanding. Compoſition of Phantaſms, how Illuſtrated by Mr. Hobbs. *That Reaſon taken for the Underſtanding (in the Notion of Underſtanding ſetled before) agrees to no other Animal but Man. Of Prince* Maurices *Parrot. The Acts of Reaſon as taken for the Underſtanding, reduced to two, to wit, Apprehenſion and Judgment.*

I Know very well, that moſt Men, and even moſt Philoſophers do take Reaſon but for *Contrivance*, or for *Diſcourſe*, which is a ſort of Contrivance; and that Contrivance (a dexterity in which they call *Sagacity*,) is a thinking upon means to compaſs and attain ends; as firſt upon the neareſt means, then upon the means to that, and ſo on till all the neceſſary means are thought upon. But thoſe who think

think ſo, (to wit, that Reaſon is nothing but Contrivance,) can never evidence that Reaſon is the Character or ſole Prerogative of Man, (which yet it is commonly belived, and ſaid to be;) ſince there is Imaginative, as well as Intellectual Contrivance, and Imaginative Contrivance muſt be owned to belong to Inferior Animals, as well as to Men. My meaning is, that other Animals beſides Men, and below them too, have a faculty or power by which, after a ſort, they do conceive the next means (though not under the Notion of a Means) to what they would have, and then the means to that, and ſo by a train of Phantaſms, go on till they have found enough for compaſſing the thing which they deſire and proſecute. I have ſeen an *Hen* whoſe Chicken ran from her through a little hole that was in a Gate, through which ſhe could not follow them, into a Court Inviorned with a very high Wall, that being in a paſſion to come to them, firſt ſhe looks to ſee if ſhe could fly to the top of the Wall, which was the neareſt way and means, but upon Trial finding that unfeaſible, and ſpying at ſome diſtance a Pent-Houſe, from which ſhe was able to gain it, away ſhe flies to That; though it was to go farther than before from her Chickens, and conſequently, no ways

ways for her purpoſe, but as it was a means to reach the top of the Wall, which was the neareſt means to get to them: Thus did this *Hen* contrive for her purpoſes.

The Inſtance I have given is a ſmall one, and in a Creature not remarkable as many others are for Acts of *Sagacity*; it is not an Inſtance in the Elephant, in the Caſtor, the Fox, the Dog, or ſuch other ſubtle Animals; and yet an Inſtance ſerving well enough for my deſign, which is to ſhew, that Reaſon which is proper and Characteriſtical to Man, is not meer Contrivance or Diſcouſe. For this it plainly ſheweth, ſince it manifeſts, that Inferiour ſenſitive Creatures are Contriving and Diſcurſive, and capable of making network of their Sentiments and Fantoms; and withal (manifeſts) that Apprehenſion, Compoſition and Illation are in ſome ſort, as well the Acts of the Imagination, which is common to all ſenſitives, as of the Underſtanding and Reaſon, which is peculiar to men. More, and Nobler Examples may be had in *Rorarius*, and in others of the Moderns; and in *Cicero l. 2. De Natura Deorum*, for the Ancients.

The way how Phantaſms are compounded by the Imagination, is prettily, though perhaps not adequately, Illuſtrated by

by M. *Hobbs*, in a Similitude taken from Water; 'Water (ſays he) when moved 'at once by divers movements, receiveth 'one motion compounded of them all; ſo 'it is in the Brain or Spirits ſtirred by di-'vers objects; there is compoſed an Ima-'gination of divers conceptions; that ap-'peared ſingle to the Senſe. As Senſe at 'one time ſheweth the Figure of a Moun-'tain, at another of Gold, and the Ima-'gination afterwards compoſes them in a 'Golden Mountain.

But without determining that Images are compounded in the Imagination, juſt the ſame way as Mr. *Hobbs* has repreſent-ed, this is certain, a compoſition of them there is, and contrivance too in that com-poſition; and this as well in Animals that are called Irrational, as in Men, who may, in ſome meaſure, gueſs at the latitude and extend thereof in other Animals, by what they find in themſelves, in common *Dreams*.

But whatever Contrivence (that Re-ſembles Reaſoning) ſuch Animals as are called Irrational may have, certain it is, that Reaſon taken for the Underſtanding, as the Underſtanding is a power of perceiving without Imagining, cannot be evi-denced to be in them; they may Imagine, and by force of Imagination, after a ſort Contrive,

Contrive, but it cannot be ſhewed that they Underſtand, or that they do Contrive the ſame way that men do, who do it by vertue of their Underſtanding. The Contrivance (and conſequently the Diſcourſe) of Irrational Animals, is a pure Effect of Senſe and Imagination, and performed only by the *Sequel* of Images, which Sequels is not properly Illation made by way of Judgment, but as (in effects of the Plaſtick) the Images follow one another by means of their *Congruity*; or of ſome other Antecedent connexion; wherein the Memory, which is the Exchequer or common Treaſury of all Senſations, and the diſpoſition and order of Images in it, ſerves to good purpoſe. Such *Animals*, as they have not that uſe of *words* that Men have (of which hereafter,) ſo they have not that Power of Underſtanding which is termed *Judicative*; a power that ſo Eſtimates, and Weighs and Ballances Things, and their proportions one to another, by Comparing and Conferring them, that accordingly it pronounces upon them; *This* is *That*, or, *This* is not *That*, and *This* is *Such*, or, *This* is not *Such*; Which *Sentences* ſo pronounced, are called *Propoſitions*, or Enunciations, and are, really, *Judgments*. Whence it follows, that the ſo much talkt of *Syllogiſme* of Hounds, (for

ſo *Reiſch* in his *Margarita Philoſophica* calls it, when he ſays, *In bivio, feram alterâ declinaſſe parte* Sillogizant *canes*,) is meer fallacy; the *Hare* is gone either this way or that way, he ſmells out the minor with his noſe, he is not gone this way, and therefore concluding he is gone the other, doth with open mouth run that way, without his putting Noſe to ground. All this is but Senſation, and following of the *Scent*, without any thing of Enunciation or Judgment; there is nothing of *Propoſitions*, *Major*, *Minor*, or *Concluſion*, in the caſe: The Hound perhaps does put his Noſe at firſt where the Scent is not, and not finding it, turns another way, where it happens to be, ſo that upon turning being preſently ſtruck with the Scent, he follows it, with an out-cry; without putting of his Noſe to the ground, to ſeek for what he has found already.

I confeſs, the ſtory of Prince *Maurice* his Parrot is ſtupendious, and if no Illuſion was in it, as none Appears; or that it was not an Effect of Witchcraft, which I moſt ſuſpect, (the Country of *Braſil* in which it was Acted, (as all the *Indies*) having many Diabolical Agents, that work by Magick;) I ſhould think it a very *Croſs* Inſtance to my former Diſcourſe. But conſidering it, as I do, only as an Effect

fect of Diabolical power, I put it in the number of the Extraordinary Events, with the Tricks of the *Divining Ape* which Mr. *Terry* writes of, in his Relation of a Voyage into the East-Indies; and then it may not be drawn into Argument. However, that thinking men may have an Occasion to employ their Thoughts, and to make an Impartial Judgment, I will tell the story as I find it in Sir *William Temples* Memoirs p. 57. Ed. 2. in his own Words, together with the Reflexion he makes.

" With the Prince of *Orange* (says he) " returned most of the General Officers to " the *Hague*, and among the rest Old " Prince *Maurice* of *Nassaw*, who, as the " Prince told me, had with the greatest in- " dustry that could be, sought all occasions " of dying fairly at the Battle of *Seneffe* " without succeeding, which had given " him great regrets; and I did not won- " der at it, considering his age of about " Seventy Six, and his long habits both " of Gout and Stone. When he came to " visit me upon his return and before he " went to his Government of *Cleve*, it came " in my head to ask him an idle question, " because I thought it not very likely for " me to see him again, and I had a mind " to Kown from his own Mouth the Ac- " count of a common but much credited

" ſtory, that I had heard ſo often from
" many others of an old Parrot he had in
" *Braſil* during his Government there,
" that ſpoke, and asked, and anſwered,
" common queſtions like a Reaſonable
" Cteature; ſo that thoſe of his train
" there, generally concluded it to be
" Witchery or Poſſeſſion; and one of the
" Chaplains, who lived long after-
" wards in *Holland* would never from that
" time endure a Parrot, but ſaid they all
" had a Devil in them. I had heard many
" particulars of this Story, and aſſevered
" by People hard to be Diſcredited, which
" made me ask Prince *Maurice* what there
" was of it. He ſaid with his uſual plain-
" neſs and dryneſs in talk, there was ſome-
" thing true, but a great deal falſe, of
" what had been reported. I deſired to
" Know of him, what there was of the
" firſt, he told me ſhort and coldly, that
" he had heard of ſuch an old Parrot when
" he came to *Braſil*; and though he be-
" lieved nothing of it, and it was a good
" way off, yet he had ſo much curioſity as
" as to ſend for it; that it was a very great
" and a very old one; and when it came
" firſt into the room where the Prince was
" with a great many Dutchmen about
" him, it ſaid preſently, *What a company*
" *of White men are here?* They askt it what

" he

" he thought that Man was? pointing at
" at the Prince. It anſwered, *Some Gene-*
" *ral or other.* When they brought it cloſe
" to him, he askt it, *Dou venes, vous?*
" [Whence come you?] It anſwered, *De*
" Marinnan. [From *Marinnan.* The
" Prince, *A qui eſt es vous?* [To whom
" do you belong?] The Parrot, *A un Por-*
" *tugez.* [To a Portugez.] Prince *Que*
" *fais tula?* [What do you there?] Par-
" rot, *Je garde les poulles.* [I look after
" the Chickens?] The Prince laughed
" and ſaid, *Vous gardes les poulles?* [You
" look after the Chickens?] The Parrot
" anſwered. *Ouy moy & je Scay bien faire,*
" [yes, I, and I know well enough how to
" do it.] And make the Chuck four or five
" times that people uſe to make to Chick-
" ens when they call them. I ſet down the
" words of this worthy Dialogue in
" French, juſt as Prince *Maurice* ſaid them
" to me. I asked him in what Language
" the Parrot ſpoke? And he ſaid in Bra-
" ſilian. I asked whether he underſtood
" Braſilian? He ſaid, no, but he had taken
" care to have two Interpreters by him,
" one a Dutch-man that ſpoke Briſilian,
" and the other a Briſilian that ſpoke
" Dutch; that he asked them ſeparately
" and privately, and both of them agreed
" in telling him juſt the ſame thing

"that the Parrot ſaid. I could not (ſays "Sir *William*) but tell this odd Story, be- "becauſe it is ſo much out of the way, and "from the firſt hand, and what may paſs "for a good one; for I dare ſay this Prince "at leaſt believed himſelf in all he told "me, having ever paſſed for a very honeſt "and pious man. I leave it to Naturaliſts "to reaſon, and to other men to believe as "they pleaſe upon it.

Thus that excellent Perſon. But to return, (for indeed, what I have ſaid in this Section is a Kind of Digreſſion, as being more proper for another place.)

The Acts of Reaſon (taking Reaſon for the Underſtanding) may be aptly enough reduced to two, to wit, *Apprehenſion* and *Judgment*: to the latter of which that diſpoſition of our Conceptions into order and method, which commonly is called *Ordinative Diſcourſe*, as alſo Argumentation and Deduction, which is termed *Illative*, and hath the name of *Reaſoning* appropriated to it, do (both) belong, as *Inſtruments* and *Means*.

CHAP.

CHAP. II. *Of Apprehenſion.*

SECT. I.

Apprehenſion, the firſt Act of Reaſon. Of Words, the ordinary Means of Apprehenſion. The Ends and Uſes of Words, 1. To diſtinguiſh things as they are in the Mind, in which, words do ſtand for things. Why Mind is called Underſtanding. 2. To expreſs our Thoughts and Conceptions one to another. The Importance of Words unto Knowledge, in this ſecond Uſe of them. Of the Senſe of Words. Of Canting. All Uſe of New Words, not Canting. The Senſe of Words twofold; Verbal, and Reall. This diſtinction of the Senſes of Words Illuſtrated, and the Uſefulneſs thereof explained. Why the Meaning of Words is called Senſe.

Apprehenſion, or that Act of the Reaſon or Underſtanding, in reſpect of which it is ſaid to ſee or perceive things, is the ſame in reference to this faculty, that ſeeing is unto the Eye: for the mind to apprehend, perceive, or know any Object, is the ſame (to ſpeak by way of alluſion and ſimilitude) as for the Eye to ſee, or diſcern one.

What I have ſaid in the former *Chapter*, does caſt ſome Light on this Subject; but yet to ſet it out more fully, I will conſider, *Firſt*, the Ordinary Means the Underſtanding uſes in its Acts of Apprehenſion, and thoſe are Words. *Secondly*, The immediate Object of Apprehenſion, and that is Notion, or Intellectual Sentiment; Sentiment of the Mind. *Thirdly*, The two chief Affections of Apprehenſion, and thoſe are clearneſs and diſtinctneſs; of which three conſiderations; the Second properly is a Subject of Metaphyſicks; the Third of Logick; and the Firſt is common to both.

Apprehenſion properly and primarily is of things, as things are taken largely, for (external) Objects of the Mind. By an (external) Object of the Mind, I mean whatever any wiſe is without, and thought upon by it. Now, the mind may think upon Objects, two ways. *Firſt*, it may think upon them nakedly and abſtractly, as they are in themſelves, (without conſidering them as marked and diſtinguiſhed by Words, or any other Characters and Notes, that ſhould betoken or ſignifie them,) only by having the *Idea* or notion of them. And this is to apprehend an Object *immmediately*. For example, without conſidering of the *Word* [whiteneſs,] or having the leaſt thought of it, one may conſider

conſider the *Image* of Whiteneſs, as it doth appear in Snow, in Paper, or on a White wall. But *Secondly*, the mind may alſo think of things, and conſider them by *means* of Words, that ſignifie them; as when having in our thoughts the word [whiteneſs], we do not think of the thing or Image, but under that word, which ſtands for it; or perhaps do think and ſpeak of whiteneſs, without having the Image of whiteneſs at all; for both *ways* we may think of things by means of words, ſince words may be uſed to call the Images or Notions of things into our minds, for elſe themſelves may ſtand in our minds for theſe Images or Notions, and ſo may be diſcourſed of, or uſed in the Diſcourſe of other things. This Inſtance I acknowledge is an Imaginative Apprehenſion; and I uſe it rather than another that is Intellectual, becauſe the Underſtanding in its Acts of Apprehenſion, if not always, doth very often, ſummon in the aid of the Imagination; as alſo, becauſe it ſerves well enough to manifeſt my meaning; which, in ſhort, is, that the mind may think on things either immediately, without the help of words; or *mediately* by means of them.

Words are the Names of things, and of the Notions, Thoughts and Conceptions that we have of things. *Names* are Articulate

culate Sounds, appointed to ſignifie things and Notions.

All Articulations of Sounds, all Voices (for Articulations of Sound are call'd *Voices*) tho they be, or may, by compoſition and conjugation, be multiplied, almoſt to infinity, yet they are reducible within the compaſs of the Alphabet, and can be expreſſed by the four and twenty Letters, in their Combination; which certainly was an excellent Invention, and full of Admiration. For Words, as properly they are but Sounds, ſo, as Sounds they could not be ſpoken, and conſequently could not ſignifie, but unto perſons that are preſent, and within hearing, and to them too but for the preſent. Whereas by means of *Letters*, becoming capable of being permanent and fix'd in *Writing*, they become communicable, both to thoſe that are preſent, and to thoſe that are abſent; even to the moſt remote, in time, and place. *Again*, Since *Writing* is a repreſentation of our Words, as, Words of our Conceptions and Thoughts; ſo that Writings do ſignifie, and ſtand for, our Words, as Words do ſignifie, and ſtand for, our Thoughts; therefore when I do diſcourſe of Words, I would be underſtood to diſcourſe of thoſe that are written, as well as of thoſe that are ſpoken. And *in fine*, ſince thoughts

may

may be signified by gestures and other Signs, as well as by Words; (for there are *three* ways of discourſing, or communicating of thoughts; to wit, by *Words*, by *Writing*, and by meer *Signs* and *Geſtures*;) therefore what I ſay of *Words* muſt be taken as intended to be equally meant, *mutatis mutandis*, of Geſtures and other Signs (ſo far as they are uſed to ſignify our thoughts) as well as of words themſelves.

The *Uſes* of words are divers. The *Firſt*, to be as ſo many marks and tokens upon things, to ſignifie and ſhow them; ſo that every man may be able to know them again in his own mind, and to diſtinguiſh and diſcern them in it.

For the clearing of this uſe, it muſt be conſidered, that the Underſtanding hath not of its own, (as the Imagination hath) any *proper Images*, any Figures of the things it converſes with, whereby to know or diſtinguiſh them; the only Images it has of things (beſides thoſe of the *Senſe*, or the Imagination) are the *Words* which ſignify them; which do ſtand therein for the very things themſelves. For to give an Example; There is no ſuch thing in the Underſtanding as an Image, or ſenſible Figure, of *Subſtance*, or of mind, or of matter, or of colour in general, as there is in the ſenſe, or imagination of white, of black, of red,

of

of green, or of other particular Colours: The *only* Images it has of theſe, and of all things elſe that are purely intelligible and mental, are the *Words* that ſignify them: Ay, the very *Ideas* the Underſtanding hath of things, are nothing but its definitive conceptions of them, or *definitions*; and definitions as properly they are of *Words* (which *Words* ſince they ſtand in the mind for things, are commonly miſtaken for, and conſequently miſcalled, *Simple Ideas* of theſe things;) ſo they are made by words. To ſuch a degree, in this reſpect, are words of uſe to the underſtanding, which cannot work without them; a thing ſo certain, that even the *denomination* it ſelf of [*underſtanding*] at leaſt in part, ariſes from hence; for the *Mind* is called (the) Underſtanding, becauſe it has a power of ſeeing things *under* Words that *ſtand* for them; as well as becauſe it has one of perceiving Subſtances under Accidents; and had Beaſts this power, they would come but little ſhort of men, as to Acts of mind.

But beſides this uſe, (which is more private and particular, an uſe that every man muſt have of Words for himſelf) there is a *Second*, an uſe that men have of them one for another? to wit, mutually to expreſs their Sentiments and Thoughts; in reſpect of which, words are ſaid to be as *Mony*: the

the meaning is, That words uſed to convey our minds to others, muſt be ſuch as are current, and in uſe, or elſe they will not paſs.

Speech or Language (the cloathing of our Sentiments and Thoughts in Words) is, in reſpect of *both* the mentioned uſes, eſpecially the latter, of ſo much moment to *Reaſon* (taken for Diſcourſe, or Contrivance at large; that ſome have conceited, that men are little beholding to any thing elſe but the *former*, for that degree of the *Latter*, that doth divide and diſtinguiſh them from Beaſts. Reaſon in their Opinion, in the Seeds and principles of it, being but as a Spark, which in men, by the advantage of Speech, becomes improved and blown into ſuch a flame as has engroſſed the Title; ſo that tho the ſame Principles of Reaſon are common to all Animals, yet this *Improvement* of them (that only carries the Name) is proper to man, becauſe Speech is. And in truth, by means of Speech, or communication of Sentiments and Thoughts, as one man becomes aſſiſted and aided by another; ſo if we do add *Writing* and *Printing*, which are but Fixations of Speech, it may be ſaid, that every man is aſſiſted and aided with the Sentiments and thoughts of all; and how much help this may bring toward the improving

proving of Reaſon, is nothing hard to be conceived by one that ſhall conſider the great advantage a Conſult has, for the ripening of Buſineſs, or making a judgment upon things, above the reaſoning of any one particular ſolitary perſon; or hath obſerved the difference that Cultivation and Savagenes, do make, in men. Should one permit himſelf to imagine that Elephants, Caſtors, Dogs, Foxes, and other ſagacious Animals, which can contrive and do ſo much ſingly, (as we find by experience they can, and do) ſhould have the united Ingeny of their ſeveral Kinds; it would be hard for him to ſay, to what they might not improve, or to diſtinguiſh the near approaches that they would make to what commonly is called Reaſon, from the real uſe and enjoyment of it. Eſpecially if he alſo conſider, that Savage wild men, who want the benefit of Education, and of large Converſe; ſo that tho they have the uſe of *Speech*, yet they receive not this advantage by it, do very little excel ſuch Animals, but come infinitely ſhort of civilized and well bred men; who living in great Societies, have all the furtherance that aid and mutual aſſiſtance can give unto them.

Some in regard of the former uſe that *Words* have, do call them *Notes*, or Marks;

and

and in reſpect of the latter, term them *Signs*; but in truth, in referenc to both their Uſes, Words are *Signs*, ſince, in both, they do ſignifie, either to ones ſelf, as in the firſt uſe, or unto others, as in the ſecond. Words are *Signs*, but *Signs* that ſignifie but by agreement, conſent, and Inſtitution: For ſhould any do it by *Nature*, the Language that conſiſted of them would be univerſal, ſpoken and underſtood of all, which none is: ſo that the way of tryal in *Herodotus*, of the moſt Ancient Language, was as ill grounded, as the Diſcovery made by it ridiculous. 'Tis true, *Jacob Behman* talks of a *Language* of *Nature*, but I think he rather intended by it the *Language* of *Signatures*, than that of Words; ſince the *Language* of *Signatures*, if underſtood, may be interpreted (as he affirms his *Language* of *Nature* may) in *Hebrew*, *Greek*, *Latin*, *Dutch*, *Engliſh*, or any other vernacular Tongue: And in this ſenſe too, That *Adam* underſtood the *Language* of *Nature* (as he ſays he did) was a truth, and perhaps implied in the Hiſtory, which tells us, That *whatſoever* Adam *called every living Creature, that was the Name thereof.* But tho this may be, as he ſays, yet I cannot believe that That is ſo which he adds, That *Adam* had the Gift [of underſtanding the *Languages* of *Nature*] which was loſt by

hi

his Fall, reſtor'd to him by his Regeneration: For that the New Birth, that conſiſts in renovation of the Mind, after the Image of God in Chriſt, has any thing to do with *Philoſophy*, or the Knowledge of Nature, is a conceit that cannot enter into my thoughts: I do not find in the Holy-Scriptures, which can give us any certainty herein, that our Saviour Chriſt himſelf did teach, or that his Apoſtles and firſt followers did profeſs, Philoſophy and Science of Nature. But enough (if not too much) in this place, of the Language of *Nature*, ſince here we are to ſpeak of the Language of men, and the Language of men is words, which are not natural but only inſtituted and impoſed, ſigns.

The uſe of words of uſual and current ſignification is called *ſpeaking*; the uſe either of uncurrent *Fictitious* words, or of current words *abuſed* from their uſual common ſignification, to a private particular meaning, is called *canting*. Of the former ſort of canting *Baſilides*, *Valentinus*, and all the *Gnoſticks*, in Theology; *Paracelſus*, *Van-Helmont*, and all the *Chymiſts* generally, with many others, in *Philoſophy* and *Medicine*, are not only common, but juſtly noted, Examples. Not that the uſe of every *new* Word is canting, or that we need be as nice as *C. Cæſar* in *Aulus Gellius*, and

and avoid a new word, tho neceſſary to expreſs our meaning, as we would *Charybdis*, or *Scylla*. Words are but the cloathing of Thoughts, and therefore muſt be made and fitted to them; and if we keep (as near as conveniently we can) to the ordinary Rules and Laws of Speaking, the making of new Words, when none, or none ſo apt, are ſtampt already, to ſignifie our Sentiments, is a practice that calls for imitation, ſince *Cicero* himſelf has ſet us a *Copy*; many of the Words that now enrich the *Roman* Language, and do make it ſo expreſſive, were Innovations of his: And *Epicurus* did ſo before him: For, (as *Cicero* tells us, *l.* 1. *de Nat: Deorum*) he either invented, or firſt applied the Word προλήψις; *Sunt*, ſays *Cicero*, *rebus novis, nova ponenda nomina, ut Epicurus, ipſe* πρόληψιν *appellavit, quam antea nemo eo verbo nominarat.*

The *Eſſence* of Words, if words are taken, not materially, only for Articulate Sounds, but formally; for Articulate Sounds as they are *Signs*, do lie in their *ſignification*; and their *ſignification*, (or that which is ſignified by them) has the Name of *ſenſe* or *meaning*.

The *ſenſe* or *meaning* of words (the want whereof we call *Nonſenſe*) is two fold; the *ſenſe* and *meaning* of words in reference to

our common ordinary *Conceptions*; and the *ſenſe* and *meaning* of words in reference to the *things* expreſſed and ſignified by them: The former may be term'd *Verbal*, the latter *real ſenſe*; or (perhaps to ſpeak more properly,) the former may be called the *ſenſe* or *meaning* of the words, the latter the *conception*, the *notion*, or the *Idea* of the *Thing*. Should a *Roman Catholick* tell me he means by *Tranſubſtantiation*, that a real and ſubſtantial mutation of the Elements of Bread and Wine is made in the Holy *Sacrament*, into the very Body and Blood of Chriſt, but yet ſo, that notwithſtanding this mutation, the *Species* or Accidents of Bread and Wine do ſtill remain to affect our ſenſes: 'Tis poſſible I may conceive the ſenſe and meaning of the ſeveral words he uſes, and alſo apprehend what it is he would have me believe, when yet at the ſame time, I cannot apprehend that ſuch a thing can really be, ſince I ſee a plain contradiction it ſhould; it being equally impoſſible to make a *Conception*; (that is, to frame a coherent conſiſtent Notion or Idea) of the thing he means, and make all the parts of it to hang together, as to make *one* of a circular *ſquare*, or of a Triangular *Circle*. *Ecquem*, ſays *Cotta* in *Cicero*, *l.* 3. *de Nat. Deorum pag.* 129. *tam amentem eſſe putas, qui illud, quo Veſcatur, deum credat eſſe?*

A *Diſtinction* then there is (and that a remarkable one too) between the verbal, and real, meaning of words; which to ſet out more fully, I will ſhow, *Firſt*, The the Occaſion, and Riſe of it, and then *Secondly*, The Uſe and Benefit of it.

Firſt then, this diſtinction *Ariſes* from the Imperfection and Inadequacy of Human Knowledge; we Knowing little of things but under words, and words being (immediately) the ſigns but, of our Conceptions, which are always ſhort and narrow, and, too often, indiſtinct and confuſed. Now if the ſentiments we have according to the Vulgar and Ordinary way of conceiving, which is but general and confuſed, do cohere and hang together, when one of them is affirmed or ſpoken of another, ſo that the Notions are compoſſible in common acceptation, we *call* it ſenſe, though really the things themſelves (for which thoſe words are underſtood to ſtand) be Incompoſſible, and repugnant each to other, and therefore *indeed* it is Nonſenſe. This is to be better underſtood in Examples. Such *Propoſitions* as theſe, that *Colours* (even as to their Images) are in the Objects in which they do appear; that *Odours* are in the things ſmelled; that *Sapors* are in the things that are taſted; theſe and the like Aſſertions are not com-

monly underſtood, or ſaid, to be Nonſenſe, becauſe, Knowing in the general and confuſedly, what is meant by colour, what by Odor, and what by *Sapor*, as likewiſe what is meant by the thing ſeen, by the thing that is taſted, and by the thing which is ſmelled; nothing appears in thoſe confuſed general Notions (which we have,) to hinder us from thinking that Colours, Sapors, and Odours do as really Inhere in thoſe external objects, as they ſeem to do. And yet to a Perſon that hath diſtinct, real, and juſt conceptions of the ſeveral ſubjects and predicates in thoſe propoſitions, it is evident, that 'tis as groſs and palpable *Nonſenſe* to affirm that Colours, Sapors, Odours, and other Accidents, (which are but *Phænomena* and Intentional beings) do really exiſt in the Subjects where they ſeem to be, as to ſay, that there are Notions and Cogitations in a Wall, in a Figg, or in a Roſe, than which there cannot be a greater Bull or abſurdity.

The *Uſefulneſs* of this diſtinction, is greater than moſt will think; ſince from the want of making, or of obſerving it, it comes to paſs, that ſo many do run into great miſtakes and errours, in their diſcourſes; *Do* skirmiſh one with another, to no purpoſe, and without end; and often

ten *do* differ from themſelves, as much as each from other. For few there are that do fix and ſettle even the verbal Senſe of words, (which often have a doubleneſs of meaning, and then are called *Ambiguous*;) and fewer that do think of the real, without which yet, they can never come to any certainty; ſo that, (as Mr. *Hobbs* has ingeniouſly ſaid; words that are Wiſe Mens *Counters*, become Fools *Mony*.

The meaning of words, as well the verbal, as the real, is called *Senſe*, becauſe the Perception of it ought to be as *Clear*, and diſtinct, and as ſteady and fixt, as that of Senſe is: For words, to be underſtood as they ought, muſt have their meanings be as clearly and diſtinctly perceived, by the mind, as objects of Senſe when they are Seen, or Heard, or Taſted, or Smelled, are by the Senſes.

SECT. II.

All Falſity is not Nonſenſe; but all impoſſible Falſity is. Repugnance in the mind to yield aſſent to propoſitions that are Nonſence. Whence it ariſes. Of Enthuſiaſm, as it is a Kind of Nonſence. What Enthuſiaſm is. The diſtributions of it. Examples of the ſeveral Kinds of Enthuſiaſm, out of Dr. Fludd, *and in the Magick Aphoriſms of the* Roſy-cruſians. *That Enthuſiaſts when they ſeem to underſtand one another, do ſo by Sympathy only, and not by way of Apprehenſion and Judgment. How this may be, ſet out in a ſtory very Remarkable.*

I Have ſpoken of Senſe and Nonſenſe in the general; but toward a further clearing of the Notions of them, and eſpecially that of the latter, it muſt be obſerved, that falſity and Nonſence are not Synonimous terms; For all *Falſity* is not Nonſenſe, that is, every Propoſition that is falſe, is not alſo Nonſenſical; for many things are *poſſible*, that are not *Actual*; and therefore many propoſitions that are not actually true, might have been, or may hereafter be ſo; and as what is true, is

Senſe

Senſe, ſo Senſe is *compoſſibility*, not actuality; not that only which at preſent is true, but whatever is any wiſe poſſible to be ſo But though all Falſity is not Nonſenſe; all *impoſſible* Falſity is. I mean, every propoſition is Nonſenſe, that is falſe to that degree, that it is impoſſible (abſolutely impoſſible) it ſhould be true; for no propoſition is abſolutely impoſſible to be true but that which implies contradiction, and that which implies a contradiction muſt needs be Nonſenſe; ſince the Underſtanding cannot frame any Notion or Idea of it, and ſo cannot make any real ſenſe of the words, that compoſe it. Contradiction in *Terms* is plain or groſs Nonſenſe, (called a *Bull* in Engliſh, or an Abſurdity;) and where the terms in common acceptation are not Contradictory, yet if the thing they are deſigned to expreſs do really imply a Contradiction, the propoſitions, though Verbal Senſe, are really Nonſenſe; as in the Inſtances above.

Obſerve again, that there is in the mind a certain ſenſible *Reluctance* to give aſſent to Propoſitions that are Incongruous, and really Nonſenſical; for whoever Attends to what does paſs within himſelf, will be Conſcious of a *Pain* (as it were of diſlocation) upon a ſerious predication of Abſtracts one of another; as when he ſays, good-

neſs is Juſtice; or of Contraries, as when he affirms, love is hatred, and the like in other Inſtances. The *Reaſon* is plain. For as this is to ſay, that one thing is another, ſo he that ſays that one thing is another, ſays alſo, that neither is it ſelf, that is, ſays a Contradiction, and a Contradiction (whither explicite or implicite,) being Affirmation and Negation of the ſame thing, and conſequently an Aſſent and Diſſent at the ſame time, and Aſſent and Diſſent being contrary Motions, or Modifications, it follows, that to ſay, or go about to Aſſent unto, a Contradiction, is to *diſtract* and diſtort the mind, and put it to pain, becauſe it is to draw it contrary ways at the ſame time.

Nonſenſe in perſons who pretend to ſupernatural Aſſiſtances, may be called *Enthuſiaſm*. *Enthuſiaſm* properly, is a falſe conceit of being inſpired; to be *inſpired*, is to receive immediate motions and inſtincts from the Spirit of God; the perſon that has this falſe conceit of his being immediately Inſtincted, and moved by the Spirit of God, is called an *Enthuſiaſt*. A perſon may be an *Enthuſiaſt* as well in matters of *Philoſophy*, as in thoſe of *Divinity*, and many Examples there are of both ſorts of Enthuſiaſts, ſome of which I have touched before; but I forbear to ſay any

more

more of them now, in reference to their *Original*, or the *Quality* and *Cauſes* of their Diſtemper, *&c.* Since now, it is not my buſineſs to treat of *Enthuſiaſm*, and to ſet out the *Nature* of it, under the Notion of an *Imaginary Inſpiration*, ſo much as to ſpeak of the *Language* of *Enthuſiaſts*, which uſually is Nonſenſe.

And of this I find a full Example in Dr. *Fludd*, in the third Book of his *Moſaick* Philoſophy, the firſt Section and fourth Chapter, when having cited the Seventh Chapter of the the Book of *Wiſdom*, the 25th, verſe. He infers in theſe terms, 'So that we may diſcern by this 'Diſcription of the Wiſe Man, what is 'the Spiritual Chriſt, who is the Wiſdom, 'Vertue, and word of God, and how by 'his Apparition out of Darkneſs, that is, 'by the mutation or change of the firſt 'principle, (which was in Darkneſs, *Quaſi verbum in Principio*,) from Dark Aleph 'to Light Aleph, the Waters which were 'contained in the profound Bowels of the 'Abyſs were revealed, and were anima-'ted, that is to ſay, by the emanation or 'emiſſion of this ſelf ſame Spirit of Eternal 'Fire or Light, and afterward by his ad-'mirable activity, and reſtleſs motion and 'penetration (for by *Solomon* it is ſaid to 'be *Omnibus mobilibus mobilior*, &c. Sap. 7. 24.

'7. 24.) It firſt diſtinguiſheth and ſepa-
'rateth the Darkneſs from the Light, the
'obſcure and groſs Waters from the ſubtle
'and pure, and then it diſpoſeth the
'Heavens into Spherees; laſtly it di-
'videth the groſſer Waters into Sublunary
'Elements, as by the words of the firſt
'Chapter of *Geneſis* each Man may plainly
'diſcern.

This is a full Example, and yet in further entertainment of the Curious, and for more variety, I will add another in the *Magick Aphoriſms*, (for ſo I find them called) of the *Brethren of the Roſy-Croſs*, which are as little capable of real Senſe (at leaſt in my Underſtanding,) as that I cited before from Dr. *Fludd*: And I will give them in the ſame Language in which I find them, without pretending to the skill of Tranſlating them exactly.

1. *Ante Omnia punctum extitit, non το ἄτομον aut Mathematicum, ſed diffuſivum, monas erat explicitè, implicitè myrias; lux erat & nox, Principium & finis Principii, omnia & nihil, eſt & non.*

2. *Commovet ſe monas in Diade, & per triadem egreſſæ ſunt facies luminis ſecundi.*

3. *Exivit ignis ſimplex, Increatus, eſt ſub aquis, induit ſe tegumento ignis multiplicis.*

4. *Reſpexit*

4. *Reſpexit ad fontem ſuperiorem & inferiorem, deducto typo, triplici vultu ſigillavit.*

5. *Creavit unum unitas, & in tria diſtinxit, trinitas eſt & Quaternarius nexus & medium reductionis.*

6. *Ex viſibilibus primum effulſit aqua, Fœmina incumbentis ignis, & figurabilium gravida mater.*

7. *Poroſa erat interius & corticibus varia, cujus venter habuit cœlos convolutos & aſtra indiſcreta.*

8. *Separatus artifex diviſit hanc in amplas regiones, & apparente fœtu diſparuit mater.*

9. *Peperit tamen mater filios lucidos, Influentes, in terram Chai.*

10. *Hi generant matrem in noviſſimis, cujus fons cantat in luco miraculoſo.*

11. *Sapientiæ condus eſt hic: eſto qui potes promus.*

12. *Pater eſt totius creati, & ex filio creato per vivam filii Analyſin pater generatur. Habes ſummum generantis circuli myſterium: filii filius eſt, qui filii pater fuit.*

This it ſeems is the *Roſycrucean Creed*, in which perhaps there may be much of deep myſtery and ſenſe; but for my part I can make none, that is real; and I believe that moſt

moſt of my Readers will be able to make of it as little as I; and therefore I have ſet it down as an Inſtance and Example of Nonſenſe, that Nonſenſe which I called Enthuſiaſm.

And here (ſince it may be demanded if ſuch *Enthuſiaſms* really are Nonſenſe, and conſequently unintelligible, how it comes to paſs that *Enthuſiaſts* do underſtand one another?) I conceive it fit to obſerve, that when *Enthuſiaſts* think, that they underſtand One Another (as in truth they profeſs to do, and this ſo ſeriouſly, that 'tis hard not to believe them to have ſome impreſſions common to them, which may ſupport their Profeſſion;) yet for as much as no ſober man, tho never ſo ſagacious or inquiſitive, can underſtand them, it muſt be reckon'd an effect of Sympathy, and not of *Intellectual Apprehenſion*; I mean, they underſtand one another not *judiciouſly*, by conceiving; that is, by framing clear and conſiſtent Notions of what is ſaid, but only *ſimpathetically*, by having, upon ſuch Expreſſions ſome Notions, and conſequent Thoughts, excited in them, that are conformable to theirs that uſe the Expreſſions: it being with *Enthuſiaſts*, who poſſeſs the ſame Frame and texture of mind, as with *uniſon Lutes*, or other *Inſtruments* fitly tuned; in which to touch one, is to affect and ſtir all within a convenient diſtance. To

To evidence how much conformity in Body and mind may ſignifie to that purpoſe I will make a relation of a very credible Story which I have read of *Twins*; who exactly reſembling each the other in all the Features and Lineaments of Body, and conſequently in Frame and Texture of mind, did alſo *ſimpath ze* to a wonder; ſo that being at great diſtance one from another, they would notwithſtanding be ſtirred with the ſame Affections and motions. The Story is to be found in a Book entituled, *Remarkable Antiquities of the City of* Exeter, *pag.* 42, 43.) and is this; *Henry* '*Tracy*, an Inhabitant of the City aforeſaid, 'had a numerous Iſſue, being the Father 'of eight Sons, and eight Daughters; the 'the Sixth and Seventh Sons were of one 'Birth *Twins*, and ſo well like in a all Li-'naments, and ſo equal in Stature, ſo co-'loured in Hair, and ſo like in Face and 'Geſtures, that they could not be known 'one from the other, no not by their 'Friends, Parents, Brothers or Siſters, but 'privately by ſome ſecret marks, and open-'ly by wearing ſome ſeveral coloured Rib-'bands alike, which in ſport they would 'ſometimes exchange to make tryal of their 'Friends Judgment; yet ſomewhat more 'ſtrange was, that their *Minds* and *Affecti-'ons* were *as one*, for what the one loved,

'the

'the other desired; and so on the contrary; 'the loathing of any thing by the *one*, was 'the distasting of the same thing by the o-'ther; yea, such a consideration, or in-'bred Power or Sympathy was in their na-'tures, that if *Nicholas* were sick or grie-'ved, *Andrew* felt the like pain, (tho' far *di-'stant* and remote in their persons, and that 'too, without any intelligence given to ei-'ther party;) and 'twas also observed that if '*Andrew* were merry, *Nicholas* was like-'wise so affected, altho' in different places 'which long they could not endure to be 'asunder; for they ever desired to eat, 'drink, sleep and walk together; yea, so 'they lived and died, for they both served 'the King in Arms against his *Barons*; and 'in a Battle, the one being slain, the other 'stept presently into his place; where in 'the height of danger (no perswasions able 'to remove or hinder him) was there like-'wise killed.

The like (if not the same Story I find reported by the *Author* of the Book, Entituled, *England's Worthies* in Church and State, Printed *London* 1684. (*pag.* 165.) who tells it in these Words: '*Nicholas* and '*Andrew Tremane* (says he) were Twins 'alike in all Lineaments, and felt like 'pain, tho at distance, and without any 'Intelligence given; they equally desired

'to

'to walk, travel, ſit, ſleep, eat and drink to-'gether. In this they differed, that at '*New-Haven* in *France*, the one was a Cap-'tain of Troop, the other but a Private 'Soldier; there they were both ſlain toge-'ther *Ann.* 1564.

Theſe (two, if two) Stories open a great light for the underſtanding the Sympathies and Conſents that are in the World of Nature, as well as in the World of men; but I think it not ſo proper to inſiſt any longer upon them at this time, ſince the very occaſion that I have taken of mentioning them here, is but incident, and indirect.

SECT. III.

Of Queſtions, their Nature, and their diſtribution. That a Queſtion is neither true, nor falſe; neither Affirmative, nor Negative. An Objection removed. That proceeding by way of Queſtion, or as it were of Inquiry, in Common Diſcourſe, is very uſeful, as well as Civil. Judgment required in putting Pertinent Queſtions.

AS Words when they are *joined* and put together; for Example, a Ver-

tuous

ruous Woman, an Excellent man, are called *Oration* or Speech; and if joined by way of Affirmation, or Negation, are called *Propoſitions*, and Propoſitions joined by a Conjunction, a *Compound* Propoſition; ſo a Propoſition when there is added to it a Sign of Interrogation is called a *Queſtion*. For Inſtance, Whether the *Baptiſm* of *John* is the ſame with *Chriſt's*? Whether the Heavens are ſolid? or Fluid? Whether the Sun is a Flame? Whether the Earth move? And ſince a Sign of Interrogation may be added to any Propoſition whatever, it follows, that Queſtions are of as many *kinds* as Propoſitions themſelves, in reſpect of their *Subſtance* and *quantity*; ſo that they are either *Simple*, or *Compound*; *Univerſal*, or *Particular*; *Indefinite*, or *Singular*. Only as to the *quality* of Propoſitions, as well the *Verbal*, (which is the Affirmation, or the Negation is in them,) as the *real*, (their verity, or falſity,) it muſt be owned, that Queſtions are not capable of the ſame diſtribution in reſpect of this, as Propoſitions are. For tho' *Propoſitions* may be divided into *true* and *falſe*, and into *Affirmative* and *Negative*, *Queſtions* cannot; ſince he who only asketh the Queſtion, whether a thing is ſo? or not ſo? neither affirmeth, nor denieth it to be; and he that neither affirmeth, nor denieth a thing to be, ſpeaks

nor

nor true nor falſe of it. And yet it muſt be confeſſed, that as a Queſtion may be *asked*, there may be implication of Affirmation, or Negation in it; ſo that in this regard a Queſtion may have the Denomination of being affirmative, or negative, accordingly as it is made: But this is but accident, and ariſes not from the *nature* of a Queſtion, nor belongs unto it as ſuch, but rather is contrary, and only ſprings from the *manner* of putting the Queſtion. I will give an Example in each: This *Queſtion*, Is not Jeſus Chriſt the Son of God? may be called *Affirmative*, becauſe, being made in that manner, it ſeems to imply, that he who puts it, would have the Anſwer to be, he is; and this is Jeſus Chriſt the Son of God? eſpecially as it is *toned* in pronouncing, may be termed a *Negative* Queſtion, becauſe it ſeems to imply, he is not. But then either way of propoſing the Queſtion, is not barely the *putting* a *Queſtion*, but alſo a directing the *Anſwer*: For to make a fair and naked Queſtion, it ſhould be worded thus; Whether Jeſus Chriſt be the Son of God? elſe it may be only verbally a Queſtion, but in effect an Aſſertion. *Quæſtio* (ſays *Cicero*, *lib.* 4. *Academ Quæſt.*) *eſt Appetitio Cognitionis, Quæſtioniſque finis Inventio.*

But to leave a Diſcourſe that certainly will appear but dry and barren to ſome, and to refer ſuch others, who are better pleaſed with it, and with the like, unto *common Logicians* and *Summuliſts*; I will only obſerve, that in common Diſcourſe and Converſation, to make Objections by way of Queſtion, as it is leſs offenſive than that of aſſerting and dogmatizing, ſo, being well managed, it is no leſs convincing and perſwaſive. For this Reaſon the way was much in uſe with the Ancients, eſpecially with *Socrates* and *Plato*, who preferr'd it before the Method of Syllogiſm, and Oppoſition; and in truth, to queſtion, ſince it is not to affirm, or to deny, does not contradict, or put a miſtake upon Any, but ſeems only a further Inquiry, rather than Oppoſition of what is Affirmed; and yet as it requires a great proportion of Judgment, and of ſtrength and clearneſs of underſtanding, to do it pertinently and well; ſo being done in this manner, it gains more eaſily, and as it were by ſurprize. Beſides, the way of queſtioning is *broader* and larger than that of Syllogizing, which is confined to one medium, and which too is often uſed to divert and carry one off from the buſineſs in hand, for which purpoſe it ſerves moſt excellently well, if managed with dexterity..

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Of Notion, *the immediate Object of* Apprehenſion.

SECT. I.

That Notion *may be conſidered two ways.* 1ſt. *In general*, *and* 2ly. *more ſpecially. Of Notion in the general ſenſe of the Word. No Original Native Notions. Why it ſeems as if there were. The Notion of Apprehenſion cleared. Of Notion in the ſpecial and limited Senſe of the Word, what it is. That the underſtanding apprehends things but inadequately, and under Notions in the limited ſenſe. This evidenced by ſeveral conſiderations. An Objection againſt it removed.*

I Have ſpoken of words the ordinary, but inſtituted, means of Apprehenſion; I am now to ſpeak of *Notion*, the immediate Object (ſome would call it the natural means) of Apprehenſion.

The word *Notion*, may be conſidered two ways, either as it does ſignifie more generally and largely, or as it is taken in a more reſtrained, ſpecial and particular ſenſe.

A Notion in the general and larger acceptation of the word, is *any* conception formed by the Mind in reference to Objects; and ſo taken, is the ſame with a *thought*, or that, in reſpect of the Mind, that a Sentiment largely taken, is, in reſpect of the ſenſe. I ſay a Sentiment largely taken; for inſtance; when Sentiment is taken in ſpect of the Viſive Power, not ſtrictly and properly for light, or colour only; but largely, for any perception that the Eye has, by way of ſight, of things, or of their relations and habitudes. And ſince there is ſo great an Analogy between the Eye and the Underſtanding, and between the Sentiments of the one, and of the other, it will be an eaſy inference, that no reaſon can be given why there ſhould be Original *Innate Notions* in the Underſtanding (as ſome imagine there muſt) that it may be able to apprehend, which will not equally *argue*, that there ſhould be the like *original Figures* and *Images* in the Eye, which ſhould enable it to ſee; and yet none will Allow of *theſe*.

But to ſhow how It comes to paſs, that there are (as there are) appearances as if the mind had ſome original innate Notions, which for that reaſon are called *Prolepſes* and Anticipations, and withal to bring ſome light to the buſineſs of Apprehenſion, which

which (as to the *way* of it) is obſcure enough, and but ſeldom touched to any purpoſe: I will offer an Obſervation very common, but (as it may be applied) very luciferous in reference to this Subject.

Every body obſerves, that if a Blow is aimed at the Head of any perſon, he will hold up his Arm to receive it, and keep it from his head, without thinking either *that*, or *why*, he does ſo; and this is ſaid to be done *Naturally*, and by inſtinct; becauſe, in truth, it is done without premeditation, and ſo at that time, without any actual conceived deſign.

And yet again it is certain, that an Infant will not do ſo, or any Child before it has been taught and inſtructed to do it; which makes it plain, that the doing ſo in thoſe who are come to reaſon, is no effect of natural inſtinct, but of uſe; only the Child was taught to do it ſo early, that by the time he comes to the Age of Diſcretion, having forgotten, or rather, having made no obſervation, when it was firſt taught, or firſt did it, and upon what Motives, and doing it now *without deliberation* it hath the aſpect of a thing effected by *Nature*, and not of a *cuſtom* or habit.

In the ſame manner in the buſineſs of *Reaſon*, we may, and often do proceed upon

on Principles inſtilled into us very *early*, and are Acted by them, without Knowing *how*, or *why*, it being no Effect of preſent conſideration. *Experience* confirms this, ſince we may be certain, if we do but attend to our own Actions, that, many times, we are carried to the Affection, or Diſaffection of things, and the Approbation or Diſapprobation of them, we Know not *why*, and yet all the paſſions and Motions of our Mind, have *Reaſons* for them; for all Effects muſt have *Cauſes*; but *theſe*, ſometimes, are ſo *early* graffed in us, and, at other times, ſo *unawares*, that we remember not they were ſo; and then the *Effects*, only being obſerved, and the cauſes lying deep, hidden and ſecret, we do call it *Nature*, or Inſtinct, though in truth, it be *Reaſon*, and habit, as much as any thing elſe is.

Again, much the ſame way we do compute or *reckon*; for when we uſe any greater numbers, either in Addition, or in Subſtraction, or in any other Arithmetical operation, we do it without any actual conſideration of what the leſſer particular numbers are that make the greater, for that we have done before, (perhaps long,) and conſequently are poſſeſſed of the *Ideas* (may I ſo expreſs it) without the *Images* of them. But at firſt, we had

a particular Knowledge. As, when we Multiply and ſay, Six and Six is Twelve, and Twelve and Twelve is Four and Twenty, we do it without conſidering actually at that time, that ſix is ſo many unites, though at firſt (but poſſibly ſo long ago that we do not remember it) we did ſo, and muſt (do ſo) to Know the particular value of that number ; and the like is of others.

And thus alſo with an eaſie Application may it be conceived, *how words come to ſtand in the mind for things*, and that when we have the *word*, we think we have the ſimple *Idea* of the thing ; it is juſt as the Figure [6] doth ſtand for the number [Six.] And that when once we have had a diſtinct Idea or Notion of the *Number*, afterward, (without actual thinking thereof,) we uſe the Figure inſtead of it, and that as well, or better than if we did diſtinctly conſider the Number it ſelf. Now, words do carry the ſame Relation unto things, that Figures do unto Numbers, and both Words and Figures ſeem to derive the power which they have of ſtanding iu the Mind as Repreſentatives, from the connexion they have, Figures with Numbers, and Words with Things ; after the ſame manner as we hold up our Arm, or a Stick, to ſave our Head, with-

out thinking of saving it. For though the Action prevents all actual thought of the End of it, yet 'tis done for an End, in vertue of it its first *Direction* and Use. This Discourse attended to, and well digested, will open a great light into the *way* in which the Understanding comes to have Apprehension of things by the means of Words; and to form its Ideas and Notions, taking Notions largely for *any* Thoughts or Conceptions.

But besides the former Sense of the Word [Notion,] there is *Another* which is more Restrained and Limited; in which a Notion is *Modus Concipiendi*, a certain particular *manner* of conceiving; a manner of conceiving things that corresponds not to them but only as they are *Objects*, not as they are *Things*; there being in every Conception some thing that is purely *Objective*, purely Notional; in so much that few, if any, of the Ideas which we have of things are properly *Pictures*; our Conceptions of things no more resembling them in strict Propriety, than our Words do our Conceptions, for which yet they do stand, and with which they have a Kind of Correspondence and Answering: just as Figures that do stand for Numbers; yet are no wise like them.

To

To make this clearer, it muſt be conſidered that the *Eye* has no perception of things but under the *Appearance* of Light, and Colours, and yet Light and Colours do not really exiſt in the things themſelves, that are perceived and ſeen by means or them, but are only in the Eye. Likewiſe the *Ear* has no perceivance of things, as of a Bell, of a Lute, or of a Viol, but under ſounds, and yet ſound is only a ſentiment in the Ear that hears, and is not, or any thing like it, in the Bell, or Viol, or Lute that is heard. For as the Eye has no Perceivance of things but under *Colours* that are not in them, (and the ſame time with due alteration, muſt be ſaid of the other Senſes.) So the *Underſtanding* Apprenot things, or any Habitudes or Aſpects of them, but under *Certain Notions* that neither have that being in Objects, or that being of Objects, that they ſeem to have; but are, in all reſpects, the very ſame to the mind or Underſtanding, that Colours are to the Eye, and Sound to the Ear. To be more particular, the Uunderſtanding conceives not any thing but under the Notion of an *Enity*, and this either a *Subſtance* or an *Accident*; Under that of a *whole*, ore of a *part*; or of a *Cauſe*, or of an *Effect*, or the like; and yet all theſe and the like, are only *Entities of Reaſon* conceived

ceived within the mind, that have no more of any real true Exiſtence without it, than Colours have without the Eye, or Sounds without the Ear. Every perſon that hath the leaſt Underſtanding of the way in which we do apprehend things, will yield this to be true as to *Whole* and *Part*, to *Cauſe* and *Effect*, and to all the *Notions* which are commonly termed by Logicians the *Second*; and it is as certainly true in reference to *Subſtance* and *Accident*, to *Quantity*, *Quality*, and thoſe other *General Notions* under which the Underſtanding apprehends its Objects, though commonly they are called *Firſt* ones, and in compariſon of the others are ſo.

I have laboured the more to make the Notion that I have in this buſineſs plain and eaſie, becauſe much of what is to be ſaid hereafter will depend upon it; and now taking it for granted that my meaning is *Intelligible*. what remains, is to evince *true*; and this I ſhall do, from the very Nature of Cogitation in general, (as it comprehends Senſation as well as Intellection,) ſince that the Underſtanding doth *Pinn* its Notions upon Objects, ariſes not from its being *Such* a particular Kind of Cogitative Faculty, but from its being Cogitative *at large*; let us then reflect again

again on the Nature of Cogitation at large.

It is certain that things to us Men are nothing but as they do ſtand in our *Analogy* that is, in plain terms, they are nothing to us but as they are known by us; and as certain, that they ſtand not in our Analogy, nor are Known by us, but as they are in our Faculties, in our Senſes, Imagination, or Mind; and they are not in our Faculties, either in their own *realities*, or by way of a true *Reſemblance* and *Repreſentation*, but only in reſpect of certain *Appearances* or Sentiments, which, by the various impreſſions that they make upon us, they do either Occaſion only, or Cauſe, or (which is moſt probable) concur unto in Cauſing with our Faculties. Every Cogitative Faculty, though it is not the Sole Cauſe of its own immediate [apparant] Object, yet has a ſhare in making it: Thus the Eye or Viſive Faculty hath a ſhare in making the Colours which it is ſaid to ſee; the Ear or Auditive Power, a ſhare in producing ſounds, which yet it is ſaid to hear; the Imagination has a part in making the Imagies ſtored in it; and there is the ſame Reaſon for the Underſtanding, that it ſhould have a like ſhare in framing the *Primitive Notions* under which it takes in and receives Objects: In ſum,

ſumm, the *immediate Objects* of cogitation, as it is exerciſed by men, are *entia cogitationis*, all Phænomena; Appearances that do no more exiſt without our faculties in the things themſelves, than the Images that are ſeen in water, or behind a glaſs, do really exiſt in thoſe places where they ſeem to be.

But as this is a truth that Many will admit with more facility in reference to the Objects of Senſe, and Imagination, as Colours, Sapors, Sounds, *&c.* Than to thoſe of the Mind or Underſtanding, ſuch as Subſtance, Accident, Quality, Action, *&c.* So I find my ſelf obliged to give a farther *demonſtration* that it holds in theſe, as well as in thoſe; which I hope to do by the following Conſiderations.

Firſt, the underſtanding converſes not with things ordinarily but by the Intervention of the ſenſe, and ſince ſentiments of ſenſe are but Appearances, not Pictures, or proper Repreſentations, it is hard to conceive how ſuch conceptions are framed only by their occaſion, and only wrought out of them, ſhould be pourtraits of the things themſelves, and made juſt and exact to them.

Secondly, The underſtanding is a power of

of that nature that many think it doth not immediately Attinge (as they call it) or reach particular ſingular beings, which yet are the only beings that compoſe the Univerſe, as members or parts of it; and really, it uſes to proceed by way of *Abſtraction*, and therefore doth more Connaturally converſe with Univerſals, that are not of Mundane exiſtence, than with ſingulars that are. Now, ſince things as they are in the mind, do undergo an *Abſtraction* and ſublimation, certain it is, they muſt put on another dreſs there, and ſo appear in quite another ſhape than that they have in the World. In ſhort, All Agree that our conceptions of things are but *inadequate*, as indeed they muſt needs be, ſince things have much Refraction (may I ſo expreſs it) both before they come, and after that they come, to the mind; and if they are inadequate, they cannot be commenſurate, that is, they cannot bo ſo juſt and exact, to things, as to ſhow them as they be, and in their own exiſtences.

Thirdly, It may be Argued from the very nature of an *Idea* or notion; ſince this after a ſort is a ſentiment of the mind, as a ſentiment (properly ſo called) is, after a ſort, an *Idea* or Notion of the ſenſe; the imme-

immediate objects of the ſenſe are *ſenſible* ſentiments, and thoſe of the underſtanding are *Intellectual* ones; which they muſt needs be, becauſe the underſtanding it ſelf is a kind of ſenſe, only a more ſublimed and raiſed. *Mens ipſa* (ſays *Cicero*, *l.* 4. *Academ. Quæſt.*) *quæ ſenſuum fons eſt, etiam ipſa Senſus eſt*, &c.

In fine, this is ſo certain a truth, that whoſoever reflects, tho' never ſo little, cannot chuſe but obſerve, that as he takes in nothing by his ſenſe but under *ſentiments*, which are the *notions* of ſenſe, ſo he receives in nothing in his underſtanding, but under *certain notions*, which are the *ſentiments* of the mind; ſince he knows nothing Intellectually but either in general only, under the notion of a *thing*, or more ſpecially under that of a *ſubſtance*, or elſe of an *Accident*; and what are all theſe but *Objective Notions*? as will appear in particular upon the examination and Tryal of them.

Let us then inquire *firſt* into the *thing*, (for we ſhall ſhew it of *Subſtance* and *Accident* hereafter) and what is thing but *modus concipiendi*? a notion or ſentiment that the mind has, of whatſoever any wiſe is, becauſe it is? Thing indeed is the moſt *general* notion, but then it is but a *notion*, becauſe it is general; and has the moſt of

a notion, becauſe it is the moſt general. To be more particular; If the Queſtion be asked, *what thing* is? or what is meant by that word? *Some* have no other Anſwer but this, that a thing is *that which hath eſſence*. But then it may be farther demanded, what is meant by *eſſence*, which is ſaid to be had? What it is to *have* eſſence? And what is meant by *that*, which hath it? Or if it be ſaid, that a thing is *that, which is*, (as it is by others;) the ſame difficulties again occur: for it may be demanded, what *that* is, which is? And what is meant, when it is ſaid to *be*? And whether Exiſtence be Eſſence? eſpecially ſince Exiſtence ſeems not the firſt conception of a thing; but is a ſecond, or after-conception; as not being that, which makes a thing to be what it is, [a thing;] but what only makes it a thing in being.

By this, it plainly appears, that the meaning of the word [*thing*,] is but an *inadequate* conception, ariſing in the mind upon its converſing with *Objects*, and ſo doth ſpeak a certain particular ſentiment, which the mind has of *them*; a ſentiment better underſtood, than defined by words; but a ſentiment too, that doth not enter us into the knowledge of the Reality it ſelf (may I ſo expreſs it,) of *that* which is; *which* we only apprehend *inadequately*, under

under the Diſguiſe and Maſquerade of notions. As, that it is *that*, which is; or *that* which has eſſence; or the like; but not by any adequate exact conception. And as for *Subſtance* and *Accident*, which yet are the firſt ſteps we make toward a diſtinct Perceivance and knowledge of things; what are they, but likewiſe *Modi concipiendi*? Entities of Reaſon, or notions, that (it is true) are not without *grounds*, but yet that have, themſelves, no Formal being but only in the *Mind*, that frames them; there being no ſuch thing in the World as a *Subſtance*, or an *Accident*, any more than ſuch a thing as a *Subject*, or an *Adjunct*; and yet we apprehend not any thing but as one of theſe, to wit, as a Subſtance, or as an Accident; ſo that we apprehend not any at all, juſt as they are, in their own realities, but only under the Top-knots and Dreſſes of Notions, which our minds do put on them.

But here it will be told me, that plain unlearned men, who yet do exerciſe the Acts of Reaſoning well enough, and perhaps in the beſt manner, as doing it without *Art*, and in a way the moſt agreeable to *Nature*, do conceive and ſpeak of things without conceiving or minding of Notions, ſuch as I have mention'd; for they conceive and ſpeak of *man*, of *good* and *evil*,

evil, of *vertue* and *vice*, and the like, without conceiving or minding of *Subſtances*, or *Accidents*. But this is eaſily got over. For tho' unlearned plain men do not explicitely and in terms denominate *goodneſs*, *vertue*, *vice*, *&c.* Accidents, yet ſince they do conceive them (as All do) all things that *are in* a man, or in ſome other thing, tho' they do not call them Accidents, yet do they conceive them *as* Accidents: And when they do conceive, or ſay of a *man*, for inſtance, that he is *vertuous* or *vicious*, or the like, they do conceive him to have *vertue* or vice *in* him; that is, tho' they do not think of the *name ſubſtance*, yet they do really conceive that perſon to be *one*; ſince a ſubſtance is nothing but a *ſubject*, or a thing that has other things in it as Accidents; whereas in truth, neither Accident, nor Subſtance hath any being but only in the mind, and by the only vertue of cogitation or thought.

SECT. II.

Inferences from the former Diſcourſe; firſt, that human knowledge for the moſt part is but intentional, not real. The uſefulneſs of this Inference; an Objection againſt it removed. (And yet) Secondly, That the immediate Objects of the cogitative Powers are ſomewiſe external to thoſe powers; and this, both as to appearances, (which is ſenſibly demonſtrated) and as to their grounds. Two other Inferences added; the firſt in reference to the grounds of the Doctrine of the old Academy; the ſecond concerning the obligation we are under ordinarily to conceive and ſpeak of things as they are in our Analogy, and do appear to our faculties.

I Infer from the former Diſcourſe, Firſt, that human knowledge (at leaſt for the moſt part) is but Intentional, not Real; and that we have no Perception of any thing, (In any degree to ſpeak of,) *juſt as it is* in its own Reality and being. For all our notions and conceptions of things, are of them under *ſentiments*; the underſtanding it ſelf (as I argued before) being

being but a higher and more ſublimated *ſenſe*; and ſentiments (as ſuch) are in their own *formalities* but *apparently* only, not exiſtently, without the faculties that do conceive them. To be be particular, we have no perception or knowledge of any thing but as it is a Subſtance, or an Accident, or a Quality, *&c.* And theſe are only notions: for example, as to *Water*; we have no knowledge of it by all, or any of our ſenſes, what really it is in it ſelf, juſt as it is, and abſolutely ſpeaking; for we are utterly ignorant (otherwiſe than by Conjecture) of the Magnitude and ſize of the little parts that compoſe it; Ignorant of their figure and ſhape; and Ignorant alſo of the kind, and degree of motion they have; all this we are Ignorant of, and yet this is all that is Real in Water But as Ignorant as we are of what it *really* is, in it ſelf, and abſolutely conſidered, we have much *Comparative* Relative Knowledge of it; for we know it by ſenſe to be fluid; to have ſome degree of tenacity or viſcoſity; to be moiſt; in a word, to have ſo many Qualities (for ſo *we* conceive and ſpeak) that all put together, do give the mind a ſufficient riſe to diſtinguiſh it, as a different ſubſtance, from Earth, or Fire; So that a perſon that has at any time had

the perception of them all, will not miſtake them afterward, one for the other.

But here it muſt be remembred, that (as I have ſhewed before) tho' we do not ſee the *reality* of things immediately, and juſt as it is in the things themſelves, yet by means of ſentiments and notions, we do, ſomewiſe, perceive *it*: as the Eye that ſees not any thing immediately but Light or Colours, yet by means of Light and Colours, diſcerns Gold, Silver, Stones, Wood, as alſo the Magnitudes, the Figures, the motions, the diſtances of things; with a thouſand other Realities, ſo the underſtanding diſcerns infinite Realities, infinite habitudes of things; not indeed immediately, but either under the ſentiments of ſenſe, or by means of its own, which I call notions; as of Subſtance, Quality, Cauſe, Effect, Whole, Part, *&c.*

I have been ſomewhat longer in the Explication of this Inference, becauſe to know the *nature* of our Knowledge, muſt needs be of great advantage unto us; and much relieve us in our Inquiry after the nature of Things; ſince it frees us from the confuſion, that our mind muſt neceſſarily be in, ſhould it take the Apparitions of things (for ſuch ſentiments and notions are) to be external and real Exiſtences. Would not a thinking man be much perplexed,

plexed, to make a ſatisfying conception, what that Image is, that he ſees in a glaſs, or in water, if he was perſwaded of its being a Reality (of Exiſtence,) and not a meer Apparition? The like muſt he be, who takes Objective Notions for *real* Exiſtences, and who confounds *Attributes* that are only Objective, and that do belong to things but as they are Objects with thoſe that do belong unto them as they are Things, and that are Real,

However, it will not follow, as ſome have weakly Objected, that then nothing is Real; for tho' the Images themſelves of Whiteneſs, Blackneſs, Redneſs, Greenneſs, that do *ſeem inherent* in viſible Objects, are not really ſo, yet really there are Diſpoſitions and textures of particles in thoſe Objects, that, by the various Modifications which they give the Light, do occaſion in the Eye, to which the Light is reflected, all that diverſity of ſentiments (which we call colours) that does appear in thoſe Objects. The ſame, *mutatis mutandis* muſt be ſaid of ſounds, ſapors, odors, and of Tangible qualities, and in proportion will hold alſo in mental notions. For tho' the very Notions of Entity, Subſtance, Accident, Whole, Part, Cauſe, Effect, and the like, do not really exiſt without the mind; yet as they do *ſeem*, Real, and ſome

more Real than others, ſo *really* they have in things without us certain *grounds* or Foundations, that, upon our converſe with theſe things, do naturally Occaſion, or Excite, ſuch notions and ſentiments in us. But I will ſpeak to this matter more particularly, becauſe it is of importance.

First then, the *immediate* Objects of Cogitation, both the Senſitive, and the Intellectual, are, in *appearance*, *external* to their ſeveral faculties; that is, ſuch Objects do ſo *ſeem* to be without their ſeveral faculties, to which they correſpond, *that*, in appearance, they are either the very *ultimate Objects* themſelves of thoſe faculties, or, at leaſt, do *Exiſt* in them, and upon this account are called *Objects*; for Whiteneſs *ſeems* to the Eye to be *in* ſnow, or in a white wall; and ſound to the Ear, to be in the Air; a Man doth ſeem to the underſtanding, to be really a Subſtance, or a thing that is inveſted with Accidents.

If it be *Inquired* how it comes to paſs, that ſentiments and notions, which really are not in the things that are without us, do yet appear as if they were, and conſequently that they ſeem to be Objects? it muſt be *Anſwered*, that this ariſes from the very nature of cogitation it ſelf, and of

the

the cogitative faculties; and that both Reaſon and Experience do evidence, it muſt be ſo.

Firſt, *Reaſon* ſheweth that it muſt be ſo; for as we are conſcious that we have a perceivance of Objects under certain Images, and Notions, ſo we are *not* conſcious of any Action by which our faculties ſhould make thoſe Images or Notions; and therefore being ſenſible that we are Affected with ſuch Images, and Notions, ſo long *as*, and no longer *than* we do Attend to things without us, (which things are therefore called *Objects*;) and not being ſenſible that we are ſo by any Action from within our ſelves, it cannot but appear unto us that we are Affected *only* from the things without us, and ſo, what really is only in our ſelves, muſt *ſeem* to come from thoſe things, and conſequently to be really in them.

Experience alſo ſhews; (to wit, that what is *really* but in the cogitative faculty, does yet *ſeem* without it;) for if the Eye by any accident becomes infected with *Colours*, as, (to inſtance in a more received, than often experienced, Matter,) with *yellow*, by the yellow Jaundice, or with *Green*, (as I have ſometimes obſerved, before the coming of Convulſions;) that is,

(for this is the Reality) if the Visive Spirits, or whatever other parts of the Eye, that are immediately concerned in the Act of Vision, be Preter-naturally put into the same motions with those, which by the Impressions of Yellow or Green Objects they are naturally put into, in either of these Cases, the *Object* beheld by *that* Eye, will appear as yellow, or green, tho' to every bodies else, it is but White, or Red, or of some other colour. And whence comes this, but hence? that the Images conceived in the Eye, (for in the Instances alledged, the Images of yellow and green are no where else,) are naturally *pinned* upon the Object. As is farther evident in *Dazling*; which is, when an Impression made upon the Eye by one Object, becomes translated to another; thus, coming out of a bright Sun-shine, on a Summers day, into a darkish room, one sees a *splendor* in every corner, and upon every Object. The like Appearance there is, upon the beholding of Objects thro' tinctur'd *Glasses*: So that it must be concluded, that the immediate Objects of cogitation, I mean the very Images and sentiments that are perceived, do, to all *appearance*, seem as external to the cogitative powers, as even the ultimate Objects themselves, that are perceived

perceived under them; which was the firſt thing to be ſhewed.

The ſecond point to be ſhewed is, that the immediate Objects of cogitation are external in their *ground*, as well as in appearance, and in truth, are therefore external in appearance, becauſe they are ſo *really* in their grounds. And this is as certain, as that every Effect muſt have a Cauſe. For *things without us*, are the Cauſes that do excite ſuch Images and Notions *in* us: In the order of Nature, we do *ſee* a thing ſo long *as*, and no longer *than*, we keep our Eye upon it; and therefore that we do ſee it, muſt come from ſome *impreſſion* from the Thing; and ſince to *ſee* a thing, is nothing but to have ſome Image *from* it, and ſo *of* it, in the Eye, and the Image is as the Impreſſion, and the Impreſſion as the Thing that makes it, it follows that the *grounds* of the Image is in the Thing without us. And ſince the Image (by which I mean Light or Colour) is the immediate object of *Viſion*, and, that what is inſtanced in one Act of cogitation, will equally hold in all, it follows, that the immediate Objects of all other cogitations, as well as of viſion, are ordinarily and naturally as external in their *grounds*, as in *appearance*; that is, are fundamentally external, as well as apparently.

I thought once to have ended this Chapter here, but now before I do ſo, I will add an Inference or two from the former Doctrine; the firſt is, that we learn from it the *Foundation* of that Opinion the *Academicks* of old were in, That *no judgment could be made of Truth*; that things do ſeem to us, but cannot be perceived by us; and that no *certainty*, but great *probability* only, is to be Attained unto by men. For as this Opinion had all the *Phænomena* of cogitation to give it countenance, ſo thoſe *Philoſophers* ſaw it; for they evidently perceived, that they ſaw not the Realities, but only the Appearances of things; *Plato* the chief of them, one of the moſt penetrating, as well as the moſt elegant, of all that ever were, affirmed that the preſent, was a word, of *Veri ſimilitude only*, and not of Truth and Reality; That the beings in this World were only *Shadows*, but that the *Subſtances* themſelves were in the *Ideal*. How far herein he went with the Truth, may eaſily be perceived by what I have diſcourſed before, concerning the Nature of Cogitation; as alſo, where he ſtrikes out.

The *Second* Inference is, That ſince Sentiments, and Notions bottomed upon Realities, do ſeem, the former to the Senſe, the latter to the Underſtanding, to be Realities; and ſince we are obliged to conceive,

ceive, and ſpeak, of things, ordinarily and popularly (for all are not Philoſophers) in that way and manner that they ſeem to be; it follows, that we are obliged to conceive, and ſpeak of Sentiments and Notions in Common Converſation, and to the people, *as if* really they were the things themſelves that are perceived; or at leaſt were in them: And ſo may ſay, the Snow is white, the Emerald is green, and the like.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of the distribution of Notions in the Restrained sense of the Word.

SECT. I.

Notions are either the Notions of things, or Notions about things. Of the Notions of things. And first of Entity or Thing. The Pinax Entium, *or general Table of things. Things are either Real, or Cogitable. And these either* meer *Cogitables, or* real *Cogitables. A Reality what. A Cogitable what. Of Real Cogitables. Real Cogitables, either Proper, or Reductive. Proper Real Cogitables of two sorts; of the Sense, or of the Mind. These of the Sense, of two kinds; Connatural, or Preternatural. Apparent colours, are real Connatural Cogitables. Real Cogitables of the Mind, like those of the Sense, of two Kinds; Connatural, or Preternatural. Real Cogitables Reductive, subdivided into those of sense* (External, Internal) *and those of the Understanding.*

Notions taken in the limited Sense of the word, for *Objective Ideas*, by and

and under which the Understanding apprehends, and conceives, of, things, and which, for this reason, may be called *Fundamental* (as being essential to the business of Knowledge,) are either Notions of things; such as Entity, Reality, *&c.* Or Notions about Things, such as whole, part, cause, effect, *&c.* of which the former are conceived as *absolute*, the latter more as *relative* Notions.


The Notions, (or *Modi concipiendi*, that I call the Notions) of things, may be reduced to four, to Entity or thing, Reality, Substance and Accident.

Entity or *thing* is taken in several senses; either first, in the largest, in which it is the same with *something*, or *Aliquid*. Or 2dly. more strictly, as it comprehends *but* substances, Accidents and Modes. Or 3dly. Most strictly, as it stands for *Substances* only. I take it not at this time in the *largest* Sense.

Thing in the largest Sense, is that which any wise *is*, or that is Knowable, directly: for Nothing, no wise is, nor is Knowable, but indirectly, and by means of thing, of which it is a Negation; Nothing is Not a thing.

And

And thing, or Entity, taken in the largeſt ſenſe for



For that which any wiſe *is*, is either without the thinking of any one upon it; or it is no longer than while one is a thinking, and becauſe he is a thinking, on it.

That which is without the thinking of any one upon it, and whether it be minded or no, is a *real* Thing, or a Reality; a thing that ſo is in the world, as that it is a part, or Appurtenance of it, and ſuch a thing is *matter*, and every Affection, and every Syſtem of matter; and ſuch a thing alſo is Mind.

That which no longer is than while one is a thinking, and becauſe he is a thinking, on it; [ſo that tho it have that which is called

called in the Schools an objective being, a being in the Cogitative Faculties, yet hath none without them in the World:] this I name a *Cogitable*; a Cogitable thing, or Entity. And thus, all the *Sentiments* of Senſe, thoſe of the Mind, and even meer Objective Notions, are Things, not things of Mundane and External Exiſtence, but of Cogitation and Notion; Intentional, not Real things. For ſuch are Colours, Sounds, Sapors, Time, Place, Subſtance, Accident, Cauſe, Effect, *&c.* they are *Intentional* things, things that, as ſuch, have only an *eſſe Objectivum*, an *eſſe Cognitum*, as the Schoolmen phraſe it.

Cogitables, or Things that have being only in the Faculties that apprehend them, and by vertue of their being apprehended, are of *two* ſorts; For either they have a being in *Faculties* by means of the Impreſſions made upon *them* from external Objects, and conſequently have *Grounds* and Foundations in the things that are without us; or, they have a being in our Faculties, only by a working of the Faculties themſelves, without any ſuch Grounds.

Thoſe Cogitables, that have being by means of Impreſſions made upon our Faculties, by External Objects, I call *Real Cogitables*; Cogitables, becauſe the being which they have, is, *formally* a being in Cogita-

Cogitation only; Real Cogitables, becauſe they have Grounds and Foundations, in things that are Real. Thus the *Sentiments* of Senſe, ſuch as Colours, Sounds, *&c.* the *Fundamental Notions* of Mind, thoſe *of* things, and thoſe *about* them, ſuch as Subſtance, Accident, Cauſe, Effect, Whole, Part, *&c.* are Real Cogitables; Cogitables, for that the very Images themſelves, the very *Ideas*, are Entities only of Cogitation, as having but an *eſſe cognitum*; and Real Cogitables, becauſe they have *Grounds*, in things that are Real; for, antecedently to any Operation of the mind concerning theſe Cogitables, there do really exiſt, in the world, Things that in their own natures are fitted to produce, or to occaſion them in our Faculties, in a certain correſpondence to themſelves.

Real Cogitables are either properly *ſo, or but* reductively.

Real Cogitables *proper*, are ſuch things as have being in our Faculties, by the impreſſions of External Cauſes, that are *Objects*, as well as Cauſes, of the Acts that make thoſe Cogitables. And theſe are of two ſorts. For Example, (for things of this nature are beſt conceived in Examples) there is *Greenneſs* in Graſs, as alſo in an Emerauld,

merauld, and there is *Bowedneſs* in an Oar, or a *S*taff, that is in the Water, ſo, as that part of it is in, part out: Now *both theſe* [the *Greens* and the *Bowedneſs*] are but Appearances, or *Pænomena*; and having equally (one as much as another) their Grounds and Foundations in the things that are external to our Faculties, both are *equally* Real; and yet every one that conſiders muſt Acknowledge, that they are of very different natures, and that Bowedneſs is Not, in all reſpects, of the ſame ſort of Appearance that Green is, as to its General Nature.

The differences that are in ſuch Appearances, depend upon the differences that are in their *Grounds*, and therefore muſt be accounted for from theſe.

*S*ome Appearances there are, that do *Ariſe* from ſenſation (for I will begin with *thoſe of ſenſe*) when it is made with all the Conditions and Circumſtances that are Requiſite, to make it *Right*; and theſe I call *Connatural* Appearances; ſuch as the *Greens* in Graſs, or in an Emerauld: But there are others that ariſe from ſenſation when it is not made with all the Conditions and Circumſtances that are requiſite to its being right and natural; as, when Viſion is made thro' a double *Medium*, a thicker and a thinner; and theſe Appearances I call *Preternatural*,

ternatural, of which ſort is that of *Bowedneſs* in the Oar, or *Staff*. Theſe Appearances I call, the former Connatural, the latter Preternatural; not in reference to Nature as it is taken for the complex of all, or any, Cauſes; (for in relation to their proper Cauſes, all Effects are equally natural;) but as Nature is taken in a more reſtrained ſpecial ſenſe (of which more hereafter) for a certain *particular* order of Cauſes and Effects.

As for the Colours in a *Rainbow*; thoſe of a *Pigeons neck*, and others of like nature, *tho'* they are commonly call'd *Apparent* and Emphatical, and by that Denomination diſtinguiſhed in *School Philoſophy*, from thoſe that are Real and Exiſtent; yet I think not fit to make another *Claſſis* for them. For thoſe fugitive *changeable* Colours, tho' they are not ſo fix'd and permanent as others are, yet they are as Real, and as Connatural as they; the fugitive waving Colours of *Changeable Taffata*, and thoſe of ſtanding *Corn* (while Green) Agitated and waved by the wind, are equally as real and Connatural, as the certain fixed Colour in Scarlet Cloth, or in Purple. Only, tho' all theſe Colours are equally Real, as having cauſes of their Appearance that are equally real, and all equally Connatural, becauſe All (alike) are Reſults of ſenſations duly made, with all their requiſite Circumſtances; yet, ſince their

their Cauſes are not equally permanent and fixed, but ſome are more, ſome leſs; it follows, that ſome of theſe Colours are more abiding and permanent, and ſome but *Tranſient* and *Fugitive*; for all Effects muſt be, as their Cauſes Are. But to return.

What I have ſaid concerning Real Cogitables of *Senſe*, as to their Diſtribution, may likewiſe be ſaid of thoſe of the *Underſtanding*, that ſome are Connatural, ſome Preternatural: Thoſe I call Connatural that reſult in the Underſtanding when it has all the requiſite Conditions and Circumſtances; and theſe *Preternatural*, that ariſe from the working of the Underſtanding when it wants at leaſt ſome of the Requiſite Conditions and Circumſtances; particularly, when it is *Prejudiced*, or not well *Ballaſted* with Obſervations, and Experiments, made by ſenſe: In a word, there are *Viſa animi*, as well as *Viſa ſenſus*; and ſome of them Connatural, ſome Preternatural; of the former, every one that is well weighed, and well Grounded, is an Example; and for the latter, we have as many Examples, as there are ungrounded and ſenſeleſs diſtinctions, and Notions; of which the Schoolmen afford us but too many, in their *Subſtantial Forms*, Inherent *Accidents*, &c.

Real Cogitables *Reductive*, are ſuch as come from Cauſes that are Cauſes only, and not Objects as well as Cauſes, of the Act of Cogitation, which immediately produces them: And theſe as well as thoſe that are proper, are either of the External *Senſe*, or of the *Imagination*, or of the *Reaſon* and *Underſtanding*: Since whatever is an Effect of Cogitation, and withal ariſes from an external Cauſe that is but a Cauſe, and not alſo an Object, of that Act, is a Real Cogitable Reductive, and not a *Fiction* only of the mind; and there may be ſuch in the ſenſe, and Imagination, as well as in the Underſtanding and Reaſon.

Before I give any Inſtances of Real Cogitables Reductive, it may be neceſſary that I ſhou'd explain the meaning of a Term that I have uſed, to wit, [*External Cauſe*;] by which I underſtand whatever is *without the Faculty*, and forreign to it; tho' in other reſpects it may be internal, as being within the Agent: To be plain, whatever the Underſtanding, the Imagination, or any of the external Senſes conceive, by means of any Impreſſions, even of Cauſes within the Agent, if they act without its *will*, is intended by me to come from an external Cauſe; and theſe Objective Conceptions, if they come from Cauſes, that are not alſo Objects, I call *Real Cogitables Reductive*.

In

In this *Claſſis* of Beings I do reckon *Dreams*, not only Divine (if any ſuch there be) and Angelical Dreams, Dreams that are the effects of Divine, or of Angelical Impreſſion, but alſo ordinary Dreams; as alſo the *Viſions* of the Feaveriſh, the Melancholly, and the Hyſterical: And here likewiſe I reckon that Appearances in our ears, of the *Ringing* of Bells, which is only made by Agitation of the Internal Air, as alſo thoſe *Sparkles* as of Fire, that do appear to the eye, upon a ſmart percuſſion or ſhaking of the Fibres of the Optick Nerves, either by a vehement Agitation of the ſpirits within, or a violent Stroke, or a ſtrong Frication of the eye from without.

SECT. II.

Of meer Cogitables, or Fictions. What a Fiction is. That all Fictions are Creatures either of the Mind, or of the Internal Senſe; None made by the External Senſes. The Reaſon of it. Two Philoſophical Doctrines obſerved, one concerning meer Cogitables, the other about Real Cogitables Reductive. Why the Repreſentations of things in Prophetical Dreams, are always made as if they were preſent.

ALL that I have ſaid already, relates to things that are in our Faculties, by virtue of impreſſions made upon them from External Cauſes, which Cauſes are either Cauſes and alſo Objects, or Cauſes only and not Objects; there are others that do ariſe in us from the working of our Faculties, (of themſelves,) without any grounds for it, in any thing that is external, either as a Cauſe, or as an Object; and theſe I call *meer Cogitables*, or *Fictions*; ſuch as an *Hirco-cervus*, or a *Chimæra*, a Golden Mountain, and the like.

Fictions are all forged, either by the *Mind* and Underſtanding, or by the *Imagination*

gination and | internal Senſe; there are none in the external, the Eye, the Ear, or the like; and the *Reaſon* is evident, for Fictions are voluntary things, things that have always ſomething of the *Will* in them, and therefore cannot be created by any Faculty but That, which is under the Empire of the Will, which the External Senſes are not, but the other Powers are: For though we may think, and alſo imagine, what we will, we cannot See, or Hear, or Taſte, or Smell, or Feel, what we will. The Reaſon of which difference may be this, that if the Underſtanding, and Imagination, were not ſome wiſe under the power of the Will, there could be no *Diſcourſe*; and if the External Senſes were ſo ſo too, there could be no *certainty*; and therefore that there may be both Diſcourſe and certainty, our Faculties are ſo contrived, and ſo ordered, with excellent Wiſdom.

Here it muſt be obſerved,

(1) That there is *ſome* Reality even in *meer* Cogitables, (not indeed the ſame that is in thoſe that are *real*, which have a reality of Grounds and Foundations; but a reality) both in reſpect of the Cogitative *Act*, which doth produce them, and of that Cogitable and Objective *Exiſtence*, which they have in the Mind;

ſince it is as truly ſaid, that one does think, or conceive ſuch things, as it is of him that Dreams, or ſees a Viſion, that he does Dream, or ſee a Viſion. Wherefore ſuch Cogitables as theſe, in reſpect of their Objective Exiſtence, may be referred to Realities of *Appearance*, as Dreams and Viſions are; for as the Act of Dreaming Really *is*, and the thing Dreamt doth Really *ſeem*; ſo the Act that produces a Fiction Really is, and the Fiction alſo really ſeems. However, meer Cogitables, and Real Cogitables Reductive, or more plainly, meer Fictions, and Dreams, and Viſions do not *agree* in all reſpects, even in point of Appearance; but as in ſome regards there is an Agreement, ſo in others, there is a difference, between them, in this point; for if any is to be made (as doubtleſs ſome is) between Real ſeeming, and a ſeeming to be Real; there is this between the foreſaid Cogitables; that Dreams and Viſions do not only Really ſeem, but ſeem to be Real; Whereas Fictions, do only really ſeem, but do not ſeem to be Real; at leaſt not alway,, and as Fictions.

2. It muſt be alſo noted, that in the Real Cogitables which I call *Reductive*, though their Cauſes are not Objects, yet they do impreſs our Faculties the ſame

way,

way, and with the ſame kind of *motions*, that Objects uſe to do, and that *ſuch* Objects as do ſeem to Appear would really have done, had they been indeed the Cauſes of theſe Images and Forms, that do Repreſent them, in ſuch Inſtances. Thus when we have the *ſound* as of Bells in our Ears, and yet none are Ringing, the Internal *Air* in them, though Agitated only by a Vapor, Affects the Auditory Nerve the ſame way it would have done, had the External Air been really Agitated by the Ringing of Bells, and the Internal moved by the External. Thus alſo a ſmart Percuſſion of the *Eye*, Affects its *Nervous* parts the ſame way, and with the ſame kind of Motion, that a ſpark of Fire beheld by it would have done: And thus too in ordinary *Dreams*, the Spirits of that part of the Brain (if indeed it be the Brain) that is the Organ of Imagination, are moved by the internal cauſes of ſuch Dreams, juſt in the ſame manner that they would have been, had they been impreſſed by Eternal Objects; which alſo muſt be ſaid of Angelical Dreams, and of Viſions.

And if our Faculties be moved by External cauſes that are not Objects, in the ſame manner as they be by external cauſes that are Objects, it can remain no longer

a Wonder, that the Images and Forms excited in us by ſuch Impreſſions, ſhould ſeem as real, and as much external, as if they were excited by Objects, Since our Faculties can make no difference. Hence it is, that in *Angelical Dreams*, as alſo in *Viſions*, all the Repreſentations which are made unto the Prophet, are as of things that *Are* in preſent, not of things that *Shall be*, in Future; *I ſaw a ſtone cut out of the Mountain without Hands*, ſays *Daniel*; or if a declaration muſt be made of ſomewhat which is to come, that declaration is made by way of Diſcourſe, by a perſon preſent; ſo that ſtill the Dream or Viſion is *Narrative* and Hiſtorical; as in that of the Angel to *Joſeph*, *Thou ſhalt call his Name Jeſus*. Many Divines have taken notice of this Appearance, in the *Old Teſtament Propheſies*, having obſerved that theſe are always made in a *Narrative* Form, and as Repreſentations of things preſent; but the Reaſon which they give for it, which is, that it is done to ſignifie, that the things Predicted ſhall as certainly come to paſs, as if they were already, ſeems not ſo well grounded as the Obſervation it ſelf; for I take it, the account that I have given is the more Genuine and Natural, which is, that External Cauſes that are not Objects do yet impreſs the Faculties which they

they Act upon, in the ſame manner that Objects do; and therefore all the Images that do Ariſe from ſuch Impreſſions, muſt be of things as preſent, and in being; becauſe they Repreſent them as if Really they were *Objects in Act*, that had excited and ſtirred the Faculties.

SECT. II.

Of Thing ſtrictly taken, and of the Difference betwixt the Notions of *things, and thoſe that are* only *about things. Of the Idea of Subſtance, and that of Accident.* Spinoſas *Notion of Subſtance, and that of an Accident conſidered. Maxims of Thing in general.*

THing taken ſtrictly, as it comprehends but Subſtances, Modes and Acccidents, is whatever ſeems *External* to any Faculty, and conſequently, ſeems to have Being in the World, as a Part, or an Appurtenance, of it, whither it be really ſo or no. And in this ſenſe of the Word, as *Real Things* themſelves, (which are eminently called Things.) So likewiſe the *Sentiments* we have of theſe things, as Colours, Sounds Sapors, *&c.* are Things; and thus alſo, *Notions* are Things,

Things, both the more general and common Notions, thoſe of Subſtance and Accident, and the more ſpecial, the Notions of the ſeveral *Species* of Quality, and *thoſe* of Relations, &c.

But when I ſay, that not only things themſelves, but the Sentiments and Notions we have of them, are Things, it muſt be underſtood with *diſtinction*; for the Things themſelves, (ſo I call the *grounds* of Sentiments and Notions) are Realities of *True Exiſtence*; but Sentiments and Notions being only Real Cogitables, are only *ſeeming* Realities; Realities of *Apparition* only, not of *Exiſtence*: Thus, the *Notion* of *Subſtance* is a Reality of Appearance only, but the things that we apply it to, are Realities of Exiſtence.

By the Notion of thing as taken ſtrictly, we have a Riſe afforded us to apprehend the difference between the Notions the Underſtanding hath *of* things, and thoſe it hath only *about* things; for the Notions that I call the Notions of things, appear to the Underſtanding as *Things External* unto it; for (not to mention Subſtances) even ſome Relations, and Intelligible Qualities do ſeem to the Underſtanding, as really Inherent in the things they are Attributed to, as the ſentiments of

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Colours, Odors, and Sounds do unto the Senſes. But for Notions that are only framed by the Mind about Things, ſuch as Cauſe, Effect, Meaſure, Meaſured, *&c.* they ſeem not to it to have being in the things themſelves, but to ariſe from its own Reflexions, upon comparing and conſidering of Things. Thus, at the ſame time that the mind conceives of Almighty God, that he is the Cauſe of all, as it does conceive, that the word [God] is the name of a Real Being, ſo it conceives alſo, than the term [Cauſe] is not, but that it only ſignifies a certain Kind of Relation between God and Things, as theſe do ſpring from him, and ſo is only the name of a certain Objective, and not of a Real, Being.

Of the things that do Appear unto our Faculties to have a Reality of being, *ſome* are perceived by them *immediately*, in their own proper Formal Natures, and thoſe are either *Modes*, or *Compleat Accidents*; *Others* are not perceived by them immediately, in their own proper Formal Natures; but only by *means* of, and under, thoſe that are perceived ſo; and *theſe* are called *Subſtances:* Compleat Accidents and Modes are Appurtenances, Subſtances are the things to which they do Appertain.

It

It is true, *Spinoſa* is in another perſwaſion; who tells us, that he underſtands by *Subſtance*, that which is in it ſelf, and is conceived by it ſelf, that is, as he expreſſes it, a thing in whoſe conception that of another is not involved. Adding, that by *Attribute* he underſtands the ſame that he means by Subſtance, to wit, a thing conceived in and by it ſelf, in whoſe conception that of another is not involved. Thus ſays he, *Extenſion*, in as much as it is capable of being conceived in and by it ſelf, is an *Attribute*; but *Motion* that cannot be conceived but as ſomething in another thing, is None. Only he ſays too, to prevent Objections; that a Notional diſtinction may be made between a Subſtance and an Attribute, in this manner, that a thing may be called an Attribute in reſpect of the *Underſtanding*, which doth Attribute ſuch a certain Nature to a Subſtance; and then a Subſtance is the thing that the Underſtanding doth Attribute that Nature unto.

But as what this Philoſopher ſays on this occaſion is not very clear, ſo it is certain, that the Notion of Subſtance, as alſo that of an Attribute, is Relative; nor are the Inſtances he puts ſo well adjuſted, but that ſome exceptions may be brought againſt them. I can no more conceive

any

any *Real Extenſion*, than I can any *Motion*, but as a thing that belongs to another; Extenſion to the thing extended, as Motion to the thing moved. And tho' I do not believe my Underſtanding, the meaſure of other mens; yet I cannnot but think, it will be found on tryal, as hard a task for any other, as it is for me, to think otherwiſe; For what is meer Extenſion, but an Extenſion that belongs to nothing? And what is Extenſion that belongs to nothing, but an Extenſion of nothing? and certainly, an Extenſion of nothing, is nothing really, whatever it may be in Imagination; but more of this in another place.

Maxims concerning Thing in general.

1. Nothing can be, and not be at once.

2. Things that but Appear, do equally Affect the Mind as thoſe that really are.

3. Things are not to be Multiplied Unneceſſarily; as they are, when the Fictions of Men, are made to paſs for the Creatures of God.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of Subſtance.

SECT. I.

The Idea or Notion of Subſtance. Self Subſiſtence, how in the Idea of it. The Idea of Subſtance only Relative. Neither Extenſion nor Exiſtence the Idea of it. Subſtances are either Principles, or Principiates. The Grounds of this Diviſion. Subſtance that is a Principle, is either Mind, or Matter. Conſiderations premiſed for the better Underſtanding of this Diſcourſe. The Ideas of Mind and Matter. The Grounds of the diſtribution of Subſtance into Mind and Matter. Abſtracted Mind is as conceiveable as Matter, under the Notion of Subſtance. Spinoſa's *Notion of Mind rejected.*

THE Primary Notion or Idea which we have of *Subſtance*, is (as I have hinted in the former Chapter) that of a thing which is a *Subject*, or an *Ultimate* Object; that is, we have not any Real immediate Conception of it, but only a Notional. Or (to ſpeak more plainly, according

according to the Principles laid before) Subſtance as ſuch, is not a thing conceived juſt as it is in its own Reality, but a thing conceived under a certain notion; that is, a ſubſtance is a thing that is a Subject. For when the Underſtanding does think of the things we call Accidents (which are the only things that do immediately, and at firſt preſent themſelves unto us,) for example, when it thinks of Odours, Colours, ſapors, figures, *&c.* it doth at the ſame time conceive, that beſides *theſe* there muſt be other things that have them, in which thoſe odors, colours, ſapors, figures, *&c.* are. And thoſe things that are conceived to *have* thers, we call *ſubſtances*; as thoſe that are conceived to be *had* of others, or to be in them, we call *Accidents:* but what thoſe things, which we do Denominate Subſtances, Are, in themſelves, ſtript of all their Accidents, is no wiſe known; All we know of any ſubſtance is, that it is the ſubject of ſuch and ſuch Accidents; or that it is Qualified ſo or ſo; and hath theſe, and the other Qualities.

This Notion of a ſubſtance [that it is the ſame with a ſubject,] I call Primary, becauſe though that [of ſubſiſting by it ſelf,] is deemed ſo by others, yet, in our ordinary way of Reaſoning, and Inveſtigating of things, this [of ſelf-ſubſiſting] is a conſequent one, to that of being

a ſubject. For converſing with things; as the firſt that do preſent themſelves to our conſideration, are the Accidents of them; ſo the firſt Reflection the underſtanding makes, upon theſe Accidents, is, that other things are under them, which do uphold and ſupport them, and conſequently, that are *ſubjects*, or ſubſtances. But then indeed, when it comes again to conſider, whether theſe ſubjects are alſo *in* ſubjects, finding in its ſelf a certain Reluctance to conceive (that) they are, becauſe, if they were, there would be no end, things would be in one another infinitely; therefore it concludes, that that, which is a ſubject of Accidents, is it ſelf in no ſubject; that is, it is ſelf-ſubſiſtent. Thus the notion of being ſelf-ſubſiſtent, ariſes from that of being a ſubject: Nor is the notion of [being ſelf-ſubſiſtent] a more Real one, than that of [being a ſubject.] For what is Self-ſubſiſtence but an *Attribute* that belongs to ſomething elſe? but what that ſomething elſe is, to which it belongs, I am willing to learn; and will ever honour as my great Maſter, that Perſon who will effectually teach me. We have no Ideas of any ſubſtances, but ſuch as are Notional and Relative; that is, ſuch as do ariſe from them as they ſtand in our Analogy, and are cloathed with Accidents.

A truth that might be made to appear by a full Induction of all the particulars; But will inſtance but in ſome; but thoſe the moſt obvious, and moſt commonly diſcourſed of. For what Idea have we of *Earth*, but that it is ſomething material, that it is fixt and taſtleſs? What of *Salt*? but that of ſomething ſapid, and eaſily ſoluble in water? And what Idea have we of *water*? but that it is ſomething material, moiſt, and fluid in ſuch a degree, and the like? So that the Idea of a ſubſtance is that of a thing which is a ſubject; and this is a Relative Idea.

But many, who cannot ſatisfie themſelves with the former, do conceit that they have found a Better, a Real, a Poſitive Idea of Subſtance. Of theſe, ſome do hold, *Extenſion* is that Idea, ſo that ſubſtance is Extenſion; and accordingly as Extenſion is either Penetrable, or Impenetrable, ſo they frame the Notions of *Spirit*, and *Body*; or the ſpecies of ſubſtance, as it is immaterial, or material. Others hold, that *Exiſtence* or Being is the Idea of ſubſtance in general, and that ſubſtances of this or that particular ſpecies, are only determinate Talities of Being; for ſince in being is the Idea of an Accident, being (ſay they) muſt be that of a ſubſtance, and as to be is to exiſt, ſo *being* is nothing but *exiſtence*.

I ſhall have another occaſion hereafter to conſider the firſt of thoſe Opinions when I come to Anſwer a certain Objection, touching the Idea of God; but will ſay of it now, that thoſe who profeſs it, cannot make out (as they ought to do) a clear and ſatisfactory Idea of *Extenſion in general*, that ſhall agree in common, both to that which is Impenetrable, and to that which is Penetrable. *Beſides*, it is not conceiveable, that a Spirit ſhould be only a Penetrable Extenſion, ſince (as will appear more fully hereafter) Extenſion has but little to do with mind or thought, which is Eſſential to a Spirit, and without which a Spirit cannot be a Spirit: and Penetrability, and Impenetrability has all as little.

Nor is the *ſecond* Opinion more conceiveable. For not to Inſiſt, that Exiſtence properly taken is only of Cauſates, (*exiſtere* properly being [*eſſe extra cauſas*,] and nothing properly is [*extra cauſas*] that was not firſt (*in cauſis*;) I will take it at large, for *any* being in act; yet even ſo, it is not of the Idea, or firſt Conception, of ſubſtance: for [being] taken not as a *Noun*, but as a *Participle*, (as here it is taken,) is in the very ſenſe of the term, a word of Relation; *being* is not a *thing*, but of a thing; not a thing, but a *mode* of it,

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and conſequently preſuppoſing it; and that which preſuppoſes thing or ſubſtance, cannot poſſibly be in the Idea, or firſt conception of it. In ſhort, Accidents have being, tho' not the ſame being as ſubſtances; but to proceed.

Now, if this is the proper notion of ſubſtance in general, that it is a thing that is a ſubject of Accidents, it will follow, that we cannot frame any *Notions* of ſubſtances in particular, or make any agreeable *Diſtributions* of them, but according to the ſeveral Accidents, of which they are ſubjects. And this I deſire may be noted, becauſe it will be of very great uſe in clearing what I ſhall ſay hereafter, in the proſecution of this Diſcourſe.

Of Subſtances ſome are *Principles*, ſome *Principiates*. By *Principles*, I mean ſubſtances that are cauſes of other things, but are themſelves uncauſed. By *Principiates*, (give me leave to make an Engliſh word of one not very good Latin) I mean ſubſtances that are cauſed, or compoſed of Principles. Principles make, Principiates are made to be.

That there are ſubſtantial Cauſes, and ſubſtantial Effects, in the World, is evident to ſenſe; For even to ſenſe, ſome ſubſtances *begin* to be, and ſome do *ceaſe* being. Now that which begins to be, is

made to be after having not been, muſt of neceſſity have Something, (and this ſomething muſt of neceſſity be another thing,) that makes it to be; that is, it muſt have a *Cauſe*. So that Cauſes and Effects there are; elſe nothing could begin to be, or ceaſe being. And if there are Cauſes, either thoſe Cauſes, all of them have Cauſes alſo, and conſequently, as they (as Cauſes) make other things to be; ſo, (as things that have Cauſes) themſelves are made to be by others; or elſe, at leaſt ſome of them have no cauſes, but are ſelf-ſubſiſtent and uncauſed. If all Cauſes have Cauſes, then an infinite Progreſſion muſt be owned in the account of Cauſes, than which nothing can be more repugnant to the mind of Man; to Science; and to the Order and Unity of the Univerſe. And indeed then, there muſt be a number actually infinite, ſince all Cauſes are actual. But if any Cauſes are uncauſed, (as certainly ſome muſt be, for the reaſons Alledged) thoſe uncauſed Cauſes are *Principles*, or firſt Cauſes. More ſhortly, either ſomething in the Univerſe of being is uncauſed, and ſo is a Principle, for what is uncauſed is a Principle; or elſe, every thing is Cauſed; but every thing cannot be Cauſed; for if every thing is Cauſed, Nothing muſt be the cauſe of Something. For if

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every thing is cauſed, every thing was once nothing, for what is Cauſed was nothing before it was Cauſed; and if every thing was once Nothing, either Nothing muſt be the Cauſe of ſome, or, (which in effect is the ſame) nothing may become ſomething without any cauſe, than which No thought can be more unreaſonable.

Again, as nothing is more certain than that there is ſome Principle, ſo the *Stoicks* (the Wiſeſt of all the Philoſophers, as well as the moſt Devout) affirmed, that there are *two*, Mind, and Matter. Thus *Seneca* in his Epiſtles (*Ep.* 65.) *Univerſa ex Materia & ex Deo conſtant.* All things (ſays he) are compoſed, or, do Conſiſt of God and Matter. And indeed, we cannot be more aſſured by all our faculties, that there is *Action*, and *Paſſion* in the World, and that the World could neither be, or perſevere in being, without them, than we are to ſpeak Philoſophically, that there are *two* Principles, *one*, the Principle of all the Action; the *other*, the Principle of all the Paſſion is in it; the former the *Active* Principle, or firſt ſubject of Activity, the latter the *Paſſive* Principle, or firſt ſubject of Paſſivity; of which, I call the firſt, *Mind*, the ſecond, *Matter*. This Aſſertion *Zeno* in *Laertius* fully agrees unto, when he tells us, that the Principles of

things are *two*, τὸ ποιῶν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, the Active, and the Passive; Nor doth the great Originist *Moses* say much less, when in his *Genesis*, he writeth of the *Spirit* of God that moved, and of the *Abyss* and Waters upon which he moved; and methinks, in all *Animal Generations*, in which there must be a *Male* and a *Female*, as who should say, an Active and a Passive Principle, there is some (and this no very Dark or Obscure) Adumbration of it.

Before I do proceed to a more particular Consideration of these Principles, I would have it be observed, that we ought to *Distinguish* what is manifest, certain, and of undoubted truth concerning them, from that which is but doubtful and uncertain. Now it is certain, *that* there is such a thing as we do call *Matter*; such a thing as *Mind*, such a thing as *Motion*; and *that* Matter is alter'd, figured, textur'd, and infinite ways wrought upon & moulded by means of motion. *Again*, it is certain *that* all things have not Mind in equal proportions, but that some exert the acts of it in a higher way and degree, and some in more ways for kind than others do; and also certain, *that* the exercises of Acts of Mind in all the ways and all the degrees of them in Corporeal Animals, (for we are not so well acquainted with others,) do much depend upon

upon the Nature and Qualifications of their Organs; that is, upon Texture and Diſpoſition of matter. Theſe things we are as certain of, as that our ſelves be, and have a true uſe of our faculties. But if we advance farther, and to endeavour to Enter and Penetrate into the very *nature* of Matter, into *that* of Mind, and into the *Nature* of Motion; here being forſaken and deſtitute of ſenſe to hunt for us, we are much at a loſs, and as unable to proceed in our ſearch an inquiry after them, as to their juſt Realities, as we are in that of things, which are wholly out of our view. It is hard to conceive juſt what *matter* is in its own Poſitive Reality; alſo what *Mind* is, and even what *Motion* is, (as taken for a ſubordinate Principle.) Nor can it be Demonſtrated, that (as ſome will have it) there is only *one* ſubſtance in the Univerſe, and that Matter and Mind are only ſeveral *Modifications* of that one ſubſtance; nor be Demonſtrated, that *Matter* (for this I think they mean by ſubſtance,) is in its own Nature, a *vital* Energetical thing; and that the diverſe *Gradations of Life*, that are obſerved in the ſeveral ſpecies of Animals, ariſe only from the ſeveral Modifications of Matter, and of that *life of nature* (as thoſe Philoſophers call it) which is Eſſential thereto, and is

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the *root* of thoſe Perceptive, Appetitive, and Motive Powers that do dreſs up being in all the Shapes and Forms in which it appears upon the Stage of the World. I will not build upon ſuch *Hypotheſis*; which being unevident, muſt needs be doubtful and uncertain, if not falſe. A Philoſophy that ſhall be *ſolid*, and ſound, muſt have its Ground-work and Foundations firmly laid; which none can have, but that which is bottomed, rais'd and built upon *evidence*; I mean, upon the certain *Teſtimony* of our faculties. And therefore ſince our *faculties* do rather go upon *Notions*, than on Realities, and do plainly *Diſtinguiſh* between Mind and Matter, and (as I will ſhow in the Progreſs of this Diſcourſe) do Contradiſtinguiſh them, I hold my ſelf obliged to treat of theſe diſtinctly, but ſtill in the *Real Notional* way.

Mind then is Cogitative, thinking, or perceiving ſubſtance; or, Mind is the firſt ſubject of Cogitation. *Matter* is Extenſive, ſpacious, ſubſtance; or, the firſt ſubject of dimenſive ſpacious Quantity. In other, but Equivalent terms; *Mind* is Active ſubſtance, *Matter* Paſſive ſubſtance. I affirm, that theſe latter Definitions are equivalent to the former, becauſe, in effect, it is the ſame to ſay, that Mind is *Active*, as to ſay, it is *Cogitative*; and the ſame to ſay,

ſay, that Matter is *Paſſive*, as to ſay, it is *Spatious* Extenſive ſubſtance. Nor is Mind Cogitation, or matter extenſion, as *Des Cartes* makes them; but the former is Cogitative, the latter Extenſive ſubſtance. We find a Reluctance in our minds to conceive that Cogitation is a ſubſtance, as alſo to conceive Extenſion as one; and yet we cannot conceive Mind and Matter but as ſubſtances.

The main Reaſon why I do *diſtinguiſh* Subſtance into Mind and Matter, as into *firſt* Original kinds, is, becauſe (as I hinted before) Cogitation and Extenſion, that do Conſtitute their ſeveral Ideas, are of no Relation one to another, for what hath a Thought to do with a Cube, or a Triangle? or with Length, or Breadth, or Depth? Certainly Cogitation and Extenſion are quite different Accidents, without any thing in their Ideas, that is *Common* to both; and therefore the firſt ſubject of the one, cannot be conceived the firſt ſubject of the other; their ſubjects muſt be ſubſtances of quite as different kinds as themſelves are, at leaſt to us; ſince all the diverſity we can conceive in ſubſtances, is and muſt be, taken from the accidents they have, theſe being the Characters by, and under which alone, we do perceive and know, and by conſequence, can only diſtinguiſh them.

I inſiſt herein the more, for that many think that *Mind* is only an Accident, and that taken for a ſubſtance, it is unintelligible, and a meer *Chimera*: ſo that, tho' Matter is acknowledged (by them) to be a ſubſtance, it will not be yielded, that Abſtract, ſeparate mind can be one. But thoſe that think it ſo, if they conſider'd, that men have no conception of ſubſtance, nor can have any of it, but as it is a ſubject of Accidents, they would ſoon change their Opinion. For the Accident of *Cogitation*, or of Activity, that Mind is the ſubject of, is as diſtinctly and clearly conceiveable, as that of Extenſion, or of Paſſivity, which matter is the ſubject of. Nor is the *thing* it ſelf that is the ſubject of Extenſion, or of Paſſivity; any more Conceiveable but by, and under *this*; that is, the ſubſtance of mind and matter are equally conceiveable, and equally unconceiveable. They know no more what *that* is in it ſelf, that is extended, than what *that* is, that is Cogitative; and may be as ſure, that they do think, as they are, that they are ſpacious, ay, they cannot know that they are ſpacious, but by thinking. But of ſpatioſity or extenſion, (the Accident that conſtitutes matter,) I ſhall have occaſion to diſcourſe hereafter, when I come to ſpeak of quantity, I proceed now to diſcourſe of Mind.

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The Idea I have given of Mind, that it is the Immediate ſubject, or (as others perhaps would chuſe to ſay) the Immediate Principle, of Cogitation, Energy, or Activity, is much more eaſie to be conceived than that of *Spinoſa*, when he defines the human mind to be the Idea of a body, or thing, actually exiſting: for Mind, even the human, is not ſo properly ſaid to be an Idea, as to be the Principle, our Cauſe efficient, of Ideas; ſince all Ideas (even in common ſenſe) are conceived; and Mind is that, which conceives them. Thus it is in our Refracted, Inadequate, *Real-Notional* way of conceiving; and for an Adequate and juſt one, as it is above our faculties, ſo I do not find that *Spinoſa*, or *Mal. Branche* after all their Ambitious Reſearches in that higher way, have edified the World thereby to any great Degree. This way of *ſeeing* all things *in God*, and in their own proper *Realities*, is a way much out of the way. Otherwiſe, when *they* keep the lower way of ſenſe, many of their thoughts are ſurprizing, and excellent.

SECT.

SECT. II.

A two fold Conſideration of Mind; one, as it is Abſtracted from Matter; the other as it is Concerned with Matter. What is meant by Concernment of Mind with Matter. Of Mind. That is the Idea of God. God as pure Mind, is in himſelf, and directly incomprehenſible. However, he is knowable as it were by Refraction, and Reflection; in an Hypotheſis, and by way of ſimilitude. That a Parabolical, Comparative way of knowing God, ought to content us. Of the Divine Attributes; the true conception of them. The vanity of thoſe who talk of ſeeing all things in God. Spinoſa's *Opinion that God is all ſubſtance Rejected, for ſeveral Reaſons. That this Opinion ſeems to imply, that God is no ſingular ſelf-exiſtent, ſelf-ſubſiſtent Being. The Ground of this Opinion touched. Another ſentiment concerning God, that he is infinite Extenſion indued with Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Power, conſidered. The Ground of this underminded, and the nature of the Divine Omnipreſence repreſented.*

Mind

MIND may be considered, either in it self, as it is *Abstract* and simple, free from all Concretion and Composition with matter; or else as it is *concreted* or concerned therewith.

By the *Concretion* of mind with matter, I mean nothing but the acting of Mind in this or that particular manner, by means of matter. As it is in our selves, who do not see, or hear, or feel, but by means of Organs, that is, of matter.

Mind as it is in it self, Abstract and Simple, free from all concretion or concernment with Matter, I call *Pure Mind*; Mind Concreted with Matter, I term, *Mind in Matter*.

Pure Mind, is the Notion or Idea of *God*; as is implied by our Saviour, when he says, *John* 4. 24. God is *Spirit*; he does not say, God is a Spirit, but God is Spirit; πνεῦμα ὁ θεός, All Spirit, nothing but Spirit. In like manner *Seneca*, in the Preface to his natural Questions, first demanding what God is? Answers, he is *Mens universi*, the mind of the Universe; and being obliged, for the clearing of his notion, to show the difference between the nature of God, and that of Man, adds, Mind is only the Principal *part* of *our* nature, but the *whole* of Gods, which is nothing

thing but Mind God is pure Mind, all Reaſon. In his own terms thus, *Quid ergo intereſt inter naturam Dei & noſtram? Noſtri melior pars Animus eſt, in illo nulla pars extra animum.* Again, in his Epiſtles (*Ep.* 65.) He has this expreſſion, *Nos nunc primam & Generalem cauſam quærimus, hæc ſimplex eſſe debet; nam & materia ſimplex eſt*; now, ſays he, we ſeek the firſt Univerſal cauſe, which ought to be ſimple (or uncompounded) for even matter it it ſelf is ſimple. Only, I doubt, he (as many other Philoſophers did) took God but for an immanent an ingredient Cauſe of all; which perhaps is only true of the Moſaical Spirit of God.

But *God* as he is *Pure* mind, is an *Inacceſſible Light*, that dazzels all the eyes that behold it; and therefore, we can hope to acquire but very little particular knowledge of *him* or acquaintance with him, under this notion. But then again, as the *Sun* that cannot be beheld directly, in its own proper light, may yet be ſeen by Reflection; ſo may the Deity, in an *Hypotheſis*, and by way of Parable; by ſpeaking of him after the manner of men. The holy *Scriptures* themſelves go this way. They Repreſent God as an Infinite Almighty Perſon, (ſuppoſe a man,) that hath Underſtanding, Will, and Affections; that

conſults

consults and decrees; and that is touched (as men are) with the motions of Love, Hatred, Desire, Aversion; and in consequence of this Notion, do further Represent him, sometimes as a Father, sometimes as a Lord, or as a great King, that Governs the Universe, according to the Rules and Laws that he himself hath set, and by rewards and punishments. Now, all this is *Parabolical*, and but Comparative Knowledge: However, we ought to satisfie and *Content* our selves therewith; for though it is not to know the Deity in in the Reality, as he is in himself, yet it suffices for the Principal *End* for which we should endeavour to know him; which is to Adore and Obey him. *Besides*, it is well nigh the only particular Knowledge of him that we Mortals are capable of, in this Terrestial State; and, *in fine*, is almost as much, in effect, as that which we have of any thing else, even in the Corporeal World.

It is true we nnderstand that *Matter* and *Motion* are Real things, and that all others that are Corporeal, do result from these; but this (at least) is only a *General Confused Knowledge*, and *no more* than *that* we have of the Abstracted Pure Mind. For, as to the *particular* Natures of things, their Internal Fabrick and Texture,

and that degree of Motion, that is in the particles which compose them, (of this) we have only a weak imperfect Conjecture, without certainty. All the particular Knowledge that we have of things by which we distinguish them one from another, both in reference to their Kinds, and to the Individuals of those Kinds, and by which we resolve their Operations, is of nothing (to speak of) but of *Accidents*; and Accidents are nothing but (as I have touched before, and shall shew again more fully hereafter) the *Sentiments* we have of things; *they* being not so much as Grounds or proper Representations of Grounds, but only certain *Appearances*, under which our several Senses do dress up things, and so show them unto us: and this is enough for *Use*.

As therefore any person would know but little of this *Corporeal World*, and nothing usefully, that would not take it in by his Senses, and know it (as he only can) under the Mascarade of *Sentiments*, that are not without him, but only in Appearances, and in their Grounds; so, he shall know but little of *God*, that will not condescend to see him in an *Hypothesis*, by way of Analogy and Similitude. What was said by God himself unto *Moses*, will hold

hold true in every Mortal; *Thou shalt see my* Backparts, *but my* Face *shall not be seen:* All our Knowledge of him at present, is but ἐν αἰνίγματι, we can but *Riddle* at him; the *Ideas* we have of him, are only *Attributes*; and Attributes are not Qualities really Inherent in him, but only *Notions* of his Operations, and of the various Relations and Aspects which they bear, to one Another, and to Us,) that are excited into us, upon the view and considerations which we take of his works. Thus the several Attributes of God, that we conceive and know him under, are, in reference to him, just as the *Accidents* of things Corporeal, their Colours, their Odors, their Sounds, their Tangible Qualities are unto them; we see him but ὡς ἐν ἐσόπτρῳ, as in a Glass; and to see a thing as in a Glass, is not to see the thing it self, but only by Appearances; and yet, he that will look behind the Glass, to see more, shall see nothing at all.

What, then, must be said of those, who think, they *See all things in God?* When God, though in himself he is Pure Light, without any Mixtnre of Darkness, yet, as to us, in respect of any clear, just, distinct Knowledge of him, He dwells in the thickest Darkness: No

Windows in the *Sanctum Sanctorum*; where the Seat of God was; and the very *Heathen*, many of them, Adored him with *Silence*, as one that was Ineffable and Unconceiveable: Methinks, it is meer Enthuſiaſm, to talk of Seeing All Things in the *Original*, when we cannot ſo much as look upon *it*; God is Pure Mind, and Pure Mind is Pure Light, of too Tranſcendent Glory to be immediately beheld by us, but Blear-eyed, Weak-ſighted Mortals.

There are *two* Opinions in reference to the Nature of God, that *Differ* from mine; both of which I will conſider.

The *Firſt* is, that of *Spinoſa*, That he is *all* Subſtance, and that Particular Beings (even formally taken) are but Participations of his; as being only ſo many ſeveral Modifications of the Divine Attributes. But this is a Notion (of the Deity) that I cannot receive, as for other Reaſons, ſo for this particularly, that it makes him to be the *Univerſe*, and to be Matter, as well as Mind; whereas, God is neither Matter, nor the World or Univerſe, but only Pure Mind; for the

the Great World has a Mind, that made, and Governs it, as well as the Little. Even Mr. *Hobbs*, has said, *He that thinks this World without a Mind, I shall think him without a Mind*: And says *Seneca*, *Nat. Quæst. Lib.* 1. *C.* 45. *Eundem quem nos* Jovem *intelligunt, Custodem, Rectoremq; Universi; Animum ac Spiritum, Mundani hujus operis Dominum & Artificem, cui nomen omne convenit*, &c. Which I would Render thus; God is the Father All-mighty, All-wise, All good, the Maker of Heaven and Earth, Soveraign Preserver and Governor of All.

For my own part, I much doubt that those Philosophers, who profess themselves in this Opinion, [that God is *all* Substance, or that he is the World,] do really believe he has no Being at all, but, only in Fiction of Mind, and by way of *Prosopopœia*; and that as *Nature*, *Fortune*, *Chance*, which yet are said to do This, and to do That, do, really, only signifie *Causes* so or so considered; so, *God*, with them, is only a *Notion*, a Name, a Mode of Expression, by which they mean *all* Causes taken together; and so no more the Name of a Real Individual singular Being, than that of Nature, or Fortune. *Sunt* (says

Lucilius in *Cicero l. 2. de Nat. Deor.*) *Qui omnia Naturæ nomine appellent*, *ut* Epicurus, *&c.*

The unwary Expreſſion of ſome Theologues, and Theologizing Philoſophers, who Denominated God *Nature Naturing*, might give occaſion to this improper conceit of him, among the moderns; as might alſo that miſtaken *Idea* of *Infinity* (as an Attribute of God) that ſome have given, which ſeems to ſhock his *diſtinction* and ſingularity of Being. For *thence* it is Argued, how can God, be Infinite Being, if he be not all Beings? And it he be, how can he be One by himſelf? be a Singular Individual Being, diſtinct from all others? Theſe were the ſpeculations, that obliged *Spinoſa* to conceive of God, that he is the *Ingredient*, Immanent Cauſe of all Things; and the ſpeculations too, that tempt others, to other miſtakes concerning him. But when I come to diſcourſe of the Notions of *Finite* and *Infinite*, and to Repreſent in what Senſe the latter is truly Aſcribed to God, I hope to manifeſt, that there is great *Miſtake* in ſuch Speculations and Arguings, and to exempt the true received Notion of Infinity both from theſe, and from all the like intangling Embarraſments and Difficulties.

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The *Second* Opinion, is that of Dr. *More* and his Followers, who do hold, that God is an Infinite *Extenſion*; that he is indued indeed with all Goodneſs, Wiſdom, and Power, but he is an Extenſion ſo indued; and of this they are ſo confident, that ſome require a belief thereof as of an Article as great as any in the Creed; an Article that is the Foundation of all Religion; both revealed and Natural. But as I believe, that no Man hath known the Father except the Son, and he to whom the Son hath revealed him, ſo, ſince among all the Revelations that the Son has pleaſed to make of God the Father, this is none [that he is an Extenſion] I cannot admit his being ſo, to be a Notion ſo Eſſential unto all Religion, as they would make it; Eſpecially when I conſider, that it might as eaſily have been ſaid, that God is *Extenſion*, as, that he is a *Spirit*; and Chriſt hath ſaid the latter but not the former. Beſides, I cannot underſtand how Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and Power ſhould be ſaid of meer Extenſion, which is but ſpace; it ſeems to me a leſſer Incongruity (though even this is Incongruity enough) to ſay that God is *Matter* ſo indued, than that he is *Space* ſo indued; ſeeing, even in common ſenſe, there is more of Reality and Being in meer Matter,

than

than there is in meer Extenſion or Space. But to urge this Argument more home. By *Extenſion*, (which the perſons who are in this Opinion do Attribute to God,) they muſt mean either *meer* Space, or elſe a *thing* that in the Idea of it is *Spatious*. If meer Space is intended; As this does no ways differ from *inane* or *vacuum*, ſo one may think, it might as well be ſaid (which yet its hard to ſay) that God is an Infinite *inane* or *vacuum*, that is, in plain Engliſh, an Infinite Nothing indued with Wiſdom, Goodneſs and Power, as, that he is infinite Extenſion ſo indued. On the other ſide, if by Extenſion is underſtood a *thing that* in the Idea and firſt Conception of it is Extenſive, that is, a thing that does eſſentially take up ſpace, ſo as that it cannot be conceived, but withal ſpace muſt be Imagined, as an Appurtenant of it; in this Senſe, I cannot ſee how it differs from *Matter*; and then to ſay, that God is Extenſion, is to ſay, that he is Matter; whereas, God is Pure *Mind*, not *Matter*. *In fine*, as it is certain, that God is Mind, rather than Matter; ſo likewiſe it is certain, that in the Ideas that we frame of Mind, and of all the things that properly relate to it, ſuch as Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Thought, *&c.* We never do once think of Extenſion or Space;

Space: And if at any time we do endeavour to apply Extenſion or Space unto Mind, or to any thing properly mental, there always ariſes a Repugnance in us, upon but the thoughts of it; an Inch, a Foot, a Yard of Underſtanding, or Goodneſs, is a *Bull*.

I know it is Argued from the *Omnipreſence* of God, that he is Extended; and in truth it is very hard to imagine any preſence with things that are extended, but withal, there muſt be an Imagination of ſome Extenſion in the thing that is preſent: but ſtill, this is but *Imagination*, which is apt to impoſe upon us, and therefore it muſt be examined by Reaſon. And Reaſon tells us, that we cannot have a diſtinct and clear conception of the *preſence* of God, if we have not (as we have not) ſuch an one of his *Eſſence*, ſince the preſence of God is but a Mode of his Eſſence; and if we have no diſtinct and clear Conception of the preſence of God, nor conſequently of his Omnipreſence, or the way how he is preſent with all his Creatures, where ever they are; I do not ſee with what Cogency or Force an Argument can be Deduced from it, in this buſineſs. In ſhort, ſince things are preſent one with another very *differently*, in proportion to their ſeveral Natures, it will follow, that

things

things *Mental*, muſt be preſent with others, in much another way than thoſe that are *Material*, and Conſequently that God who is pure Mind, muſt be preſent with Material Beings, much otherwiſe, than theſe themſelves are, one with another. Mind can no more be preſent the ſame way that Matter is, than be the ſame thing with Matter.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Of Mind in Matter.

SECT. I.

Mind as concerned with Matter comes under a double conſideration, 1 *As it actuates a moſt ſubtle and more than Etherial Matter, that is diffus'd throughout the World.* 2*ly. As it actuates ſome particular Vechicle or Body. In the firſt Notion of it, Mind in Matter is the Idea of the* Moſaical *Spirit of God This Spirit according to the Scriptural Hypotheſis, is the Immediate cauſe of all things in the firſt Creation, and ever ſince. The Being of this Spirit Evinced, both by Authority and by Argument. Dr.* Mores *Diſtinction, between the Spirit of Nature (which he calls* Principium Hylarchicum *) and the Spirit of God, conſidered.*

AFter a Conſideration of Mind *as* it is in it ſelf, Pure and *Abſtract, Exempt* from all Intrinſecal concernment, and compoſition with Matter: I come now to conſider it as *concerned* with Matter, that is,

is, as Acting in, and by means of Matter; in which conſideration Mind may be called *ſecond* Mind, as in the former, it may be termed the *firſt*.

Mind concerned with Matter, may be conſidered in *two* reſpects, either *as* it has for the Vehicle which it actuates, and by which it acts, all that moſt ſubtle Matter that does permeate the Univerſe, in the utmoſt Extent and Capacity of it; or, *as* it actuates ſome particular ſyſtem of Matter, that may be called a Body, and it is a particular Vehicle.

Mind in the *former* Conſideration of it, as it doth actuate, and act in, and by, a moſt ſubtle matter diffuſed throughout the Univerſe, ſeems to me to be the *Moſaical Spirit* of God, mentioned, *Gen.* 1. *v.* 2. And the *ſame* that in the *Scriptural Hypotheſis* (which never mentions *Nature* as the Efficient Cauſe of any thing, but Repreſents Philoſophy only as a *Theology*, that ſwallows up the ſecond Cauſes in Contemplation of the firſt,) is the *Cauſe* of all productions, the Births, the Growths, and all the Alterations and Changes that come to paſs in the World. This, in that account, is the Principle of Human *Souls*, *Mal.* 2. 15. *Did he not make one? Yet had he the Reſidue, of the Spirit*: As if he had ſaid, he wanted not Spirit, [he had more left]

left] to Animate more, had he been pleased to make them, but he made but one; and the Principal too of all *Corporeal Effects*, even of Snow, of Hail, of Ice, of Wind, &c. *Psal.* 147. 15, 16, 17, 18. *He sendeth forth his Commandment upon the Earth, his word runneth very swiftly. He giveth Snow like Wool he scattereth the Hoar Frost like Ashes. He Casteth forth his Ice like Morsels; who can stand before his Cold? He sendeth out his word and melteth them; he causeth his Wind to blow and the Waters Flow.*

To understand this Text with the more clearness, we must have Recourse unto *Genesis*, Ch. 1. *v.* 2, 3, 6, 9, 12, 14, 20, 24, 26. In which we find, in, *v.* 2. mention made of the *Spirit of God* that moved upon the Face of the Waters, as the *Active Principle* that wrought all; and in the 3. and the following verses, of the *Word* or *Commandment* of God, that as a *Directive Principle*, did regulate and order all, so that the Spirit acted accordingly; thus *v.* 3. *God said* let there be *Light*, and there was Light; and *v.* 6. *God said* let there be a *Firmament*, or rather an Expanse, in the midst of the Waters, and it was so, and *v.* 9. *God said*, Let the *Waters under the Heaven be gathered together into one place*, and let the *Dry Land Appear and it was so.*

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The like in the following works. Now the World in the account of the Holy Scriptures, has the ſame for its *Conſerving*, that it had for its *Procreating* Cauſe; and therefore as God at firſt did make All by his Almighty *Spirit* through his *Word*, ſo the Pſalmiſt tells us, that he ſtill doth; for as at firſt he ſaid, [*Let there be*] ſo ſtill, he *Sendeth forth his* [*Commandment;*] and as all was ordered at firſt by the Divine Word, [He *ſaid*, let there be Light; He *ſaid*, let there be a Firmament, *&c.*] *So ſtill his WORD Runneth very ſwiftly*: The Spirit of God doth ſtill Execute, as he did at firſt, all the Directions and Commands are given it; He Produces the Snow; the Hoar Froſt; and Ice; he maketh Cold; and Raiſeth Winds; and cauſes all the Alterations that are made in the Air, in the Earth, in a Word, in all the Elements, and in all above them. This is the Scriptural *Hypotheſis*; the meaning of which is, that God by his infinite *Wiſdom*, as well as *Power*; both *Made* and *Governs*, the World; but to Return.

Of this Spirit, that Penetrates through all the World, and that doth All in it, not only *Moſes* has written, but many of the Old *Philoſophers*, have alſo told. *Velleius* in *Cicero*, *l.* 1. *de Nat. Deor.* acquaints

quaints us, concerning *Pythagoras*, *Quod cenſuit animum eſſe per Naturam rerum omnem intentum & Commeantem*, that he believed a Mind diffuſed throughout the whole Nature of things. The ſame *Velleius* alſo reports, concerning *Zeno*, that he in ſome of his Books, diſcourſed of what he called the *Reaſon of the Univerſe*; [*Rationem per omnem pertinentem Naturam.*] In fine, (to omit others) *Plutarch* mentions a *Spirit* that Penetrates throughout the World, [πνεῦμα διῆκον ὅϑ κόσμϑ·] And what can this Spirit be, that Penetrates throughout the Univerſe; that animates it; and is as a common Reaſon in it (for I will unite the Expreſſions, and ſo compleat the Idea;) but the *Moſaical* Spirit?

But not only *Authority* (Sacred and Prophane) evinces, that there is ſuch a *Spirit*, an Energetical Vital Principle, diffuſed throughout the World; but *Experience* alſo ſhows it, if the Experience that we have of ſuch a Principle Diffuſed throughout *one* Region of it; [our own] may be ſufficient to conclude, it is ſo in *all*; of which Experience I ſhall ſpeak hereafter, when alſo the Nature of this Spirit, and the Influence it has upon, and in things, will be ſet out more clearly, and more fully.

I Know the Learned Dr. *More* hath told us of a *Principium Hylarchicum*; which he defines an *Incorporeal Substance, without Sense and Animadversion, that pervades the Matter of the whole Universe, and exercises in it a Plastical Power according as the Portions of the said Matter are Predispos'd*; and this he calls the *Spirit of Nature*, and Distinguishes it from the *Spirit of God*; Affirming, that God doth actuate all the Matter of the Natural Corporeal World by the Spirit of Nature; but that he actually acts in and governs the world of Men and Angels by the Spirit of God. But I have shewed already from the Scriptural *Hypothesis*, that it is *one* Spirit, [the *Mosaical*] that Actuates, and Acts in All, in Men and other Animals, as well as in the World of meer Nature, as to all the operations commonly called Natural; for as to those that are called *Supernatural*, that come from the *Holy Ghost*, or the Comforter, these as they are of another Nature, so the Consideration of them belongs to another place: In fine, the *Principium Hylarchicum*, or Spirit of Nature (as this Learned person calls it,) is but a *Plastick Faculty*, of the *Mosaical* Spirit.

SECT.

SECT. II.

An Inquiry into the Original and Riſe of Motion. What is meant by Motion in this Inquiry. That Motion comes from Mind in Matter, or the Moſaical *Spirit. This ſhewed in many inſtances, by the Connexion between Cogitation and Motion. How Motion comes from a Principle at Reſt, and how Matter from Mind ſet out in the Metaphyſical Hypotheſis, and by other Illuſtrations.*

I Think I ſhall not ſtep much (if I do at all) out of my way to make Inquiry in this place into the *Original* and Riſe of Motion. By *Motion* now I mean not Actual Motion, or Motion as it is the (actual) Tranſlation of Bodies from place to place; which ſome define [*The Succeſſive Application of a Body in all it hath outwardly, unto the ſeveral parts of the Bodies which touch it immediately*;] which is the moſt uſual Senſe of the word. But here I mean by it, that *Force*, Energy, or Motive Vertue, called in Latine *Impetus*, from which this Actual Tranſlation, or Succeſſive Application of Bodies does immediately come. And my Enquiry now

ſhall be concerning the *Original* of This, not in *particular* as it is in this or that particular Body, but the Riſe of *Impetus* or Motive Force in *general*, which having found, I will *firſt* remove an Objection, and *then* improve the Diſcovery, to ſhew *how* Matter comes from Mind, as well as how Motion doth from a Principle that is at reſt.

It muſt be acknowledged, that there is ſome appearance (at firſt ſight) of cauſe to believe, that as *mind* is the firſt ſubject of Cogitation, and *matter* the firſt ſubject of Extenſion, ſo, ſince *Energy* or Force (the immediate Principle of Action and of Actual motion) is neither Cogitation, nor Extenſion, that ſome *third* ſubſtance Diſtinct both from mind and matter, ſhould be the firſt ſubject of *it*, and conſequently, that there ſhould be *three* Principles, Mind, Matter, and the firſt Mover. And indeed it looks as if the Scripture *Hypotheſis* did countenance *this*; for there mention is made of the *Spirit* which wrought, as the firſt ſubject of motion; of the Abyſs of *Waters* wrought upon, as the firſt Recipient Subject; and of the *word* Reaſon, or Wiſdom which directed the Work. But on ſecond Conſideration, as it is clear, that all that *Moſes* ſays in his *Geneſis*, concerning the Spirit, and the Word, is not

ſaid

ſaid with deſign to intimate, that really the Spirit was only a meer ſenſleſs inartificial Force, or Energy, and that Wiſdom or the Word was another diſtinct Principle, that directed and guided it in all its Motions; but to ſhew, ſince we men (in our inadequate way of Conceiving) do diſtinguiſh *Wiſdom* and *Power*, that all the works of God were made in *Both*, but Both united in one *Demiurgical Mind*, or (to uſe *Seneca*'s Expreſſion) on *Ratio faciens*. Thus, *Ratio faciens* is the Idea or Notion of the *Moſaical* Spirit, the true *Natura Naturans*, that concurred to make the World, not in the manner that *God* himſelf did, who, in the Moſaical Hypotheſis, Acted only as an External Efficient, but in the way that the *Soul* would do in a living Creature, if firſt by its Plaſtic vertue it ſhould form all the members of the Body of it, and afterwards, ſhould inform it, and act in it. And *Cotta* in *Cicero* has as finely as compendiouſly expreſſed the Difference between theſe *two* ſeveral ways of working, even in Reference to the World. When *L.* 3. *de Nat. Deor.* he ſays, *Ita prorſus exiſtimarem, ſi illum* [*mundum*] *ædificatum, non quemadmodum docebo, à naturâ conformatum putarem.*

It is this Spirit that is the *Original Cauſe* of the *Impetus*, that is the *neareſt cauſe* of

Local Motion; and indeed, it is the Original Cauſe of all *Mundane Activity* and Energy: Motion comes from Energy or Action, and all Energy and Action from the Moſaical Spirit; [not from meer matter, but from mind in matter.] In ſhort, *Impetus* or Force ariſes from the *ſame* Principle that Cogitation or Perception does; as is evident by the following Conſiderations.

Firſt, The *firſt mention* that we have of *motion*, or Corporeal Action, is in Relation to the Moſaical Spirit, in *Gen.* 1. 2. where it is ſaid, that the *Spirit* of God *moved* upon the face of the waters. It is true, the word uſed in this Text for motion, is ſeldom uſed, [but thrice in the whole Scripture, to wit, in this place, in *Deut.* 32. 11. and in *Jer.* 23. 9.] And therefore the direct particular meaning of it will not be eaſily agreed, but that it imports ſome motion (which is as much as I do urge it for;) is beyond diſpute: *Motum aliquem Notari*, (ſays Hotting. in Exam. Hiſt. Creat. Queſt. 33.) *non eſt Dubitandum.*

Secondly, It is farther Evident from the very *Ideas* that we have of things: For we cannot conceive mind as a Perceptive Cogi-

Cogitative ſubſtance, but withall, we muſt conceive it as *Active*, and that there is ſomething *Energetical* in it; whereas, on the other hand, matter may (and in its own proper Idea muſt) be conceived as a thing that is only *Paſſive*, not Active; there being nothing of Active or Energetical in it as it is but ſpacious extenſive ſubſtance; and therefore Energy and Action cannot be conceived to proceed but from matter, which in its ſelf is Idle and unactive; but rather from mind, which is eſſentially active and buſie.

Thirdly, It may alſo be argued from the *relation*, that (Experience aſſures us,) is between Cogitation and Actual motion. For we clearly perceive, that all our voluntary motions do ariſe from Thought or Imagination; we do move our ſelves, or any particular part that hath the proper inſtruments of voluntary motion, and theſe duly qualified, at our pleaſure, when we will; that is, by imagination and thought. We go, we ſtand ſtill (which is by Tonic motion;) we put our hands, feet, heads, eyes, and other parts of our bodies into motion, and regulate them in their ſeveral motions, by will or thought, ay, even cogitation it ſelf in all the ſeveral modes of it, as it is ſenſation, imagination, or ratiocination,

ocination, does ever bear a proportion to ſome motion; inſomuch that as the minute parts of any Organ that ſerves unto Cogitation of any kind, are more or leſs in motion; or, (which is meant and is Equivalent,) as the *Organ* is in more or leſs Diſpoſition and Aptitude to receive impreſſions; ſo anſwerably, the Act of Cogitation is graduated. Organs that are affected with heavineſs or *torpor*, (as thoſe are whoſe Particles are too little in motion, and conſequently indiſpoſed for receiving fitting impreſſions,) are anſwerably under a *Stupor*, or Diminution of ſenſe and perception: but inflamed Organs, whoſe particles have too much motion, and conſequently are apt to be too *eaſily*, or too *much* ſtirred, theſe are exquiſitely ſenſible and tender. In fine, *Reaſon* it ſelf, as to its grounds, is but *Harmony*; a certain modification and turning of the parts, (either the Spirits, or the Filaments,) that are the immediate inſtruments of that kind of cogitation; ſo that they be not wound up too high, or let down too low; that is, that they be not in too much motion, or aptitude unto it, or in too little, but in a juſt mediocrity; and this is to be in *Tune*, or in Harmony. The truth hereof is evident. For if the Organ of Reaſon is inflamed, ſo that the Particles of it are too much

much in motion, the action that it exerts in that inſtance is not reaſon, but *madneſs* of one ſort or another; and again, if the Organ is torpid, through a defect of motion in the Particles of it, the Cogitation that is exerciſed in this inſtance is plain *ſtupidity* and folly; and the power a dulneſs or ſhortneſs of wit. Wherefore *Ariſtoxenus* the Muſician, who affirmed that the Soul was a Harmony, as he receded not from his Art, ſo he did not much wander from the true nature of the Soul. In truth, *Harmony* or Proportion is the *Soul of the World.* For if we look well, we ſhall find that, that which formalizes things, and qualities, and which makes them be of this or that kind, and to act in this or that way, is nothing but the Proportion or *Logos* that is in them; that is, it is the *Tuning* of them in the world, and one to another, as to parts, and motions: moſt, if not all the *Specifical Qualities* and Operations that are in the World, ariſe from hence; which are therefore called *Occult*, becauſe this Spring and Original of them is ſo little regarded; but of this more in another, and perhaps a more proper place.

But to more illuſtrate the former Argument, and ſhow in a fuller light, the rela-

tion between Cogitation and actual motion; I will enter farther into the Conſideration of *motion*; and will manifeſt, both the *ſubtlety* of it, and alſo the *Correſpondence* which it holds with Mind, or the *Perceptive*. I will not ſpeak now of the motion that is *Local* to ſuch a Degree, that it falls under *Obſervation* of the ſenſe, but of *that* motion (for motion it is) that contributes to the *being* of ſenſe; which for Diſtinction ſake may be called *Impreſſion*. We are convinced by ſenſe, that in the *Impreſſions* that make it, there is a great deal of ſubtlety, and this too in various *Degrees*; and we are equally convinced, that there are various ſenſitive *Powers* to receive *them*, in thoſe ſeveral Degrees. Thus the impreſſion made upon the *Eye*, that cauſes *Viſion*, is by many Degrees more delicate and fine than that which cauſes the *Feeling*; ſince the Object ſeen by the Eye, and Conſequently making a Viſive impreſſion (upon it) ordinarily doth not make any upon the ſenſe of feeling. I ſay ordinarily, becauſe ſometimes, where the impreſſion of the viſible is very ſtrong, as when one looks upon the Sun, or on ſome other very ſtrong and vigorous Light, the *feeling* of the *Eye* is affected, as well as the *Sight*, ſo that there is a ſenſe of *pain*, from a ſolution of Continuity. Which plainly

evinces

evinces (to note it by the by) that all visible impression, tho' it be not sensibly a motion, yet really is so, since even visible impressions, if strong and vigorous, are painful; and consequently, are motions; for nothing causes pain but motion; pain being nothing but little Spasms and Tensions of the parts; and if strong impressions be motions, weaker ones are so too; tho' in a less degree.

Again, The impression made upon the *Ear*, that causes *sound*, tho' it be by much a less fine and delicate one than that upon the Eye, which causes Light or Colour, it is however of far greater fineness and delicacy than that Impression which produces *pain* in the Ear; For as we *see* without pain, so, ordinarily we *hear* without it; that is, we are affected by sonorous Objects, which do propagate their motions to our ears, with the sentiment of sound, without being sensible of this Affection any other way. And yet if the sound be too intense, it always *pains*, and often breaks, or too much stretches the *Tympanum* or Drum of the Ear. The observation that some Philosophers have taken of this latter effect, occasion'd them to make a *Maxim*, that *an Excellent Object destroys the Sense*; but possibly this must be understood with Correction, not so much in respect

ſpect of the Faculty or Perceptive *Power*, as of the *Organ*; for could the Organ bear thoſe ſtronger impreſſions, without Alteration or Hurt, the perceptive Faculty would not be offended; it is not the ſentiment, either that of *Light*, or that of *Sound*, that offends, but the motion that cauſes *it*, which is too ſtrong for the Organ, and diſſolves or alters its Texture. In fine, the impreſſion that cauſes *Intellection*, is by much a finer and more ſubtle one, than that which cauſes ſenſation, whether External, or Internal; and that by as many degrees as *Intellectual Ideas* are more fine and ſubtle than *Images*, and the *Underſtanding* a finer and more delicate Faculty than the *Senſe*.

By *Finer* and Delicater *Impreſſions*, I mean ſuch as have leſs of Local Motion. By Finer and Delicater *Faculties*, I mean ſuch as are ſenſible of Finer and Delicater Touches, or Impreſſions.

In this ſenſe, the *Imagination* muſt needs be a finer and more delicate faculty than any external ſenſe, for as much as it receives the impreſſions of External Objects but by *Reflection*, or Communication from the *Senſories*, but theſe have them *directly* from the very *Objects* themſelves; and by the ſame Reaſon, the *Underſtanding*, that receives impreſſions from the *internal ſenſe*, muſt

muſt needs be (as indeed it is) a much finer and delicater faculty than *That*.

Upon the whole, it is evident, that there is a near relation between actual motion and cogitation, and conſequently, that it is no unreaſonable thought to think, that as they are *near of kin*, ſo both are Off-ſprings of *one* Original cauſe, [mind in matter;] but then it will follow alſo, that motion, and indeed all Energy whatever in the Spring and Principle of it is *Reſt*, for ſo mind is. But this is the difficulty. For that motion ſhould come from a Principle that is at reſt, appears as unintelligible, as that Froſt ſhould come from Fire, or Darkneſs from Light.

Wherefore to make this clear, I muſt conſider things in the *Metaphyſical Hypotheſis*, as all are underſtood to come from one, by way of *Emanation*: and thus, all *Created Being* is compared to *Light*, that flows from the Sun; and then its *Emanation* is in the ſame manner, as the *Radiation* of Light, which is from a Center into an Orb or Sphere, in *Extenuating* Lines. Now in this Hypotheſis, as all Beings (even thoſe that are moſt oppoſite) do come from *one*, ſo they come from *it* in this way, that the more *Removed* any is from the *Central* Being, the more *Extenuated* it is; that is, as *God* or pure mind is the Central Being, that

that *Sun*, that is the Father of Lights; ſo all the Being that proceeds from *him*, has leſs of Light and more of Darkneſs, in proportion to the diſtance it has, upon the Scale of Being, and in its utmoſt *Elongation* or Removal from him, terminates in that, which in Appearance has nothing of Reſemblance to the Original Light; but (to be compared with it) is only *Darkneſs* and ſhadow; and this laſt is the Idea of *meer matter*, as that of the Central Light is of pure Mind. God is Light; Matter is *Darkneſs*; all intermediate Beings are *Light* and *Darkneſs*, in ſeveral proportions.

What I have ſaid is ſenſibly ſet out in the *ſhades* of Colours, and in *Colours* themſelves, which are but ſhades of *Light*; For the Extremes of *any* Colour, for Example, the *Brighteſt* Red, and the *Darkeſt*; or the Extreams of *all* Colours, as *White* and *Black*; compare them each with other, and they are ſo contrary, that nothing can be more, eſpecially the two latter; and yet they do participate, the former not only of Colour in general, but alſo of Red: and the latter, tho' of no particular Colour, yet of Light, which is the Ground of Colour in general; and alſo the Darkeſt Red, if it doth not come from the Brighteſt; and the Blackeſt Colour

lour from the Whiteſt; yet, by the Gradation of Shades, or Participle, intermediate Colours, they are ſo continued one to another, that the Aſcent and Deſcent from one unto the other is moſt Agreeable and Delightful, as made by eaſie ſteps, without any Patches, or Chaſms. It is true, if we look on Contraries in their *Phyſical* Conſideration, ſo they are of *oppoſite Natures*, oppoſite Operations, and one expels the other, when they are immediately ſet together; but if we look upon them in their *Metaphyſical* Conſideration, ſo they are but *degrees* of the ſame nature, and capable of being United and Reconciled; inſomuch, that One in a right ſenſe may be ſaid to come from Another; as Darkneſs from Light. For however contrary *Light* and *Darkneſs* are, each unto other, as to Qualities and Phyſical Operation, and ſo in their Phyſical Conſideration, yet as to their Metaphyſical, they differ but in *degrees*; both have the ſame grounds; for Shadow really is but leſſer Light, occaſion'd by the interpoſition of an Opaque Body, and Darkneſs is but a great Shadow. And thus a *Flat* and a *Sharp*, tho' contrary ſounds, as to their *Phyſical* Conſideration, yet as to their *metaphyſical*, they are but different degrees; the Sharp a greater, the Flat a leſſer degree

gree of Celerity. And thus as Darkneſs comes from Light, only by the Leſsning or Extenuating of it; ſo may matter come from mind: *mind* is pure Light, or, all Being in Eminence; but *matter*, as it doth Participate nothing at all of mind, but only by meer Exiſtence, ſo it is meer darkneſs, without the leaſt degree of Vitality or Life; and *all Beings* between Mind and Matter, are as *Colours*, in reſpect of Light, or as *Shades*, in reſpect of any particular Colour.


But to add ſome further cleering to this Subject, and to ſhew how actual local motion may come from a Principle that is at reſt, which being ſhewed, will ſhew withall *how* Matter may come from mind, ſince there is no greater Repugnance (even to common ſenſe) in the one, than is in the other, I will conſider the Relation that the *Center* of a Circle has unto its *Circumference*, and how things are in the *one*, and how in the *other*; For this will afford it much Illuſtration. In the *Center* then of a Circle, or of a moved Sphere, all is at Reſt, and out of *it* all in motion, but in ſuch proportion, that that portion of a *Radius* which is at a farther diſtance from the Center, is *more* in motion, by reaſon of that diſtance, and that which is nearer

is

is *leſs*; which is evident even to ſenſe, in the following Diagram.

In the three Concentrical Circles, *B. C. D. E. F. G.* if the Ray *A. B. D. F.* is ſuppoſed to be moved from *F.* to *G.* it will appear to any that conſiders, that in the ſame time that in the inmoſt Circle it doth move from *B.* to *C.* and in the middle from *D.* to *E* it moves in the outmoſt from *F.* to *G.* that is, it moves faſter, and is more in motion, the farther it is from the Center *A.* and only becauſe it is ſo. Again, on the Contrary, in the ſame time that the *Radius* moves in the outmoſt Circle from *F.* to *G.* it moves in the middle but from *D.* to *E.* and in the inmoſt (which is neareſt to the Center *A.*) but from *B.* to *C.* that is, it has more of Reſt, and leſs of Motion, the nearer it is to the Center, and in the Center has no motion at all, but is at pure reſt. Even ſenſe acquaints us, that the Arch or Space *F. G.* is much Greater than the Space *D. E.* and that *D. E.* is Greater than *B. C.* and ſo on the contrary, that the Arch or Space *B. C.* is leſs by much than *D. E.* and *D. E.* (by much) than the Arch or Space. *F. G.* and yet all the Spaces are ſuppoſed to be paſſed by the Ray *A. B. D. F.* in the ſame time.

time. Now that which paſſes a greater ſpace in the ſame time, is more in motion, and has greater Celerity; and that which paſſes a leſs, is leſs in motion, and has leſs of Celerity; and therefore ſince the nearer the Ray is unto the Center, the leſs ſpace it paſſes in the ſame time, and the farther off it is, the more it paſſes, and that more or leſs as it is farther off, or nearer; it evidently follows, that farther off from the Center, a Ray has more of motion, and as it is nearer to it, it has leſs, and in the Center has none.



Well then, ſuppoſing that the Principle of Energy and Motion is in the *Center* of the Orb of Being, (and we may well ſuppoſe it, ſince even *Nature* has its Sphere of Activity, and Acts as from a Center to a Circumference; (ſo *Seeds* Act, ſo *Light* Acts and Diffuſes it ſelf;) it is certain that motion muſt come from ſomething not in Motion, but at Reſt; for ſo that is, which is in the Center; and indeed, elſe there muſt be infinite progreſſion in Motions. *Again*, ſince in the Orb of being, Pure Mind is in the Center,

and matter in the utmoſt Circumference, it follows, that the nearer things are unto pure mind, and the more they do participate of that, the more they have of Reſt, and the leſs of motion; but the farther off they are from pure Mind, and the nearer to matter, the more in motion they are. And indeed, all Energy in matter is Local Motion. Thus all the Effects of *Mechaniſm*, as they are purely material, ſo they are performed *only* by Local Motion; but the buſineſs of Cogitation, even in the loweſt ſtep of it, which is ſenſation, as it is of nearer Relation unto mind than to matter, ſo it is performed rather by way of mutation, than of Local motion; the *Eye* is not ſenſible of any motion imparted to it, nor is the Ear, or the Noſe, or any other of our Senſories, and yet each is ſenſible of a mutation made therein, (or rather in the Faculty) which comes from motion. But tho' the more refined any Beings are, and the nearer that they are to the Central Mind, the more at reſt they be, and the leſs in motion in their ſeveral Actions; and conſequently Abſtract Spirits that do not live in groſs Elementary Bodies, are more at reſt, and have leſs of motion, in the exerciſes of their ſeveral Powers, than Men have, who are imbodied in Elementary Vehicles;

cles; yet *no Spirit* whatſoever but only *God* himſelf, who only is Pure Mind, is *ſo* wholly, ſo Abſolutely at Reſt, *as* that it ſees all Things at once, by one Entire view and Intuition; all Principles and all Concluſions in them; all Ends and all Means and Motives to them; without the leaſt degree of Succeſſion, or any Addition. Only the *Central Being* ſees *ſo*, and he doe's.

For ſeeing all the Circumference is in the Center, ſo that all the Lines however divided they be in the former, do meet together in the latter; it is plain, that an Eye placed in the *Center*, muſt needs ſee all in the *Circle*, as clearly as any thing in it; and this too with one Individual, ſingle Intuition, without Succeſſion, or, Addition; ſeeing there is nothing of Motion, but all is Reſt in the Center. And this properly is to *ſee in Eternity*. Thus *God* ſees. But all *other Beings* beſide God, *as* they are not God, or Pure mind, *ſo* they are not in the Center, and not being the Center, but at Diſtance from it, ſome at Greater, ſome at Leſſer, but All at ſome, they All have ſomething of Motion, and conſequently cannot Act, or See, in the ſame manner as Central Pure Mind, by way of Abſolute Reſt, without Succeſſion, or Addition,

and without Diſtinction of paſt, preſent, and to come: For tho' all the Lines do meet in the Center, yet there being no place without it in which they do ſo, Creatures cannot ſee as God ſees, no more than they can be in the Center as God is. It is too ſhort and Inadequate a way of Arguing to Infer that any Creatures can ſee All things at once, but from the notions (confuſed enough) that we Mortals have of *Time* and *Eternity*; as that *Time* is Succeſſive, *Eternity* a Permanent Duration; together with a Conceit, that *all Spirits* (they being things Abſtract and Separate from Bodies,) both Are, and Act, *in Eternity*, as all Imbodied Beings Are, and do Act, in *Time*. Certainly every Being but God, is in Time, tho' not in the ſame Kind of Time; for as God only is in *the Center*, ſo he only is Abſolutely *in Eternity*. And if Time is taken for all Duration that is not Eternity, God only is without Time, and ſo without Succeſſion of Actions. But to Return.

SECT.

SECT. III.

Of Mind as it Actuates a certain Particular Body; Mind in this Notion called a Soul. Body is a Syſtem of Organs. Soul and Body an Animal. Body Conſidered two ways. To wit, in Reference to External Objects, *and in Reference to the Internal* Principle *that Acts it. In the Firſt Conſideration of Body, the Ends and uſes of Organs are ſhewed, and withal the Reaſon of their variety. This Illuſtrated by ſeveral Inſtances and Obſervations. The uſe of Body in Relation to the Internal Principle that Actuates it, is to Individuate and Singularize that Principle. This ſet out in ſenſible and plain Reſemblances. A Compariſon between Vital and Locomotive Energy; with a Recapitulation of the whole Diſcourſe, as it unfolds the Myſtery of Animals.*

WE have Conſidered Mind in the firſt Step of Relation that it carries unto Matter, Namely, as it doe's *Actuate a moſt ſubtle Matter diffuſed throughout the Univerſe*, in which Notion it is called *Spirit* ſimply, as was ſhowed from *Malachy*, *Ch.* 2. *v.* 15. Come we now to Conſider

it in the next place, as it *Actuates ſome Particular Syſtem of Matter*, in a Particular Manner; and ſo it is called a *Soul*; and that Particular Syſtem of Matter, which it doth Actuate, is a *Body*, or a Particular Vehicle; and the Reſult of both an *Animal*. An *Animal* is nothing but Soul and Body together; or a Body Actuated by a Soul. A *Body* is a Syſtem of Organs; an *Organ* is Matter framed and Contrived after a Particular Manner for ſome Animal Uſe, and End; ſome Uſe, End, or Action of a Soul: A *Soul* is a certain Determinate Vital Energy; or a certain Portion of the Spirit of the Univerſe, Veſted in a Body, or particular Vehicle; in which Notion all *Souls* are *Spirits*; as indeed they are ſtiled in the Holy Scripture, wherein we Read of the Spirit of the *Beaſt*, tho' it goes Downward, as well as of the Spirit of a *Man* that goes Upward.

This Diſcourſe I fear will ſeem a little Myſterious; and therefore to Inlighten it, and withal to open (tho' but in general) the Myſtery of the *Animal Nature*, and, by Analogy unto it, the Nature of *other Vivents*, I will Reſume it from the Beginning, and ſpeak more Diſtinctly: taking my Riſe from *Bodies*, or Syſtems of Organs, which coming under Senſe, are better

better known unto us than Spirits or Souls.

Body then, as it is a Syſtem of Organs, has a *Double* Relation, and ſo may be Conſidered two ways; either with Reſpect to External *Objects* by which it ſelf is Affected, and by means thereof, the Mind; or elſe with Reſpect to the Internal *Principle* that doth Inform and Actuate it, and Act in it, which Principle it doth *Individuate* and Singularize.

We will firſt Conſider a Body in the Relation that it has unto *External Objects*, and here we muſt ſet out the *Nature*, that is, the Ends and Uſes of the Organs which compoſe a Body, as alſo the Reaſon of the *Variety*, and number of thoſe Organs; why *any* Organs at all, and why *many*: both which will be done with one Performance. An Organ properly, is Matter Particularly Textured, and Framed for ſome Particular uſe: And an Animal Organ is Particularly Textured, and Framed for an Animal uſe: I will give the Example in only Senſitive Animals, and in the Acts of Senſation, as being beſt underſtood; but what is ſaid of Senſation, and of the Organs of it, will, by Proportion, hold in all the other Actions of Animals, and in all other Organs, with a due Alteration.

In all *Acts of Senſation* there is firſt an *Affection* of the Organ, and then a *Perception* of that Affection by the Soul; or rather, a Perception Excited in the *Soul* by means of that Affection; and this is the *End* of the *Organ*, and the only Uſe of it, that the Soul makes, to wit, to come by means thereof unto a Perception of External Objects; as, to ſee their Colours, to hear their Sounds, to Reliſh the ſeveral Taſts they have, and the like. In ſhort, a Soul cannot but by the *means* of *Organs*, take any notice of External Objects, nor the Organ be a means of conveying any notice to the Soul, but by being firſt *Affected* it ſelf. Now the *Affection* of the Organ ariſes from a *Perception* (may I ſo expreſs it) or a Reception of the *Motions* Communicated to it by Objects; and a *Capacity* for this Reception from the Particular *Frame* of the Organ. For ſince all Matter indifferently is not capable of receiving all kinds of Motions and Impreſſions; but that for ſome *Particular Motions* and Impreſſions (of which ſort are ſenſible ones) there muſt be *Particular Textures* and Frames of Matter to *Catch* them; it follows, that there muſt be *Organs*; and theſe too in ſuch *Variety* and Number: there muſt be *Organs*, to Receive the Impreſſion and Motions of Objects, which without

without a Particular Texture of Matter could not be Received; and there must be *Variety* of Organs, to Correspond these various Kinds of Motions and Impressions that are in Coloured, in Sonorous, in Sapid, and in other *Species* of Objects.

This will be better conceived in some Instances, by which it shall be made appear, that for the Reception of certain Particular Motions, there must be certain *Particular Textures*, and Dispositions of Matter; so that Matter in some certain Frames and Dispositions of it will *Catch*, and be Affected with, some certain Particular Motions, that in others, it will not be *Touched* with. It is Generally Observed, that an *Unison* string will Receive the Motion, and so, Tremble, when another also Unison is made to Sound, and yet all other Strings of the same Instrument, that are not Unisons, shall remain insensible and unmov'd. *Cardan* Observed, that in a certain Church, in which were several Images of Wax, but one would move and Tremble, and one always would, at the Ringing of a Sacring Bell. Mr. *Boile* has taken notice of the like Mechanical Perception, in several Empty Drinking-Glasses of Fine white Metal; he says, that causing the Strings of a Musical Instrument to be variously

screwed

ſcrewed up, and let down, and briskly ſtruck, he obſerved, that the Motion of one String, when it was ſtretched to a certain *Note*, or Tone, would make one of the Glaſſes Ring, and not the other; nor would the ſound of the ſame String Tuned to another Note, ſenſibly Affect the ſame Glaſs; tho' perhaps, ſays he, it might have its Operation upon another. In fine, there are *Tonical Echo's*, that Return not the Voice but when it has ſome Peculiar Muſical Note, and then it doe's. Thus Organs are Matter Particularly Textur'd, to the End to make them capable of Receiving ſome Particular Motions: ſo that a *Senſitive Organ* may be Defined, a Syſtem of Matter Particularly Framed, Diſpoſed, and Textured for receiving ſome Particular Motion of External Bodies, and for Conveying it to the Soul.

So much concerning Body in its Relation to External *Objects*; come I now to conſider it in the Relation which it has to the *Soul*, (the Internal Principle that Actuates it, and Acts in, and by it;) and ſo, the Great work and Buſineſs of the Body is to *Singularize* and Individuate the *General Vital Principle* of the Univerſe, that it may become a *Soul*, or a Particular Vital Principle of a certain Particular Body. To underſtand this it muſt be

Conſider'd,

Conſider'd, that the *Moſaical Spirit* (the Riſe and Principle of all Created Cogitation,) as it is Extended throughout the whole Univerſe; ſo, to become in Particular a *Soul*, of any Particular *Animal*, it muſt be *Singularized*, and Individuated, that is, it muſt be *Apportioned* (as it were) to that Particular Animal, which it comes *to be* by means of the Body. To Illuſtrate this, it muſt be Remembred, that a *Voice* or Sound Diffuſed throughout the whole capacity of the *Medium* (as the *Moſaical* Spirit is throughout that of the univerſe) is yet in the *Phonocamptick Center* or object (which is nothing but a place conveniently Diſpoſed for this Purpoſe,) *ſo Individuated* and Singularized (as the Moſaical Spirit is ſuppoſed to be by a Congruous fit Body,) that Really it has *other Affections* and Properties, than *thoſe* it owns, in all the reſt of the *Medium*, inſomuch that by Vertue of it, this *place* inſtead of being a *Medium* of Sound, becomes to all Appearance a *Principle* of it, and ſo a *Speaker*, and this is called an *Echo*. It may alſo be ſet out in a *Speculum* or Looking-Glaſs, (for a Body is to the Moſaical Spirit, what a *Speculum* or Looking-Glaſs is to the Image of an Object in the *Medium*;) A *Speculum* Catches the Diffuſed Image, and *ſo Singularizes* it, that

it

it becomes a very Different thing, and puts on other very Different Properties than thoſe it has in the *Medium*, for in the *Looking-Giaſs* it doth appear as an Object which it doe's not out of it. But what doe's ſet it out moſt naturally, is, that it is ſo in *Man*; For the Soul or Cogitative Principle of a Man, as it is Extended throughout the whole Capacity of the Body, in like manner as the *Moſaical* Spirit is, throughout that of the Univerſe; ſo it is *Singularized* and Individuated, in, and by, the particular *Organs*: inſomuch that the *Eye* only does *See*; the *Ear* only does *Hear*, and only the *Tongue Taſts*, in Vertue thereof; for which Reaſon theſe are owned to have ſeveral particular *Faculties*, which are as ſo many ſeveral Souls unto them. Now what the Organs are to the Soul in any Body (that is but a Syſtem of Organs,) Bodies themſelves are, unto the *Moſaical* Spirit, the great Soul of the Univerſe, of which all particular Bodies are Organs. But ſince this Notion is of ſo much Importance, that it will deſerve a more particular Conſideration, and I deſign to give it one in another Chapter, I ſhall diſmiſs it at preſent, without further Inſiſting on it; and now will only add ſome *Improvement* to the former Diſcourſe, by making a *Compariſon* between

tween the Vital and the Mechanical Energy.

First then I lay it down as certain, that there is such a thing as a *Vital*, as well as a *Mechanical* Energy: by *Vital Energy* I mean all that is not meerly Mechanical; and therefore do comprehend in that Term whatever is properly *Mental*; by *Mechanical Energy* I mean Impulse or Springines, the neareſt Physical Principle of Actual Local Motion. Now we are as sure by our senses, and by the Reflection that we make upon our selves, and upon the Notices which we receive from Things without us, that there is such a thing as a *Vital* Energy, as we are that there is a *Mechanical*: Because we are as much assured of the Effects of the *one*, as we are of those of the *other*; as much assured that there is Life, Sensation, and Intellection, that come from a Vital; as we are that there are Actual Local Motions; Motions of Ascent and Descent, Motions Direct, and Motions Circular, *&c.* which (as Motions) come from Impulse, the Mechanical Energy.

Again; As it is Certain that *Local Motion*, or that Impulse which is the neareſt Physical Principle of it, is *not* Matter, or Materiate, but yet is *in* Matter, as United unto it: so by this Consideration we may become

become as certain, that *Vital Energy* and the Effects of it, *though* they be Immaterial, *yet* they may be in Matter; ſince there needs no more of Hooks and Crooks to make the Latter, than to make the Former, to ſtick, and hold together.

In the next place; As the Mechanical, or Loco-motive Energy is Diffuſed *throughout the World* (for there is nothing in this, that is Entirely at Reſt;) ſo is the Vital: Since it is certain that wherever, and whenever, any Matter becomes Diſpoſed, the Vital Principle is *always at hand* to Actuate that Matter, and Act in it, according as the Diſpoſitions of it do Invite or Permit: All *Putrefaction* or Digeſtion *any where*, determines in *Inſects*, or little Animals, (as Experience evinces,) the Spirits being Unfettered and let Looſe thereby.

And yet *as* the Mechanick or Loco-motive Impulſe is not Received in all Textures of Matter indifferently, but that, (as I have ſhowed already) there muſt for ſome certain Modifications of Local Motion, be certain particular Textures of Matter, *ſo* neither is the Vital Energy Catcht and Received indifferently by all Textures of Matter; but as all Life conſiſts in Motion, or in ſomething Analogous, ſo for certain Gradations and Exerciſes of Life,

Life, there muſt be cerain particular Fabricks and Textures of Matter, called *Organs*, and alſo certain particular Diſpoſitions in the *Mechanical Spirits* (for ſo I call the ſubtle Active Corpuſcles in every Concrete) that are the immediate inſtruments of the Vital Principle in all its Actions of Life, in this Corporeal World.

So that as Actual Motion, the Effect of Loco-motive Energy, and even Loco-motive Energy it ſelf (as taken for Impulſe) is not Material in this Senſe, that it does *conſiſt* of Matter, yet, if to be material be underſtood of that which is *Dependent on* Matter, and ſo Dependent that it cannot be without it; in the Senſe of the word, not only actual Motion, but even *Impulſe* (the neareſt Phyſical principle of Motion) is material, ſince neither of them can be but in, and by the means of Matter. In like manner, the Vital Principle that Animates Corporeal Beings, though it is not material in this Senſe, that it is *only* Matter, or a mode of Matter, yet in another it is, that it *ſo Depends* in all its Animal Operations, that it cannot exerciſe any but by means of Mater, and according to the Texture and Quality of it. Nothing can be plainer than this is to Senſe, for in all the Acts of Perception, not only the ſenſitive, but the Intellectual, *as* the Organs

are,

are, ſo are the Actions; if the Organs are ſound and duly Diſpoſed, the Actions are Conformable; but if the Organs are out of Tune and Vitiated, the Actions are ſo likewiſe; Ay, are Totally Aboliſhed, if the Organs are ſpoiled; Beſides, the ſeveral Kinds, and Degrees, of Deliration, that men themſelves are Subject unto, accordingly as their Spirits are ill Qualified and Diſtempered, do further Confirm it.

Upon the whole, as the Vital Energy it Diffuſed (as Light is) throughout the Univerſe; ſo according to the ſeveral Textures of Matter that do catch it, as a *Speculum* does the Light, it Exerts it ſelf; and being Catcht and Retained by the *Congruity* of the Body, (for it is Congruity only, not Hooks or Crooks, that holds them together,) it is called a *Soul*, and the whole Complex, [of Body and Soul] an *Animal*.

What I have ſaid, does more particularly regard the *Animals*, I call *Viſible*, which we are better Acquainted with, than with *others of a Higher Nature*; but yet, with a very eaſie Application, and by way of Analogy, it will alſo open the Nature of *theſe*: However, this Admonition doth Remind me of the next Head to which I muſt paſs, and that is, the *Diſtribution* of Animals.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

Animals are either Inviſible or Viſible; in the Former ſort I reckon Angels, Good and Bad, which are Etherial: As alſo the Genii, which are Aerial Animals. Inviſible Animals, why called Spirits. That there are Spirits Evinced, 1. From the general Tradition of the World. Mr. Hobbs's *Evaſion of this Argument Conſidered. 2. From Operations that cannot be Accounted for but from ſuch Cauſes. 3. From Intelligences and Notifications that cannot be Reſolved but upon this Hypotheſis. 4. From Spectra or Apparitions. Of the way and manner how Spirits do Appear, that it is twofold, Real and Viſional. That Good Angels when they do Appear are called* πνεύματα *or Spirits; and the Bad* φαντάσματα *or Fantomes.*

SECT. II.

I Have ſpoken of Animals in General, but to bring a greater Light toward the Underſtanding of the Animal Nature, I muſt conſider its *Diſtribution*, and ſhow the General Kinds or ſorts of Animals

that are in the Univerſe. And Animals in Conformity unto the Bodies that do help to compoſe them, are either *Viſible*, or *Inviſible*. By *Viſible* Animals, I mean ſuch as do conſiſt of groſs matter, and ſo have Bodies that naturally come under the perception of the external ſenſe; by *Inviſible* Animals, I mean ſuch as have Bodies ſo refined, that naturally they come not under the perception of *All*, or *Any* of the External Senſes.

Viſible Animals, which are the Animals that compoſe this *Lower Elementary World*, (for I will not undertake to ſpeak of any ſuch as may be in the other, commonly called the Superiour and Celeſtial,) the farther Diſcourſe of them is properly referred unto *Phyſicks*, and therefore I ſhall enter no farther thereinto at this time, but proceed to treat of the *Inviſible*.

By Invifible Animals, I mean Angels, good and bad, which I call Ætherial Animals, as alſo thoſe Æreal ones (ſome Ludicrous, ſome Torvous) that are called *Genii*; all which, with the ſeveral kinds they farther branch into, I will comprehend under one name [of *Spirits*,] and ſo ſpeak ſomething of their *Nature*; Demonſtrate their *Reality* and Exiſtence; and

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in fine, add ſomething concerning their *Apparition*, and the *ways* of it.

As to their *Nature* in General, I think I ſhall have ſaid all is neceſſary for me to ſay at this time, when I ſhall have ſhewed, that there is a ſenſe in which it may be truly ſaid, they are *Incorporeal*, (as ſaid they are, generally;) and yet there is a ſenſe too, in which, they muſt be acknowledged to be *Corporeal*, if the having *any* mixture of matter in their Compoſition can ſuffice (as I know it will be yielded me it doth) to make them properly denominated *ſuch*.

The ſenſe in which Spirits are truly ſaid to be *Incorporeal*, will be beſt underſtood by ſhewing the reaſon how the Attribute of being *Corporeal* becomes *Appropriated* unto viſible Animals; to comprehend which, we muſt conſider, that in order to our converſing with Objects, and taking Cognizance of them, we are endowed with *two* ſorts of Faculties, the *Senſe*, and the *Underſtanding*; and that the *Senſe* (even to Senſe) is an *Organical Material* Power, for we do ſee the Organs it uſes, the Eye for Seeing, the Ear for Hearing, and the like for all the reſt; but that the *Underſtanding* is (to *Senſe*) an *Inorganical Immaterial* Power, there not *Appearing* any *Senſible Organ*, by means of

which, it does exert or put forth its Acts. Now in conformity to this *Distinction* between our Faculties, we do make *one* of their Objects, (nor can we do it more agreeably:) calling the Substances that do properly come under the notice and observation of our sense, *Bodies*; and those that do not, but are only inferred and perceived by the understanding, *Spirits*: the former are corporeal material Substances; because perceived by *sense*, which is a material Organical Power; but the latter, such as Angels and other Spirits, are said to be immaterial, incorporeal, because we *cannot* See, or Feel, or Tast, or Smell them in their own Subsistences: In a word, we cannot perceive them in their own proper beings by any of the *Senses* we have, but only by the Ratiocination and Discourse of the *Understanding*, which (to sense) is an Inorganical Immaterial Power. And our Saviour Christ, when after his Resurrection, he appeared to his Disciples, and they apprehended that they had seen a Vision, to convince them of the Reality of his *Corporeal* Existence, and that he was not a Spirit, or an Apparition only, as they took him to be, he Appeals unto their *Sense*, and particularly to that of *Touch*, *Luke* 24. 39. Behold, says he, *my Hands, and my Feet, that it is I my self,*

ſelf, for a Spirit hath no Fleſh and Bones as you ſee me have: Wherein he goes upon theſe Notions, that a *Spirit* is an inviſible Thing, a Thing that in its own reality cannot be ſeen, nor be felt, but only be underſtood; and that, that ſubſtance which comes under the notice and cogniſance of the ſenſe is a *Body*.

And in this ſenſe of the word [Body] all Spirits are really un-imbodied incorporeal things; they have not *ſuch* Bodies of Fleſh and Bone, or Organs that come under the Obſervation and notices of *ſenſe*, as we have; but in another ſenſe of the word, as Body is not taken reſtrainedly, for that only which is *ſenſible*, but more largely, for *any Syſtem of Matter* whatever, (whether ſo refined and ſubtle that it comes not within the compaſs of any external ſenſe, or ſo groſs, that it may be perceived by it;) ſo Spirits are Corporeal and Embodied: That is, they are material (as well as mental) Beings; minds indeed they are, but Minds *in Matter*, or Animals. In this, *Scaliger* conſents with me, who in his Exercitations (*Exerc.* 307. §. 38.) boldly ſays, *Spiritus Latinis & Græcis Omnibus, Philoſophis, Medicis, Oratoribus, Corpus eſt: id eſt, Materia, & Forma.*

This will be Evident, if we conſider (1.) That Abſolute Purity, or Exemption

from *all* Matter, is the peculiar *Prerogative of God*, who only is Pure Light, without any mixture of Darkneſs; it is only *he*, the Central Being, (he that is abſolute pure being) that is pure unmixed mind; all other beings but *he* muſt be impure, and have ſome ingredience of *matter* in their Compoſition; without *which*, as they would be pure Mind, ſo (being pure mind) they would be God. Secondly, Were all or any Spirits, except the infinite Almighty *Center* and Spring of All Abſolutely pure, without any mixture of Matter; abſolutely ſimple, without any Real Compoſition; there could be no *Diſtinction* among them, either in Reſpect of *Kinds*, or of *Individuals*; ſince *Alterity* (and where there is Diſtinction, there muſt be Alterity; *unus & alius, eſt alter & alter,*) cannot conſiſt with *Abſolute ſimplicity*; Compoſition is *Unity*, but ſimplicity is *Unicity*.

To be more Particular; were Spirits Abſolutely Pure and Simple, without any Admiſſion of Matter, there could be no Diſtinction among them in reſpect of *Kinds*. For what ſhould difference them? if there were nothing in them but that, wherein they did all agree; as there would be nothing elſe but that, if all of them were pure and ſimple: Things that *Differ*

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in ſomething, and withal in ſomething *Agree*, cannot be *Pure* or *Simple*: for all have ſomething that is *Common*, in which they do agree, and all ſomething *not* Common, in which they differ; it is plain, that each of them Conſiſts of Thing, and Thing; and Things that Conſiſt of Thing and Thing are Compounded; not Pure and Simple Things.

Again, were Spirits abſolutely pure and ſimple, without any Concretion of Matter, there could be no diſtinction among them as to *Individuals*, as well as none in relation to Kinds. For ſince all Individuation (except only that of the Central pure mind) is *Numerication*, and all Numerication ariſes from Diviſion, and Diviſion has no place but in Matter, or in Things by means of matter. It is evident that there can be no diſtinction of Spirits as to Individuation, if there be no ingredience of matter in their making. Things are ſaid to differ *in number*, (and ſo all Individuals differ, as well thoſe of one and the ſame, as thoſe of divers *Species*,) that however identified they be in other Reſpects, yet do ſo differ, that one is not the other; which cannot be without Diviſion, of one from the other; nor Diviſion be without matter: *Unum* is not only *Indiviſum in ſe*, but *Diviſum à Quolibet alio*. As for *Meta-*

phyſical Matter and Metaphyſical *Form*, or that diſtinction that ſome make of (ſubſtantial) *Power* and *Act*, they are but *meer Words*, without any ſignification (at leaſt in my underſtanding,) if they are not reduced to *Matter* and *Mind*; which are the *only* Metaphyſical Principles of Things, that are *Exiſtent* and Real. In ſhort, we may obſerve *in our ſelves*, (that Mind as I have noted before) is *Individuated by Matter*, ſince even ſenſe is ſeeing in the *Eye*; Hearing in the *Ear*; Taſting in the *Tongue*, &c.

Another Conſideration that Induces me to believe, that all Spirits are *Animals*, and vitally united unto Matter, of one ſort or another, is, that the Apoſtle *Paul*, in a Diſcourſe of his Concerning the Reſurrection, 1 *Cor.* 15. doe's Speak of a *Spiritual* Body, in Contradiction to a *Natural*, as of the Body that All that do Ariſe in Chriſt ſhall be Cloathed withal; and Chriſt himſelf tells us, that All that ſhall Attain that glorious Reſurrection, ſhall be ἰσάγγελοι, as Angels; to wit, in Reſpect of their Spiritual Bodies, that ſhall Inveſt them: and if Glorified Men ſhall be *as* Angels, Angels muſt be *as* Glorified Men; that is, they muſt have Bodies, tho' Glorious and Spiritual Bodies.

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In fine, that Spirits are *Incorporeal* Beings in this ſenſe, that they have not ſuch Groſs Elementary Bodies as we have, of Fleſh and Blood and Bones, doe's not Infer, that they are *ſo* in every ſenſe of that word; eſpecially if we Conſider, that (as the Apoſtle aſſures us) there may be *Spiritual Bodies*; and there Appears not any Incoherence (in this,) that Spirits ſhould have Spiritual Bodies. Beſides, the Underſtanding it ſelf, that, unto ſenſe, is an *Inorganical* Immaterial Faculty, is not Abſolutely *ſo*, but has the *Animal Spirits* for an Organ, ſince as theſe are Diſpoſed and Textured, well or ill, even ſo the Exerciſes of that noble power, are either right, or depraved; and from the differences in *theſe* Spirits do come the differences of *Wits*, which are many. Ay, poſſibly thoſe Animal Spirits (or ſomething that reſembles them) may compoſe the *Body* which accompanies the departing Soul: for that ſome kind of Body does, which in the *Greek* is called αὐγοειδὲς, the Learned *Origen* has told us, *L.* 2. *Contra Celſum:* which *Body* he alſo ſays, is *that*, the Separated Soul is uſed to appear in; but as to this, I ſhall offer ſomething hereafter.

By this Diſcourſe it is Evident againſt Mr. *Hobbs*, and others of the Sadducean Opinion, that Spirits in their own Nature

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are Real and *Subſiſtent Beings*, and not meerly *Powers*, or *Operations* and *Actions*; tho' at the ſame time it muſt be acknowledged, that in the Language of the *Scripture*, ſuch *Active* and *Directive* Qualities as are *Intelligible* only, and do not come directly within the Cognizance of the ſenſe are called *Spirits*; thus we read of a Spirit of *Government* and of *Prophecy*, that was firſt upon *Moſes*, and afterward imparted to the 70 Elders, *Numb.* 11. of a Spirit of *Wiſdom*, *Deut.* 34. 9. of the Spirit of *Underſtanding*; the Spirit of *Counſel* and *Might*; the Spirit of *Knowledge*, and of the *Fear* of the Lord, *Iſa.* 11. 2. Ay, that vexatious Diſtemper that afflicted *Saul*, and that ſeems to have been nothing elſe but melancholly, is called an Evil Spirit from the Lord, 1 *Sam.* 16. 14. and in *Luke* 13. 11, 12. we read of a Spirit of *Infirmity*.

But tho' Spirit in the Holy Scriptures is often taken in the inſtanced ſenſe; and that the *Name* of *Angel* is a Name of *Office*, rather than of *Nature*; yet it is certain, that Angels are repreſented in thoſe Sacred Writings as *Real* ſubſiſting Beings, all as real and ſubſiſting as men themſelves are, if the aſcribing to *them* the like Affections, Offices, and Perſonal Operations, that Men

Men have, and do execute and exert, can prove them ſo.

SECT. II.

That there are Spirits, proved by General Tradition. Mr. Hobb's *Anſwer to this Argument ſhewed to be but an Evaſion, from the Evangeliſts* Matthew, *and* Mark, *&c.*

AND this reminds me of the *Second* Point I have propoſed to Diſcourſe on, in relation to Spirits, and that is, their *Exiſtence* or Being; wherein I ſhall endeavour to make it manifeſt, that really there are ſuch Subſiſtent intellectual Beings, as are incorporated, but inviſible, which commonly we call *Spirits*; ſo that the Names of Spirits, both of the Good ones, as *Raphael*, *Gabriel*, *&c.* And of the Evil ones, as *Belzebub*, *&c.* are Names of *Subſtances* or Perſons, and not of Qualities only; ay, are *proper*, and not (as Mr. *Hobbs* tells us, the name of *Sathan* and *Devil* is) only *Appellative* Names.

The firſt Argument that I will uſe to Evidence that there are Spirits, ſhall be taken from the *General Tradition* of the World; it being received among all *Nations*, as well the Civilized, as the Barbarous,

rous, and among all *Philoſophers* except the *Epicureans*, the Ancient and the Modern, and *ſome* Peripateticks; and to me it is very unintelligible, how ſuch a Sentiment ſhould obtain ſo generally, if it had not ſome foundation of Truth; for *who* ſhould ſpread the Opinion to ſuch an extent? and *what* ſhould make it to take?

Mr. *Hobbs* himſelf acknowledges it a truth, that the belief of Spirits was very general all the World over; only he has a way (which is peculiar to him) of avoiding the Cogency and Force of the Argument, and therefore I will here conſider what he ſays.

It is true, ſays he, 'that the *Heathens*, 'and all the Nations of the World have 'acknowledged that there be Spirits, which 'for the moſt part they hold to be incor-'poreal, whereby it may be thought that 'a man by natural Reaſon may arrive 'without the Scriptures to the knowledge 'of this, that Spirits are, but the errone-'ous Collection thereof by the Heathens, 'may proceed as I have ſaid before, from 'the ignorance of the Cauſe of Ghoſts and 'Fantoms, and ſuch other Apparitions. 'And from thence had the *Grecians* their 'number of Gods, their number of De-'mons good, or bad, and for every Man 'his Genius, which is not the acknowledg-

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'ing of this truth, that Spirits are, but a 'falſe Opinion concerning the force of Ima-'gination.

Thus Mr. *Hobbs*, in his Treatiſe of Human Nature, *Ch.* 11. *S.* 6. wherein he plainly Affirms, that Spirits and Ghoſts are meer Fantomes, or Effects of the Imagination: a conceit, in which he ſeems to have the Concurrence of *Seneca*, for this Philoſopher Epiſt. 24. tells us as Mr. *Hobbs* doe's, *Nemo tam Puer eſt ut Cerberum timeat, & Tenebras, & LARVARUM habitum nudis oſſibus Cohærentium.*

This *Notion* of Spirits, that Mr. *Hobbs* Inſinuates, Reminds me of *Another*, that a Perſon whom I knew, and who was Reputed not of the Wiſeſt, had of them; for being Asked what he thought a *Spirit* was, He Anſwered, that it was the *Shadow of Concſcience*; and further Demanded, concerning a *Good Angel*, what that was; He Replied, a Good is the Shadow of a *Good* Conſcience, and a *Devil* the Shadow of a *Bad* one, And Methinks he comes near to Mr. *Hobbs*. But without jeſting.

I Find, that *Apparitions* of Spirits are ſtiled *Fantoms* [φαντάσματα] by two Evangeliſts, *Matthew* and *Mark*. For when the Diſciples of our Lord ſaw him walking upon the Sea, and believed him to be a Spirit, the Former of thoſe Evangeliſts tells

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us that they ſaid ὁτι φάντασμα ἐστὶ, it is a Phantaſm, or, as our Tranſlators Render it, a *Sprite*, *Matt.* 14. 26. And the Latter has the ſame Expreſſion, when ſpeaking of the ſame Miracle, he ſays, they ſuppoſed him to be a *Phantaſm*, ἔδοξαν φάντασμα εἶναι; or as in our Engliſh Verſion, they *ſuppoſed it had been a* Sprite. *Mark.* 6. 49. Whence it Evidently follows, againſt Mr. *Hobbs*, that Men that were not Ignorant of the power of *Fancy*, and of the Intereſt it had in the Apparitions of Spirits, yet believed their *Real* Exiſtence. For the Diſciples that believed our Lord to be a Spirit, *Appearing*, and therefore ſaid he was a *Phantaſm* (which it ſeems was the uſual Expreſſion at that time for ſuch Apparitions,) did withal believe that a Spirit was a *Reality*, and of great Power. For upon the ſuppoſed Apparition, They are ſaid, by *one* of the Evangeliſts, to be much *Diſturbed*, ἐταράχθησαν ſays *Matthew*, Chap. 14. 26. They were *troubled* and cryed out *for Fear*; and the *other* ſays no leſs, for he ſays, *They cried out*, (*for They all ſaw him and were* Troubled,) Mark. 6. 49, 50. I would Demand of Mr. *Hobbs*, were he Alive, what can be Conceived to occaſion ſo much Conſternation, ſo much Affrightment, in the Diſciples, at the Apparition of a Spirit,

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if they did not take a Spirit to be ſomething Real, tho' they called the Appearing of it a Phantome. Certainly, when they were ſo much Affrighted at it, They muſt be Apprehenſive that it was a Thing of Great Power, that was come to hurt Them; for elſe, had They believed it to be a meer Effect of Their own Imagination, they would have been as *Unconcerned*, as Mr. *Hobbs* himſelf would be, at ſuch an Appearance.

I Conclude then, that as Mr. *Hobbs* was not the Firſt that called Spirits *Phantaſmata*, or Fantomes, but that they were called ſo of Old, (and indeed the word *Spectrum* in the Latin, and this of *Apparition* in the Engliſh Tongue, does anſwer very Properly to the word *Phantaſma* in the Greek, a word too Adopted by the *Romans*, in the ſame ſenſe;) ſo this Denomination was Given to them, not with Deſign to ſignify their *Nature* and Eſſence, (as Mr. *Hobbs* would have it,) but to ſet out the uſual *way* of Their Appearing, of which more hereafter. This is Evident from the Younger *Pliny*, who in one of his Epiſtles, having put the Queſtion, whether Apparitions or *Phantaſmata* (for this is the word he uſes) were Real and ſubſiſtent Things, he Affirms they are, and Inſtances in ſeveral Remarkable Sto-

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ries (as I ſhall ſhew hereafter) to Prove it.

So that this Firſt Argument for the Real Exiſtence of Spirits, taken from the General belief that all the World has of it (as Mr. *Hobbs* himſelf Acknowledges,) doe's hold Good and Concluſive, Notwithſtanding all that this Philoſopher has ſuggeſted againſt it. And indeed what he Propoſes, is ſaid ſo *Timorouſly* by him, [for he ſay's, *the Erroneous Collection thereof may* [but may] *Proceed* &c.] and that ſo *Precariouſly*, (being only an Aſſertion, without any Proof), that I need not have Given my ſelf the trouble of ſaying ſo much in Anſwer to it, but that in Things of this Nature, ſome have ſo very ſtrong a Byaſs, both of *Credulity* on one hand, and *Incredulity* on the other, that if any Room were left for Cavil, they would be ſure to make it.

SUB. I.

Another Argument to Prove Spirits. Of the Converſion of an Indian Raja. *A Remarkable Story of Witchcraft, out of* Mr. Gage's *Survey.*

AND Thus much for the Firſt Argument, I now proceed to the ſecond. And the ſecond Argument that I will uſe to Evidence that there are Spirits, ſhall be taken from *Operations* we are certain of, which cannot be Accounted for but by ſuppoſing ſuch Agents.

I have Read in *Purchas*, that a certain *Indian*, a Great *Raja*, and Greater *Atheiſt*, was brought to a Confeſſion, as well as Conviction of his Folly, by a ſtrange Providence. The Relation in that Author, goes in theſe Terms. "A Great *Raja* a "Gentile, a Notorious *Atheiſt*, and Con-"temner of all Deity, Glorying to pro-"feſs he knew no other *God* than the "*King*, nor believing nor fearing none: "ſitting Dallying with his Women, one "of them plucked a *Hair* from his Breaſt, "which being faſt Rooted, Plucked off a "little of the Skin, that Blood Appear-"ed; this ſmall Skar Feſtred and Gan-"grened Incurably, ſo that in few days

"he Deſpaired of Life, and being Ac-
"companied with all his Friends and
" Divers Courtiers he brake out into theſe
" Excellent words: Which of you would
" not have Thought that I being a Man of
" War ſhould have died by the Stroak of
"a Sword, Spear, or Bow? But now
" I am enforced to confeſs the Power of
" that *Great God*, whom I have ſo long
" Deſpiſed, that he needs no other *Lance*
" than a little Hair to kill ſo *Blaſphemous*
" a wretch and Contemner of his Majeſty,
" as I have been. *Part.* 1. *l.* 4. *f.* 600.
Thus God, is known in the World, by the *Judgments* which he Executes

And as God is known by his Judgments, ſo may other Spirits, by ſome *Events* that happen in the World, when they are ſo Extraordinary, and out of common courſe, that they cannot be Aſcribed but to ſuch Cauſes. I have here a very Large Field, but my Buſineſs being not to handle this Subject as a Common Place, but only to Touch it by way of Argument, I ſhall content my ſelf with the General Mention of *Prodigies*, that all Hiſtory, Ancient and Modern, abounds withal; and the ſtrange Performances of *Witches* and Wizards; of which Laſt I will give an *Inſtance* or two, that carry great Credibility, and yet are Abſolutely

Unaccount-

Unaccountable, if we do not Admit of Spirits, and in Truth not very Eaſy to be Conceived if we do. But the Matter of *Fact*, being Related by an Author not in every Bodies hand, I will lay it out at large in all its Circumſtances, as I Find them ſet down by him, that ſo Ingenious Men, who have the Curioſity to Inquire into Things of this Nature, may have the ſurer Grounds to go upon, in making their Judgment.

In *Pinola* (ſay's Mr. *Gage* in his new Survey of the *Weſt-Indies*, C. 20.) there were ſome who were much given to Witchcraft, and by the Power of the Devil did Act ſtrange things; amongſt the Reſt there was one Old Woman Named *Martha de Carillo*. who had been by ſome of the Town formerly Accuſed for Bewitching many; but the *Spaniſh* Juſtices quitted her, finding no ſure Evidence againſt her; with this ſhe grew worſe and worſe, and did much Harm; when I was there, two or three died, *withering away*, Declaring at their Death that this *Carillo* had Killed them, and that they *ſaw her* often about their Beds, threatning them with a Frowning and Angry Look. The *Indians* for fear of her durſt not complain againſt her, nor meddle with her; whereupon I ſent word unto *Don Juan de Guzman*

the Lord of that Town, that if he took not order with her, she would destroy his Town. He Hearing of it, got for me a Commission from the Bishop and another Officer of the Inquisition to make Diligent and Private Inquiry after her Life and Actions, which I did, and found among the *Indians* many and Grievous Complaints against her, most of the Town Affirming that certainly she was a Notorious Witch, and that before her former Accusation she was wont wheresoever she went about the Town to go with a *Duck* Following her, which when she came to the Church would stay at the door till she came out again, and then would Return home with her, which Duck they Imagined was her Beloved Devil and Familiar Spirit, for that they had often set Dogs at her and they would not meddle with her, but rather run away from her. This Duck never Appeared more with her, *since* she was formerly Accused before the Justice, which was thought to be her policy, that she might be no more suspected thereby. This Old Woman was a Widow, and of the *Poorest* of the Town in outward shew, and yet she had always store of *Money*, which none could tell which way she might come by it. Whilst I was thus Taking Privy Information against

againſt her (it being the Time of *Lent*, when all the Town came to Confeſſion) ſhe among the Reſt came to the Church to *Confeſs* her ſins, and brought me the beſt Preſent and Offering of all the Town; for whereas a Riall is Common, ſhe brought me four, and beſides, a *Turkey*, *Eggs*, *Fiſh*, and a little Bottle of *Honey*. She thought thereby to get with me a better Opinion than I had of her from the whole Town. I Accepted of her Great Offering, and heard her Confeſſion, which was of nothing but Trifles, which could ſcarce be Judged ſinful Actions. I Examined her very cloſe of what was the Common Judgment of all the *Indians*, and eſpecially of thoſe who dying, had declared to my ſelf *at their Death* that She had Bewitched them, and before their Sickneſs had *Threatned* them, and in their Sickneſs *Appeared* Threatning them with Death about their beds, none but they themſelves ſeeing her; to which ſhe Replyed Weeping that ſhe was Wronged. I Asked her, *how* ſhe being a Poor Widow without any Sons to help her, without any means of Livelyhood, had ſo much Money, as to give me more than the Richeſt of the Town; *how* She came by that Fiſh, Turkey, and Honey, having none of this of her own about her Houſe? to which ſhe *Replied*,

that God Loved her and gave her all theſe Things, and that with her Money ſhe Bought the reſt. I *Asked* her *of whom?* She *Anſwered* that out of the Town ſhe had them. I Perſuaded her to much Repentance, and to forſake the Devil and all Fellowſhip with him; but her Words and Anſwers were of a Saintly and Holy Woman; and ſhe earneſtly deſired me to give her the *Communion* with the Reſt that were to Receive the next day. Which I told her I durſt not do, uſing Chriſt's Words, Give not the Childrens bread unto dogs, nor caſt your Pearls unto Swine; and it would be a great Scandal to give the Communion unto her, who was ſuſpected generally, and had been Accuſed for a *Witch*. This ſhe took very ill, telling me that ſhe had many Years *Received* the Communion, and now in her Old Age it Grieved her to be Deprived of it, her tears were many, yet I could not be moved with them, but Reſolutely denied her the Communion, and ſo Diſmiſſed her. At Noon when I had done my work in the Church, I bad my Servants go to gather up the Offerings, and gave order to have the *Fiſh* Dreſſed for my Dinner which ſhe had brought, but no ſooner was it carried into the Kitchen, when the Cook looking on it found it *full of Maggots*, and ſtinking; ſo that

that I was forced to hurl it away; with that I began to ſuspect my Old Witch, and went to look on her *Honey*, and Pouring it out into a Diſh, I found it full of *Worms*; her *Eggs* I could not know from others, there being near a Hundred Offered that day, but after as I uſed them, we found ſome *Rotten*, ſome with *dead Chickens* in them; the next Morning the *Turkey* was found dead; As for her four *Rials*, I could not Perceive whether ſhe had Bewitched them out of my Pocket, for that I had put them with many other, which that day had been given Given me, yet as far as I could I called to Memory *who* and *what* had been Given me, and in my Judgment and Reckoning I verily thought that I miſſed *four* Rials; At Night when my Servants the *Indians* were gone to Bed, I ſat up late in my Chamber betaking my ſelf to my Books and Study, for I was the next Morning to make an Exhortation to thoſe that Received the Communion. After I had Studied a while, it being between Ten and Eleven of the Clock; on a ſudden the *Chief door* in the Hall (where in a Lower Room was my Chamber, and the Servants, and *three other* doors) flew *open*, and I heard one *come in*, and for a while *walk about*; then was *Another* door opened which went into a Little Room,

where my Saddles were Laid; with this I thought it might be the Black-More *Miguel Dalva*, who would often come late to my Houſe to Lodge there, Eſpecially ſince my fear of *Montenegro*, and I Conjectured that he was Laying up his Saddle, I called unto him by his Name two or three times, from within my Chamber, but no Anſwer was made, but ſuddenly *Another door* that went out to a Garden flew alſo open, wherewith I began within to *fear*, my joynts Trembled, my Hair ſtood up, I would have called out to the Servants, and my Voice was as it were ſtopped with the ſudden Affrightment; I began to think of the Witch, and put my truſt in God againſt her, and Encouraged my ſelf and Voice, calling out to the Servants, and knocking with a Cane at my door within that they might hear me, for I durſt not open it and go out; with the Noiſe that I made the Servants Awaked, and came out to my Chamber door; then I opened it, and asked them if they had not heard ſome Body in the Hall, and all the doors opened, they ſaid they were Aſleep, and heard nothing, only one *Boy* ſaid he *heard all*, and Related unto me the *ſame* that I had heard; I took my Candle then in my hand and went out with them into the Hall to view the *doors*, and I found them

all

all *ſhut*, as the Servants ſaid they had left them. Then I Perceived that the *Witch* would have Affrighted me, but had no power to do me any harm; I made two of the Servants lie in my Chamber, and went to bed; in the morning early I ſent for my *Fiſcal* the Clerk of the Church, and told him what had happen'd that Night, he ſmiled upon me, and told me it was the Widdow *Carillo*, who had often played ſuch Tricks in the Town with thoſe that had offended her, and therefore he had the night before come unto me from her, deſiring me to give her the Communion, leſt ſhe ſhould do me ſome hurt. which I denied unto him, as I had done to her ſelf; the Clerk bad me be of good cheer, for he knew ſhe had no power over me to do me any hurt. After the Communion that day, ſome of the Chief *Indians* came unto me, and told me that Old *Carillo* had *Boaſted* that ſhe would play me *ſome trick* or other, becauſe I would not give her the Communion. But I, to rid the Town of ſuch a Limb of Satan, ſent her to *Guatemala*, with all the Evidences and Witneſſes which I had found againſt her, unto the Preſident and Biſhop, who commanded her to be put in Priſon, where ſhe died within two months.

Many

Many more *Indians* there were in that Town, who were ſaid in my time to do very *ſtrange* things. One called *John Gonzalez*, was reported to *Change* himſelf into the ſhape of a Lion, and in that ſhape was one day ſhot in the noſe by a poor harmleſs *Spaniard*, who chiefly got his living by going about the Woods and Mountains, and ſhooting at Wild Deer, and other Beaſts to make Mony of them. He eſpied one day a *Lion*, and having no other aim at him but his Snout behind a Tree, he ſhot at him, the *Lion* ran away; the ſame day this *Gonzalez* was taken ſick; I was ſent for to hear his Confeſſion, I ſaw his face and noſe all bruiſed, and asked *how* it came? he told me then that he had fallen from a Tree, and almoſt killed himſelf, yet afterwards he accuſed the poor *Spaniard* for ſhooting at him; the buſineſs was examined by a *Spaniſh* Juſtice, my Evidence was taken for what *Gonzalez* told me of his fall from a Tree; the *Spaniard* was put to his Oath, who ſwore that he ſhot at a Lion in a Thick Wood, where an *Indian* could ſcarce be thought to have any buſineſs; the Tree was found out in the Wood, whereat the ſhot had been made, and was ſtill marked with the ſhot and Bullet; which *Gonzalez* confeſſed was to be the place; and was Examined how

he

he neither fell nor was ſeen by the *Spaniard*, when he came to ſeek for the Lion, thinking he had killed him; to which he anſwered, that he ran away leſt the *Spaniard* ſhould kill him indeed. But his Anſwers ſeemed frivolous, the *Spaniards* integrity being known, and the great ſuſpicion that was in the Town, of *Gonzalez* his dealing with the Devil, cleared the *Spaniard* from what was laid againſt him.

But this was nothing to what after happened to one *John Gomez*, the chiefeſt Indian of that Town of near fourſcore years of Age, the Head and Ruler of the Principalleſt Tribe among the *Indians*, whoſe Advice and Counſel was taken and preferred before all the reſt; who ſeemed to be a very *Godly* Indian, and very ſeldom miſſed Morning and Evening Prayers in the Church, and had beſtowed great Riches there. This *Indian* very ſuddenly was taken ſick (I being then in my other Town of *Mixco*) the *Mayordomos* or Stewards of the Sodality of the Virgin, fearing that he might die without Confeſſion, and they be chid for their negligence, at Midnight called me up at *Mixco*, deſiring me to go preſently and help *John Gomez* to die, whom alſo they ſaid deſired much to ſee me, and to receive ſome comfort from me.

me. I judging it a work of Charity, although the time of the night were unseasonable, and the great Rain at the present might have stopped my Charity, yet I would not be hindred by either of them, and so set forth to ride nine Miles both in the Dark, and Wet. When I came to *Pinola*, being thorow wet to the skin, I went immediately to the House of Old Sick *Gomez*, who lay with his face all muffled up, thanked me for my pains and care I had for his Soul, he desired to confess, and by his Confession and Weeping Evidenced nothing but a Godly Life, and a willing desire to die, and to be with Christ, I comforted him, and prepared him for Death, and before I departed, asked him how he felt himself; he answered that his Sickness was nothing but Old Age, and Weakness; with this I went to my House, changed my self, and lay down a while to rest, when suddenly I was called up again to give *Gomez* the Extream Unction, which the *Indians* (as they have been ignorantly taught) will not omit to receive before they die. As I Anointed him in his Nose, his Lips, his Eyes, his Hands and his Feet, I perceived that he was swelled, and black and blew, but made nothing of it, judging it to proceed from the sickness of his Body; I went

home

home again, being now break of the day, when after I had taken a ſmall nap, ſome *Indians* came to my door to buy Candles to offer up for *John Gomez* his Soul, whom they told me was departed, and was that day to be Buried very ſolemnly at Maſs. I aroſe with drouſie Eyes after ſo unquiet a nights reſt; and walked to the Church, where I ſaw the Grave was preparing. I met with two or three *Spaniards* who lived near the Town, and were come to Maſs that Morning, who went in with me to my Chamber, and with them I fell into Diſcourſe about *John Gomez*, telling them what comfort I had received at his Death, whom I judged to have lived very Holy, and doubted not of his Salvation, and that the Town would much want him, for that he was their Chief Guide, and Leader, Ruling them with good Advice and Counſel. At this time the *Spaniards* ſmiled one at another, and told me I was much deceived by all the *Indians*, but eſpecially by the deceaſed *Gomez*, if I judged him to have been a Saint, and Holy Man. I told them, that they, as Enemies to the *Indians*, judged ſtill uncharitably of them; but that I who knew very well their Conſciences, could judge better of them than they. One then Replyed, that it ſeemed I little knew the truth of *John Gomez*

Gomez his death by the Confeſſion which he made unto me, and that I ſeemed to be ignorant of the ſtir which was made in the Town concerning his Death. This ſeemed ſo ſtrange unto me, that I deſired them to inform me of the Truth. Then they told me that the report went, that *John Gomez* was the Chief *Wizard* of all the *Wizards* and *Witches* in the Town, and that commonly he was wont to be changed into the ſhape of a *Lion*, and ſo to walk about the Mountains. That he was ever a deadly Enemy to one *Sebaſtian Lopez* an Ancient *Indian*, and head of another Tribe; and that both of them two days before had met in the Mountain. *Gomez* in the ſhape of a *Lion*, and *Lopez* in the ſhape of a *Tyger*; and that they fought moſt cruelly, till *Gomez* (who was the older and weaker) was tired, much bit and bruiſed, and died of it. And farther, that I might be aſſured of this truth, they told me that *Lopez* was in Priſon for it, and the two Tribes ſtriving about it, and that the Tribe and Kindred of *Gomez* demanded from *Lopez* and his Tribe and Kindred ſatisfaction, and a great Sum of Money, or elſe did threaten to make the Caſe known unto the Spaniſh Power and Authority, which yet they were unwilling to do, if they could agree and ſmother it up among them-

themſelves, that they might not bring an aſperſion upon their whole Town. This ſeemed very ſtrange unto me, and I could not reſolve what to believe, and thought I would never more believe an *Indian*, if I found *John Gomez* to have ſo much Diſſembled and Deceived me. I took my leave of the *Spaniards*, and went my ſelf to the Priſon, where I found *Lopez* with Fetters. I called one of the Officers of the Town, who was *Alguazil Major*, and my great Friend, unto my Houſe, and privately examined him why *Lopez* was kept ſo cloſe Priſoner? he was loath to tell me, fearing the reſt of the *Indians*, and hoping the buſineſs would be taken up and agreed by the two Tribes, and not noiſed about the Country, which at that inſtant the two Alcades and Regidores, Majors, and Jurates, with the Chief of both Tribes were ſitting about in the Town-Houſe all that Morning. But I ſeeing the Officer ſo timorous, was more deſirous to know ſomething, and preſſed more upon him for the Truth, giving him an inkling of what I had heard from the *Spaniards* before. To which he anſwered, that if they could agree amongſt themſelves, they feared no ill report from the *Spaniards* againſt their Town; I told him I muſt know what they were agreeing upon amongſt them-

themſelves ſo cloſely in the Town-Houſe. He told me, if I would promiſe to ſay nothing of him (for he feared the whole Town if they ſhould know he had revealed any thing unto me) he would tell me the Truth. With this I comforted him, and gave him a Cup of Wine, and encouraged him, warranting him that no harm ſhould come unto him for what he told me. Then he related the buſineſs unto me as the *Spaniards* had done, and told me that he thought the Tribes amongſt themſelves would not agree; for that ſome of *Gomez* his Friends hated *Lopez*, and all ſuch as were ſo Familiar with the Devil, and cared not if *Gomez* his diſſembling Life were laid open to the World; but others he ſaid, who were as bad as *Lopez*, and *Gomez*, would have kept it cloſe, leſt they, and all the Witches and Wizards in the Town ſhould be diſcovered. This ſtruck me to the very heart, to think that I ſhould live amongſt ſuch People, whom I ſaw were ſpending all they could get by their Work and Labour upon the Church, Saints, and in Offerings, and yet were ſo privy to the Counſels of Satan; it grieved me that the word I preached unto them did no more good; and I reſolved from that time forward to ſpend moſt of my indeavours againſt Satans ſubtilty, and

to

to ſhew them more than I had done, the great danger of their Souls who had made any Compact with the Devil, that I might make them abandon and abjure his Works, and cloſe with Chriſt by Faith. *I* diſmiſſed the *Indian*, and went to the Church to ſee if the People were come to Maſs; I found there no body but only two who were making *Gomez* his Grave. I went back to my Chamber, troubled much within my ſelf, whether I ſhould allow him a Chriſtian Burial, who had lived and died ſo wickedly, as I had been informed. Yet I thought I was not bound to believe one *Indian* againſt him, nor the *Spaniards*, whom I ſuppoſed ſpoke but by hear-ſay. Whilſt I was thus muſing, there came unto me at leaſt twenty of the Chiefeſt of the Town, with the two Majors, Jurates, and all the Officers of Juſtice, who deſired me to forbear that day the Burying of *John Gomez*, for that they had reſolved to call a Crown Officer to view his Corps, and examine his death, leſt they ſhould all be troubled for him, and he be again unburied. I made as if I knew nothing, but inquired of them the reaſon; then they related all unto me, and told me how there were Witneſſes in the Town, who *ſaw a Lyon and a Tyger Fighting*, and preſently loſt the ſight of

the Beaſts, and *Jaw John Gomez, and Sebaſtian Lopez,* much about the ſame time parting one from another, and that immediately *John Gomez* came home bruiſed to his Bed, from whence he never roſe more, and that he declared upon his Death-Bed unto ſome of his Friends that *Sebaſtian Lopez* had killed him; whereupon they had him in ſafe Cuſtody. Farther they told me, that though they had never known ſo much wickedneſs of theſe two Chief Heads of their Town whom they had much reſpected and followed; yet now upon this occaſion, from the one Tribe and the other they were certainly informed that both of them did conſtantly deal with the Devil, which would be a great aſperſion upon their Town, but they for their parts abjured all ſuch wicked ways, and prayed me not to conceive the worſe of all for a few, whom they were reſolved to perſecute, and not ſuffer to live amongſt them. I told them I much liked their good zeal, and incouraged them as good Chriſtians to endeavour the rooting out of Satan from their Town, and they did very well in giving notice to *Guatemala,* to the *Spaniſh* Power of this Accident; and that if they had concealed it, they might all have been puniſhed as guilty of *Gomez* his death, and Agents with Satan, and his Inſtruments.

I assured them I had no ill conceit of them, but rather judged well of them for what they agreed to do. The Crown Officer was sent for, who came that night and searched *Gomez* his Body; I was present with him, and found it all *bruised*, scratched, and in many places *Bitten* and sore wounded. Many Evidences and suspicions were brought in against *Lopez* by the *Indians* of the Town, especially by *Gomez*, his Friends, whereupon he was carryed away to *Guatemala*, and there again was Tryed by the same Witnesses, and not much Denying the Fact himself, was there *Hanged*. And *Gomez*, though his Grave was opened in the Church, he was not Buried in it, but in another made Ready for him in a Ditch. So far in *Gage*.

There are multitudes of *Instances* in many Authors, of a Nature all as strange, and as surprizing, as the former; and *tho'* perhaps *most* of the Relations handed about with great Confidence, do, upon impartial Examination, prove either *Impostures* of Malicious, or *Mistakes* of Ignorant and Superstitious Persons; *yet some* come so well Attested, that it were to bid defiance to all Human Testimony to refuse them belief. Among Forreign Writers I will mention only the Learned & Judicious *Bodin* in his *Damonomania*, and

the Curious *Gaſper Schottus* in his *Phyſica Curioſa*, *Part* 1. *C.* 16. § 3. and *C.* 17. § 2. Among our own, the Eloquent Mr. *Glanvil*, in his *Sadduciſmus Triumphatus*; and Mr. *Baxter* (as Sagacious and Inquiſitive a perſon as any) his *Hiſtorical Diſcourſe* of Apparitions and Witches, who all abound with very Prodigious, but Credible Relations. To all which I might add the Confeſſions I have in Manuſcript, (all Original Papers, and well vouched,) of a great number of Witches, (ſome of which were Executed) that were taken by a *Juſtice* of Peace in *Cornwall* above thirty Years agoe: In which there are ſo many Rare and Curious Paſſages, that I find my ſelf under great Temptation of Promiſing to Annex them to the Second Part of this Diſcourſe, when I ſhall have Occaſion to ſay more upon the preſent Subject, under the Head of Supernatural Power. And Thus much for the *Second* Argument, which leads me to the *Third*.

SUB. I.

SUBS. II.

The Third Argument from Supernatural Advertiſements. An Inſtance out of Simocatto. *Another, of a ſtrange Omen out of Sir* W. Rawleigh. *Of the Corps-Candles in* Wales, *&c.*

THE Third Argument to prove the Real Being of Spirits, ſhall be taken from the ſtrange *Advertiſements* of Events, and as ſtrange *Premonitions*, that are ſometimes Given, which cannot be Reſolved but upon that *Hypotheſis*. I will but mention the *Oracles* of Old; the many Admoniſhing and Predictive *Dreams*, that ſome Perſons, in all Ages, have been Favoured with, (of which there is a Large Collection by *Strozzo Cicogna* in his *Magia Omnifariâ*, *Part* 1. *l.* 2. *C.* 4. as alſo in *Cicero*, in his Firſt Book of Divination;) and in fine, the Prodigious *Omens* that do often occur.

Nor will I inſiſt on what I find in Mr. *Stow* and other Hiſtorians, that *William*, Surnamed the Conquerour, though he died at *Roan* in *Normandy*, ſooner than was Expected, yet his Death was known at *Rome* the ſame day he Died. But I lay more ſtreſs upon an *Advertiſement* I find in

Theophylact Simocatta, concerning the Murther of the Emperour *Mauritius*, becauſe the Relation of it being Particular and Circumſtantial, carries Greater Evidence than the Former, and will endure the Teſt. There happened, ſays the *Hiſtorian*, on the very day in which *Mauritius* [the Emepror] was Murdred, a thing at *Alexandria* worthy to be Recorded. A certain Writing-Maſter or Scrivener (for ſo I do Adventure to interpret the word *Calligraphus*) being (that day) at a Merchants Houſe at a kind of Goſſips Feaſt, where he was obliged to ſtay till the Fourth Watch of the Night; as he was going homeward, being come to the *Tychaum*, a noted part of the City, (about midnight) he ſaw ſome of the chiefeſt *Statues* that ſtood there removing from off their Baſes, and at the ſame time heard a *Voice* that ſeemed to come from the ſame Statues, which called on him aloud, by Name, and withal, very ſhrilly, but briefly, Related the Accident that that day had befaln *Mauritius*. In the morning the Writing-Maſter goes to the Palace to Diſcover what had happened to him, which coming to the Ear of *Peter* the Prefect of *Ægypt* then reſiding there (who was nearly Related to *Simocatta*) he diligently inquires concerning the whole Affair, and

and after he had fully informed himſelf thereof, injoyns the Relater to Secrecy, and then ſetting down, in his Note Book, the whole Relation, he waits the Event. Of this not long after, he was aſſured by an Expreſs, which on the Ninth day brought him News of the Emperours *Death*, and of the Time of it; and then he Declared Publickly, how that this Accident had been *Foretold* by the Statues, or rather by the Demons, in the manner above Related, and Vouched the Writing-Maſter as the Author. This is the ſum of the Story, as *Simocatta* has Related it, (*Hiſt. Mauritian. l.* 8. *Ch.* 13.) A Story that is not told at Random, or by an Obſcure Perſon, or by a Perſon Remote from the Scene, or from the time it was Acted on; but a Story told by a Grave and Underſtanding Hiſtorian, who lived at the ſame time; was well acquainted with the Perſons concerned; and who made a Figure in the Government; ſo that he had all the Advantages that could be deſired to render him certain of the truth of it. *Lucilius* in *Cicero l.* 2. *de Nat. Deor.* tells us a ſtory of the like Nature, *viz.* That the Elder *P. Vatienus* coming by night to *Rome*, was Advertized by the *Tyndarida* in the ſhape of two young men, on White Horſes, that that day *Perſes* was over-

come by the Roman Army, and taken Prisoner; This he Reports to the Senate, by whom he was committed to Prison for spreading False News; but afterwards, when it Appeared by the Consuls Letters, that the Advertisement was true, he was both Released and Rewarded.

And as for *Omens*, than which nothing is more Ridiculous to the *Epicureans*, and all those that deny the Reality of Spirits, (so says *Cicero* de Nat. Deor. l. 2. *Nihil tam terridet* Epicurus *quam Prædictionem rerum futurarum*;) I will Instance in one that leaves no Room for any Evasion, since I take it from a Person who was very Confident of the Truth of it, and yet was a Person as little subject to Superstition, or to Fancy, as any Epicurean whatever. Sir *Walter Rawleigh* (for it is he I mean) in his History of the World (*B.* 4. *C.* 2. *S.* 7.) says, 'The strangest thing that I have Read of 'in this kind [*speaking of Omens*] being 'certainly true, was, that the Night be-'fore the Battle at *Novara*, All, [*not one, 'or some, which might be Chance, but All,*] 'the Doggs which Followed the *French* 'Army Ran from them to the *Switzers*, 'Leaping and Fawning upon them, as if 'they had been Bred and Fed by them 'all their Lives. And in the Morning 'Following, *Trivulzi* and *Tremovilli* Gene-

'rals

'ralls for *Lewis* the 12th were by these 'Imperial *Switzers* utterly Broken and 'put to Ruine.

But to Proceed, What will an *Epicurean*, or meer *Somatist*, say to the *Corps-Candles*, or Dead Mens Lights in *Wales*? if all be true that is Reported of them in Mr. *B*'s. Historical Discourse, *Ch. 6.* And Methinks his Vouchers are Good. I will Relate the Account they give in their own Terms; The First is one Mr. *Lewis*, who in his First Letter to Mr. *B.* (*October* 20. 1656.) speaking of the Appearance of those Lights which are called *Dead-Mens Candles*, before Mortality, He says, 'This is so or-'dinary in most of our Counties [of '*Wales*] that I never scarce heard of any 'sort young or old, but this is seen be-'fore Death, and often observed to part 'from the very Bodies of the Persons, all 'along the way to the Place of Burial, and 'Infallibly Death will Enfue. In his *Third* 'Letter Dated *Febr.* 14. 1656. He says, 'as for the *Candles*, all the Parts I know 'of *Wales*, as our Neighbouring Counties '(as I hear) have Experience of them, I 'scarce know any Gentleman, or Minister 'of any standing, but hath seen them; 'and a Neighbour of mine, will shortly 'be at *Worcester* Abiding (who hath seen 'them often, and I will Direct some to

'Acquaint

'Acquaint you, and upon Oath, if need 'be,) a very Credible Aged Perſon; for 'my Part, I never ſaw the Candles; 'but thoſe of my Houſe have, and on a 'Time ſome two years Paſt, it was told 'me by them, that Two Candles were 'ſeen, one Little, and a Great one, Paſ-'ſing the Church way, under my Houſe, 'my Wife was then great with Child, and 'near her time, and ſhe Feared of it, and 'it Begat ſome fear in us about her, but 'juſt about a Week after, her ſelf firſt 'came to me (as ſomething joyed that the 'Fear might be over) and ſaid (as true it 'was) an Old Man, and a Child of the 'Neighbourhood Paſſed that ſame way to 'be Buried. This ſhe and I can Depoſe.

Thus that Gentleman; who at that time (as Mr. *B.* ſtiles him) was a Learned Juſtice of Peace, and ſeems by his Letters to have been a very Cautious Circumſpect Perſon, and a Perſon of Great Veracity, and therefore a Perſon who cannot be Imagined to go about to Deceive, or that could be Deceived himſelf in a matter Repreſented to him (as this was) as of General obſervation. For it was Eaſie for him to know if the thing were of ſo General Obſervation or Note, (ſince it was but to Ask People,) and if it was, it could not be Falſe, as having the Teſtimony of common

mon Knowledge and Experience to Avow it; and if it was not, it would be Temerity in him to believe it true; since it wanted even that Evidence that was Pretended to ground it; but it seems the Gentleman Inquired, and found the thing Confirmed (as he says) by General Experience, and I believe him too Honest to say it, if it had not been so. Besides, what he mentions in Relation to his Wife and Family, if well Considered, Adds no little strength to the whole Story. And in Fine, he brings one Mr. *Davis* for his Voucher.

This Mr. *Davis* in a Letter that he wrote to Mr. *B.* at the Request of Mr. *Lewis*, is more particular and Full than that Gentleman, in Reference to those Lights, and therefore (the Matter being Rare and Curious, and well Deserving to be made a subject of Inquiry by the Noblest Wits) I will Transcribe it at Large. 'I am to 'give you, says he, the Best Satisfaction I 'can touching these *Fiery Apparitions*, 'which do as it were mark out the way 'for Corpses to their Κοιμητήρια, and that 'sometimes before the *parties* themselves fall 'Sick, and sometimes in their Sickness. Of 'These I could never hear in *England*, 'they are Common in these Three Coun-'ties, *Cardigan*, *Caermarthen*, and *Pembrooke*,

'and

'and as I hear, in ſome other Parts of *Wales*.
'Theſe φαντάσματα in our Language
'we call *Cankwyllau Cyrth* (*i.e.*) Corps-
'Candles; and *Candles* we call them, not
'that we do ſee any thing elſe beſides
'the Light, but becauſe that Light doth
'as much Reſemble a Material Can-
'dle Light, as Eggs do Eggs, ſaving that
'in their journey, theſe Candles be
'*modò Apparentes*, modò *Diſparentes*, Eſ-
'pecially, when one comes near them;
'and if one come on the way againſt them,
'unto him they vaniſh; but preſently ap-
'pear behind him, and hold on their
'Courſe. If it be a *little* Candle, Pale or
'Blewiſh, then follows the Corps either
'of an *Abortive*, or ſome *Infant*, if a *Big*
'one, then the Corps of ſome one *come to*
'*Age*; if there be ſeen *two*, or three, or
'more, ſome Big, ſome Small together,
'then ſo many, and ſuch Corps together;
'if two Candles come from Divers Places,
'and be ſeen to meet, the Corpſes will
'the like, if any of theſe Candles be
'ſeen to turn ſometimes a little out
'of the way, or Path that Leadeth unto
'the Church, the following Corps will be
'found to turn in that very Place, for the
'Avoiding of ſome Dirty Lane, or Plaſh, &c.
'Now let us fall to Evidence, being about
'the Age of Fifteen, Dwelling at *Lanylar*,
'late

'late at Night, ſome Neighbours ſaw one
'of theſe Candles Hovering up and down
'along the River Bank until they were
'weary in Beholding, at laſt they left it
'ſo, and went to Bed, a few Weeks after
'came a Proper Damſel from *Montgomery*
'*Shire*, to ſee her Friends, who Dwelt
'on the other ſide of that River *Iſtwyth*,
'and thought to Ford the River at that
'very Place where the Light was ſeen;
'but being Diſſuaded by ſome Lookers on,
'(ſome its moſt like of thoſe that ſaw the
'Light) to Adventure on the Water, which
'was High by Reaſon of a Flood; ſhe walked
'up and down along the River Bank, even
'where, and even as the foreſaid Candle
'did, waiting for the Falling of the Water,
'which at laſt ſhe took, but too ſoon for
'her, for ſhe was Drown'd therein

'Of Late, my Sexton's Wife, an Aged
'Underſtanding Woman, ſaw from her
'Bed, a little Blewiſh Candle upon her
'Tables end, within two or three days
'after, comes a Fellow in, Enquiring for
'her Husband, and taking ſomething
'from under his Cloak, claps it down
'directly upon the Tables end, where ſhe
'had ſeen the Candle, and what was it
'but a Dead born Child: Another time
'the ſame Woman, ſaw ſuch Another
'Candle upon the other end of the ſelf

'ſame

‘ ſame Table, within few days after, a
‘ Weak Child, by my ſelf newly Chriſt-
‘ ned, was Brought into the Sextons Houſe,
‘ where preſently he died; and when the
‘ Sextons Wife, who was then Abroad,
‘ came home, ſhe found the Woman
‘ Shrouding of the Child, on that other
‘ end of the Table, where ſhe had ſeen the
‘ Candle. On a Time my ſelf and a
‘ Kinſman coming from our School in
‘ *England*, and being three or four Hours
‘ Benighted, e're we could reach home,
‘ were firſt of all Saluted by ſuch a *Light*
‘ or Candle, which coming from a Houſe,
‘ which we well knew, held his Courſe
‘ (but not Directly) the High-way to
‘ Church; ſhortly after the Eldeſt Son in
‘ that Houſe Deceaſed, and ſteered the
‘ ſame Courſe. My ſelf and my Wife in an
‘ Evening, ſaw ſuch a Light, or Candle,
‘ coming to the Church, from her Mid-
‘ wifes Houſe, and within a Month, ſhe
‘ her ſelf did follow; at which time my
‘ Wife did tell me a ſtory of her own Mo-
‘ ther, Mrs. *Catharine Wyat*, an Eminent
‘ Woman in the Town of *Tenby*, that in
‘ an Evening being in her Bed-Chamber,
‘ ſhe ſaw two little Lights juſt upon her
‘ belly, which ſhe Aſſayed to ſtrike off with
‘ her hand, but could not; within a while
‘ they vaniſhed of themſelves. Not long
‘ after,

‘ after, ſhe was Delivered of two Dead-
‘ born Children: Long ſithence there hap-
‘ pened the like in my own Houſe; but
‘ to a Neighbours Wife, whom my Wife
‘ did ſometimes call for, to do ſome work
‘ or other; and (as I Credibly heard
‘ within theſe three days) to ſome Good
‘ Gentlewoman alſo in this very Pariſh;
‘ where alſo not long ſince, a Neighbours
‘ Wife of mine, being great with Child,
‘ and coming in at her own door, met
‘ two Candles, a Little, and a Big one,
‘ and within a little after, falling in La-
‘ bour, ſhe and her Child both Dyed.
‘ Some Thirty four, or Thirty five years
‘ bygone, one *Jane Wyat* my Wives Siſter;
‘ being Nurſe to Baronet *Rudds* three
‘ Eldeſt Children, and (the Lady Miſtreſs
‘ being Deceaſed) the Lady Controuler of
‘ that Houſe going late into a Chamber
‘ where the Maid Servants Lay, ſaw there
‘ no leſs than five of theſe Lights to-gether.
‘ It Happened a while after, the Chamber
‘ being newly Plaiſtred, and a Great
‘ Grate of Coal-fire therein Kindled to
‘ Haſten the Drying up of the Plaiſtring;
‘ that five of the Maid-Servants went
‘ there to Bed, as they were wont; but
‘ (as it fell out) too ſoon, for in the Morn-
‘ ing they were all Dead, being Suffocated
‘ (I conceive) in their Sleep with the

‘ Steam

ſteam of the New-Temper'd Lime, and Coal. This was at *Llangathen* in *Caermarthenſhire.*

'Some Thirty three or Thirty four 'years ago, upon a *Tueſday* coming towards home from *Cardigan*, where I had been enjoyned to Preach the Seſſion-Sermon: *Incipiente adhuc Crepuſculo*, and as light as Noon, and having as yet, Nine long Miles 'to Ride, there ſeemed twice or thrice 'from behind me, on my right ſide, and 'between my Shoulder and my Hat, to 'fly a little whitiſh thing about the big-'neſs of a Walnut, and that *per Intervalla*, 'once in ſeventy or eighty pace: at firſt I 'took no notice of it, thinking it had been 'but the glimpſing of my little Ruff, for 'ſuch then I wore, by degrees it waxed 'reddiſh, and as the night drew on, Red-'der and redder, at laſt not *Ignis Fatuus*, '(for that I partly knew) but *Purus putus* '*Ignis*, both for Light and Colour. At 'length I turned my Horſe twice or thrice 'to ſee from whence it came, and whether 'it would flaſh into my face, then nothing 'I could ſee; but when I turned home-'wards it flaſhed as before, until I came 'to a Village called *Llanriſlid*, where as 'yet I did not intend to Lodge, though 'there were four Lodgings, and 'one of them (ſave one) the next Houſe

'in

'in my way, which when I paſſed by
'cloſe, being juſt againſt the door, my Fire
'did flaſh again upon, or very near the
'Threſhold, and there I think it lodged,
'for I ſaw it no more; home ſtill I would
'go, but bethinking my ſelf, that ſo I
'might tempt God, and meet a worſe
'Companion than my former; I turned to
'the fartheſt Lodging in the Town, and
'there after a little reſt, in a brown ſtudy
'(becauſe mine Hoſt was an underſtand-
'ing Man, and Literate, and ſuch as
'could, and had but lately read his Neck-
'Verſe in pure Roman Language) I could
'not contain, but muſt needs tell him of
'the Viſion, he the next day to ſome go-
'ing to the Seſſions, they to others there,
'at laſt it came to the Judges ears, inſo-
'much that the greateſt News and Won-
'der at the then Aſſizes was the Preachers
'Viſion. To come at length unto the Pith
'or Kernel (for I have been too long a-
'bout the Husk and Shell) at that very
'Seſſions, one *John William Lloyd*, a Gen-
'tleman who dwelt, and whoſe Son yet
'dwells within a Mile of *Glaſterig*, fell
'Sick, and in his coming homewards, was
'taken with ſuch a violent Paroxiſm, that
'he could Ride no farther than the Houſe,
'where I left my Fire to Entertain him,
'and there he lighted and Lodged, died

'about four days after. *Ex Abundanti*, 'you ſhall underſtand that ſome Candles 'have been ſeen to come to my Church 'within theſe three weeks, and the Corp-'ſes not long after.

Mr. *Davis* ſeems to have been a Learned and Underſtanding, as well as a Pious Religious *Miniſter*, and therefore his Teſtimony muſt needs carry, with Conſiderate and thinking Men the more Authority and Force; but now I cannot ſtay to preſs it farther. In truth, I have ſtaid ſo long already on this Head of Argument, and eſpecially on the *Dead Mens Candles*, that nothing can excuſe it, but the Rarity and Surprizingneſs of the Subject. Wherefore I will only deſire the *Anti-pneumatiſt* to Reſolve me, *how* theſe Dead Mens Candles come to be Lighted, and *how* to be directed to go ſo right from the Houſe of the Perſon whoſe Death they do preſage, to the Church, or Church-yard where he is to be Lodged, without the influence of Spirits, or ſome Inviſible, but Knowing and Sagacious, ay, Fore-Knowing Beings; I now proceed to the next Argument.

SUB.

SUBS. III.

The Third Argument from Apparitions. Three Stories of them from the Junior Pliny, *in his Epistles. A Recent Story of an Apparition.*

AND the next Argument (the last I will insist upon) to prove the Existence of Spirits, shall be taken from their *Apparition*. By their Apparition, I mean their shewing of themselves to Men in human (or other Animal) shape, and so conversing and dealing with them; I know the word is, and may be taken more largely, but this is the sense I take it in now.

On this Occasion I must mention again the Epistle of *Pliny*, which he sent his Friend *Sura*, to have his Opinion upon this Question, Whether really there were any such things as *Spirits*, that have a Figure of their own, and are a kind of *Numens*; or else, that all are meer fancies, and effects of fear, without any substantial Real Being. *Pliny* himself declares, that he believes their Real Subsistence, and owns he was induced to it by three *Stories*, which he there relates, and I will repeat.

The firſt is, concerning *Q. Curtius Rufus*, to whom being in *Africk*, where he followed the *Quæſtor*, that had that Province aſſigned to him, there appeared as he was walking alone, a thing in the ſhape of a Woman of great Beauty, and of a ſize much larger than ordinary, which told him that he ſhould ſee the City of *Rome* once again; ſhould bear very honourable Charges; and in fine, return unto *Africk*, with Supream Command, and there die. All which could not but much ſurprize a Perſon that was very mean and obſcure, (for ſo was *Q. Curtius* at that time,) and yet ſays *Pliny*, it came all to paſs to a Tittle. He adds, that *Curtius* Sailing to *Carthage*, as ſoon as he came on ſhoar the ſame *Spectre* appeared to him again; and that afterward falling Sick, with a Sickneſs which none about him thought any any danger of, he remembring what the *Spectre* had told him, and comparing paſt Events with future, abandon'd all hopes of recovery, and in fine, according to the Prediction of the Apparition, and to his own perſwaſion, dies in *Africk*. This Story is alſo in *Tacitus*.

The next is of a Magnificient Houſe in *Athens*, that was Haunted, but in ſo terrible a manner, that all that dwelt in it died

died with the fright; ſo it lay void a long time. But at laſt, a Philoſopher called *Athenodorus*, coming to Town, and wanting a Houſe, and ſeeing an inſcription upon this, that it was to be Lett, and for a very low price; he liking the Houſe, and admiring the lowneſs of the price, inquires, and was fully informed of the Reaſon. He reſolves however to take it, and the rather, for that it was ſaid to be Haunted. Accordingly, in the Evening he orders a Bed to be made for him in the forward part of the Houſe, next the door, and that a Writing-Table, and a Stile to write with, as alſo Light ſhould be prepared; which being done, he diſpoſes all his Domeſticks in the inner part of the Houſe, and then applies himſelf to meditation and Writing; by that means imploying both his Thoughts, his Eyes, and his Hands; leaſt otherwiſe his un-ingaged mind ſhould be poſſeſſed of fear, and this impoſe upon him. While he was thus occupied, all was ſilent, ſtill, and quiet for a while; but at laſt he hears at a diſtance the clattring of Iron, and jingling of Chains, which yet did not ſo much diſturb him, but that, without looking up, he continued his Writing, and incouraged himſelf all he could. In the mean time, the noiſe increaſes, and comes nearer and

nearer; first without doors, afterwards within, which makes him look behind him, and then he saw a most terrible *Spectre*, in shape the same as had been represented to him; to wit, a Lean, Meager, Deformed Old Man, with a Long Dangling Beard, his Hair standing an end upon his Head; gives upon his Feet, and Chains in his hands; this Old Gentleman stood still, and seemed to becken with his finger as if he had called to *Athenodorus*. *Athenodorus* answers him the same way with his hand, intimating to him, that he should stay a while, and then goes on writing. But the *Spectre* rattling his Chains over the Philosophers Head, obliges him to look up the second time, when seeing the *Spectre* still beckning as before, he takes up the Light and follows him; who leads the way, but very softly, as one loaded with Fetters; and at last, at a certain place in the *Area* of the House, he Vanishes, and leaves *Athenodorus* alone. *Athenodorus* being thus left, gathers some Herbs and Leaves, and what he could scrape together, and puts them on the place as a mark; and the next day applying himself to the Chief Magistrate, acquaints him with the Story, and advises that the place should be digged, which being done, there were found the Bones of a Man, and Chains,

but

but the Fleſh entirely Conſumed; they gather the Bones together and bury them, after which the Houſe was Haunted no Longer.

The Two former Stories, tho' they are Related by *Pliny* but upon Tradition, ſeem very Credible, But the Third, which follows, he tells of his own Knowledge. He had, he ſays, a Certain Freed man, whoſe Name was *Marcus*, a Learned Underſtanding Perſon. This *Marcus* one Time as he was Lying in Bed with his younger Brother, thought, that he ſaw ſomething ſitting on the ſame Bed, that, with a Raſor, Shaved his Head all over; and in the Morning it was found, that Really his Head had been Shaved, the Hairs Lying all about the Place. Not Long after ſays *Pliny*, Another, the like Accident Hapned, that Confirm'd the Former. For a Certain Youth Lying with many others in the Servants Lodgings, there came unto him through the Window, (for ſo the Youth Related the Story) two Perſons in white Tunicks, who, as he Lay, fell to Shaving of him, and having done it, Returned the ſame way they came; and that this was a Reall Thing, and not a Dream only, or only a Fancy between Sleeping and Waking, was Manifeſted (ſays the Author) by the Day, for

when this came, it was ſeen that the Youth was Shaved, and that the Hairs lay Scattered about the Bed.

Theſe are the Inſtances that Convinced *Pliny*, a Perſon uſed to Buſineſs, Wiſe, and Circumſpect, not Credulous, or Eaſie to be Impoſed upon, and Abuſed; to which I will Add but one more, but that ſhall be a *recent* one, of our own Time, and well Atteſted: a Story Licenſed by a Perſon of Quality, and of Great worth; who I believe has more Honour than to ſuffer the World to be Palm'd upon by what He knew a Falſity; and Greater Prudence than to give ſuch a Story a Licenſe without ſome Inquiry after the truth of it. The Story is This, 'The 22 of *February*, 1671, we (ſays the 'Maſter that tells it) Sailed from *Graves-'end*; and the *26th*, by Gods Providence we 'Sailed over the Bar of *Newcaſtle*, and there 'Loaded the 2d. of *March*. About Nine 'or ten of the Clock in the Night Fol-'lowing, we having made all clear and 'Ready for the Furtherance of our Voyage, 'ſome time after Supper I went to Reſt, 'when about twelve of the Clock in the 'Night; to the beſt of my Remembrance, 'I was Awaked out of my Sleep by a 'Great *Noiſe*, (but ſaw nothing) which 'to the beſt of my Capacity bid me *Be gone*,

'and

' and that I had nothing to do there, but
' being ſo haſtily Diſturbed, and not cer-
' tain what might be the Cauſe, I gave it
' over for a *Dream*, and paſt that Accident
' as Uncertain of the Truth. Now after
' the Firſt Day was Paſt, about Eight or
' Nine of the Clock at Night I went to
' reſt; and about Twelve, my Mate was
' ſtriking a Light to take a Pipe of Tobacco
' (as I ſuppoſe) and Expecting the Wherry
' to go up to the Town, being the Tide
' fell out about Two in the Morning, I
' deſired the Candle might not be put out,
' and being as well *Awake* as now I am, to
' the beſt of my Remembrance, I was then
' *Pulled* by the hair of my head off from
' my Pillow, and the *ſame* words Declared
' unto me as before; and then I *ſaw* the Per-
' fect Face and Proportion of a *Man*, in a
' Black Hat, Stuff-Coat, and Striped Neck-
' Cloth, with Hanging down hair, and a
' ſowre Down-looking Countenance, and
' his Teeth being ſet in his Head, I had then
' time to ſay, Lord have Mercy upon me,
' What art? at which he Vaniſhed, yet
' the Candle Burned very Blew, and al-
' moſt went out: Hereupon being much
' Diſcontented, I did by the Following
' Poſt give my owners a juſt Account of
' what had Befallen me.

' The

'The Fifth of that Inſtant, we ſet Sail: 'about four of the Clock in the Day, the 'Wind at *W. S. W.* fair Weather, and a 'Brave Gale off the Shore, which Con- 'tinued until half an hour after Eleven on '*Wedneſday* night; at which time the Man 'at the Helm called out that he could not '*ſtir* the Helm: but after I had pulled off 'the Whip-ſtaff; the Ship ſteered as before, 'being ſtill fair Weather, the Wind then 'coming to the *N. W.* and Snowing Wea- 'ther, but very fair and clear. I was yet 'Doubtful of more Wind; and therefore 'cauſed the Men to furl the Fore Top-ſail, 'and Lower down the Main Topſail upon 'the back of the Main ſail, but could not 'with all the ſtrength we had hale in; the 'Weather brake off the fore Top-ſail, 'when this was ſtill in my Judgment, 'that our Ship did hale as much, as when 'our ſails were out, then we haled up 'our Main-ſail, and ſtill the Ship had the 'ſame Liſt as with a Large Wind, which 'to my Judgment might be half a ſtreak, 'or thereabouts.

'By This time it was Two of the 'Clock, then our Men tried the Pump, 'and found Little or no Water in her: 'the Man at the Helm called out, that 'the *Candle* Burned ſo Blew in the Lan- 'thorn;

'thorn; that it gave Little or no Light,
'and three ſeveral times went out, ſo that
'I held the Candle to the Look-out, which
'Candle did burn very well, and ſhewed
'a good Light, but of a ſudden our Ship
'would not feel the Helm ſo kindly as
'before, and brought all our Sails Aback,
'then our Ship heeled as much to Wind-
'ward, as before to Leeward: the Glaſs
'being out, we went to the Pump, and
'found no Water in the Ship, but ſhe
'did not ſteer well, Neither could I find
'the Reaſon, being ſtill ſo fair Weather,
'this unkind ſteerage made me Urgent
'to try the Pump yet more, but I could
'not get the upper Box to work, nor
'ſtir, but having taken that up, and try-
'ing with the Pump-hook, we could not
'come near the Lower Box by a foot and
'half, which to my Judgment was Hin-
'dred by ſomething like a *Bull-fiſh* or
'Woolſack, that as we forced down, gave
'up again with the Hook: Whereupon
'Miſtruſting that all was not well, I
'cauſed our Men to keep the Coat of our
'Pump up; and my ſelf Looſned the Tack;
'in the mean time I ordered two Men to
'Looſe the Boat, which they did being
'Laſhed in three Places: yet they do not
'Remember to this hour, that they Looſ-
'ned any of them but the Middlemoſt;

'and

'and with three Men in her, the Boat
'*went over* the Top of the Foreſheet,
'which lay above the ſtem, without
'Touching it, with ſuch Violence, as
'even Amazed us that ſaw it; And they
'that were in the Boat, gave ſuch loud
'cryes, as frighted him at the Helm, who
'came Running out unknown to me, but
'finding the Ship coming nearer the Wind
'then formerly, I Ran to the Stair-caſe,
'to bid him put the Helm over, but
'could not: and hearing one jump down
'at the Hatch, which was open at the
'half-deck, did ſuppoſe that the Helms-
'man came Down again; and calling him
'by his Name to come and help me, the
'word was no ſooner out of my Mouth,
'but I Perceived the *ſame* Perſon that I
'had formerly ſeen before we came out of
'the Harbour; who came violently to
'me, ſaying, be gone, you have no more
'to do here, Throwing me in at the
'Cabbin door, clear upon the Top of
'the Table; When I crying out, In the
'Name of God what art, he *Vaniſhed*
'away in a Flaſh of Fire; thinking withal
'that the Ship had ſplit in a Thouſand
'pieces, it giving ſuch a Crack. The Men
'thereupon calling out, Maſter, if you be
'a Man come away, did ſomething Re-
'vive me, and ſtriving to have got to my

'Cheſt

'Cheſt, being I had got ſome Money in
'it, I found that ſomething Hindred me,
'but what it was I could not tell. Then
'Perceiving the Main Sea coming in ſo
'Faſt, that I was up to the waſt, before
'I could get out of the Cabbin, and find-
'ing all our Men in the Boat but only
'one, I deſired him to get a Compaſs;
'which he did, yet could never after
'know what became of it. We were no
'ſooner in the Boat, but the Ship *Sank*
'Down, and yet having a Great Sea Fur
'Gown, which lay upon the Dicker, up-
'on the Ships going Down, the very up-
'ſet of the Water brought it to the Boats
'ſide, and one of our Men took it in, we
'Reckoned our ſelves to be Ten or Twelve
'Leagues *E. S. E.* from the *Spern*, I Per-
'ceived the Fane at the Main-top-Maſt-
'Head, when the Ship was ſunk: we
'Continued in the Boat from three in the
'Morning till ten or eleven that day,
'when we were taken up by a *Whitby*
'Ketch, who uſed us very Kindly, and
'towed our Boat at his Stern with two
'Ends of a Hauſer, till ſhe brake away:
'She being Bound for *Newcaſtle*, and the
'Wind being Contrary, did on the *Satur-*
'*day* Following, ſet us a Shore at *Grimsby*
'in *Hull* River, where the Mayor gave us
'a Paſs for *London*. This is a True and

'Perfect

'Perfect Relation to the beſt of my know-
'ledge in every Reſpect. *John Pye* Maſter.
'And Atteſted by *Nine* Men more all Be-
'longing to my Ship.

'I Had forgot to Expreſs, that one ſide
'of my Face is Burnt and Blaſted ſorely,
'which I felt within half an hour after I
'was gone out of the Ship; but how it
'came upon me in the Ship I could not
'tell being then in a Great Horror and
'Amaxement. Thus *John Pye.*

This ſeems an Undeniable Evidence of the Reality of Apparitions.

SECT.

SECT. III.

The Apparition of Spirits twofold, Real, or Visional; both ways Explained. A Conceit about the Appearing of Ghosts Rejected. That most Apparitions of Spirits are Visional, not Real, Evinced by several Considerations. Some Phænomena *of Apparitions Salved. Of the Distribution of Spirits.*

THIS Last Argument for the Real Existence of Spirits taken from their Apparition, Invites me to Consider the *Ways* in which they use to Appear. And There are *two* ways in which they do, or may *Appear*, the one Real, the other I call Visional.

I call it *Real* Appearing, when they present themselves to some of the Outward senses, and (particularly to the Eye,) in some thing that does Really Affect it; and so, by means of the sense, (in the same way as all Corporeal External *Objects* do) they Affect and stir the *Imagination*. I call their Appearing *Visional*, when by Affecting or Stiring the *Imagination*, they occasion such Appearances as seem External to the *Eye*, or other *senses*, tho'

tho' indeed there is nothing that does really affect *it*, or *them*, from without. This Conception is grounded upon comon Obſervation. For few are ignorant that things appear as external to the ſenſe, *not only* when impreſſions are made upon it from without, by real Objects that move it, *but alſo* when the imagination is ſmartly ſtricken by ſomething from within, for ſo it is in *Dreams*, in which all things do ſeem as really tranſacted for the time; (and not ſeldom, where the impreſſion is very ſtrong, even after that men are awakened) as when the External Senſe is affected by Objects.

Well then, in real Apparitions of Spirits, the external ſenſe is immediately affaffected; but in thoſe that are Viſional, the Imagination.

The real appearing of Spirits is generally thought to be performed, *either* by their aſſuming of Bodies that are already prepared; *or* by Figuring the Air, or ſome other Elementary Subſtance into the ſhapes in which they appear; which latter is done by the *Plaſtic* Power of the Imagination; a Power a Spirit is believed to have, becauſe we truly experience *ſuch an one* in our incorporated ſelves, not only upon the *Spirits* in the Brain, which are *Figured* into a Thouſand ſhapes at our pleaſure,

pleaſure, in the ſeveral things we do imagine; but in ſome caſes, upon external Bodies; as in the *Signatures* of *the Fœtus*; not to mention other leſs certain, but ſtrongly aſſerted inſtances.

And indeed, I take the former *Thought* in this Matter, for a much more *probable* one, than that of ſome others; which is, that Spirits do appear by Condenſation of their *Vehicles*, and diſappear by Attenuating them; this being not a very eaſie Conception, for of what Matter muſt ſuch Vehicles conſiſt? ay, of *what* vaſt *Extenſion* muſt the Vehicle of a Spirit be, in its own proportion? if when it is Condenſed and Shrunk ſo much, as it muſt to become an Object of Senſe, it is yet in *Dimenſion* Equal, and ſometimes Superiour, unto *that* of a Man.

Some are of the Opinion, that *Ghoſts* (by which I mean the Apparitions of Souls Departed) do for the moſt part by virtue of their Formative *Plaſtic* Power, frame unto themſelves the Vehicles in which they appear, out of the *Moiſture* of their own deſerted Bodies; this being a Matter that is believed more Congenial to them, and more Sympathetical; and for that Reaſon, they ſay, it is, that Ghoſts do often appear in *Church-Yards*; and that they do not appear but *for ſome ſhort time*,

to wit, before the moiſture is wholly dried up; as alſo, that the Ancients uſed to *Burn* not to *Burie* the Dead; for *Cardan* tells us, that during that Cuſtom, there was no ſuch Appearing of Ghoſts as is now.

But this Opinion has very little ground; for beſides, that it does account but for the Apparition of *Souls*, and not that of *Angels*, good, or bad; tho' it is very probable that Departed Souls, if at any time they appear, they do it the ſame way that Angels are uſed to do, ſince there is the ſame reaſon they ſhould. I ſay beſides this, it is certain (if any Stories of ſuch a nature are certain) that pretended Ghoſts have appeared ſo long after their deceaſe from their ſeveral Bodies, that nothing could remain of theſe but the Duſt; and it is alſo certain, that many Perſons have been *ſeen* (to all Appearances) while alive, in their proper Shapes and Meen, and with the very Cloaths they were uſed to wear; and this could not be done by means of Vehicles framed of their Radical moiſture. In truth, this laſt is a very croſs *Phænomenon*; a *Phænomenon* that renders all Apparition of Ghoſts uncertain and queſtionable, ſince it ſeems to infer, that it is not the Departed Soul it ſelf that appears, whenever there is ſuch an

Appari-

Apparition, but ſome other Spirit that *Perſonates* it.

For my own part, I ſee many Difficulties in the way, of the real Apparition of Spirits; for beſides that of the *aſſuming* of Bodies, many times they do Eat and Drink, and perform ſeveral other *Vital Actions*, that ſeem very hard to be accounted for in that way; ſo that I am much inclined to believe, (that) their Apparition is moſtly, if not only *Viſional*; not by an immediate affection of the External Senſe, but by affecting and ſtriking the Imagination in the way I have mentioned before. And herein I am confirm'd, in that it ſeems to have been the common Sentiment of all the Ancients; who did for this reaſon (as I noted before) call the *Apparitions* of Spirits *Phantaſmata*, or *Idola*; to wit, becauſe they were rather *Imaginative*, than *Real*, not as Mr. *Hobbs* would carry it, as if they thought that all Spirits were only *Phantaſmata*, or meer Fancies, but becauſe they thought that Spirits uſed not to *Appear* but by affecting and ſtriking the Fancy. And this is Evident, in that they did call Apparitions not only *Phantaſmata*, or Images, but alſo *Pneumata* or Spirits; by the latter Expreſſion ſignifying the *nature* of the things that did appear, as by the former, the *way* in

which they appeared. Thus *Luke*, when he would intimate that the Diſciples (at the time they ſaw our Lord after his Reſurrection) ſuppoſed that they had ſeen a Spirit, does not uſe the word *Phantaſma*, as the two other Evangeliſts, *Matthew*, and *Mark*, do, on the like occaſion, but the word *Pneuma*, Luke 24. 37. *But they* [the Diſciples] *were terified and frighted, and ſuppoſed they had ſeen a Spirit.* [πνεῦμα.] I add, that from the *different* Expreſſions that theſe Evangeliſts do uſe, on the like occaſion; *Matthew* and *Mark* expreſſing the ſuppoſed ſeeing of a Spirit, by ſeeing of a *Phantaſm*, [φάνταſμα,] but *Luke*, by ſeeing of a *Spirit*; [πνεῦμα,] one may infer, that when they thought the Apparition to be of a *Good Spirit*, they called it πνεῦμα, or a *Spirit*; but when of a *Bad*, they called it *Phantaſma*, as who would ſay, a *Sprite*, an Hob-Goblin, an illuſion of Devils; without conceiveing, what perhaps ſome others will judge as propable, that they had an Opinion (as, if I do not miſ-remember, the Modern *Piatoniſts* had,) that *Good* Spirits did uſe to appear *really*, but *bad* ones, by diſturbing and *troubling the Fancy*.

Another Conſideration that induces me to think the Apparition of Spirits to be moſtly (if not always) Viſional, is, that all

all *Appearance* will be the ſame in this buſineſs of Apparitions, upon the *Hypotheſis* that they are but Viſional, as upon that, that they are real; ſince *Common Dreams*, in thoſe that ſleep; and *waking ones* in the Melancholy, the Maniacal, and the Hyſterical, do ſeem as real to them, as any things that are moſt ſo. And as *ſome* Appearances will equally as well be ſalved upon one *Hypotheſis* as upon the other, ſo there are *others*, that will be better ſalved upon the Viſional, than on the Real Hypotheſis; particularly this, that *Spectres* are often ſaid to be ſeen by one Perſon in a Room, that are not by others in the ſame Room, tho' they look where they are ſaid to be ſeen. A Spirit may be eaſily Conceived to affect and ſtrike the *Imagination* of one Perſon, without doing ſo to anothers; but that the ſame *External Object* ſhould be ſeen by one, and not by another that has the ſame advantage, is ſomewhat harder to think, and I had almoſt ſaid, cannot be conceived without a double Miracle. In ſhort, one can better conceive how Spirits ſhould eat, and drink, *&c.* in the Viſional, than in the Real Hypotheſis.

I know it may be told me, that it is more uſual for Spirits to appear by *Night* than by *Day*, and in *Dark* and Gloomy

places, than in open and lightſome; and thoſe who hold the real apparition of Spirits, will think that they can give a better account of this *Phænomenon*, than others can, who do believe it but Viſional. For they will ſay; *Thoſe* of them that do hold the Opinion of a Spirits appearing by *Condenſation* of his own Vehicle, that the *Cold* of the Night, as alſo of umbragious and gloomy places, where the Sun does not enter, or of ſolitary uninhabited ones, where Fire is not uſed, does much contribute to the Conſpiſſation of the Spirits Vehicle: And *Thoſe* that hold the Opinion that Spirits appear *by Forming* to themſelves a Body of Air, will ſay, that the Spiſſitude of the Air, which is greater by Night than by Day (when the preſence of the Sun attenuates it,) and greater in gloomy and uninhabited, than in lightſom and inhabited places, does make the Formation of a Body (and by conſequence their Apparition) more agreeable and eaſie to them. But what can be ſaid of this appearance in the *Viſional* Hypotheſis.

I cannot foreſee how very acceptable, or otherwiſe, ſuch a Diſcourſe as this will be unto others, but to me it is of an Aſpect (that is) not very Agreeable. For that the *Angelical Vehicle* ſhould be obnoxious to the impreſſions of Heat and Cold,

(as

(as is in the *First* Opinion,) ſeems ſomewhat a groſs Conception; nor can I ſee how the Spiſſitude, or the Tenuity of the Air ſhould ſignifie much, either to further or to hinder the making a body of Air by a Spirit, (as it is apprehended to do in the *ſecond* Opinion,) if a Spirit be conceived (as he muſt) to work *Magically*, and not *Mecannically*, in it. But not to inſiſt on this, but to anſwer directly. The Reaſon then why Spirits do appear in the Night rather than in the Day, and in dark gloomy ſolitary places rather than in others, is from the *ſilence* and vacancy that is at ſuch times, and in ſuch places, ſo that the Imagination not being poſſeſſed, or diverted, by External Objects, is more attentive unto, and Conſequently more ſuſceptive of internal impreſſions; there being the ſame Reaſon for *this* Phænomenon, as there is for ſome *others*, to wit, our better hearing a Sound by Night than in the Day, and our ſeeing of the Images in a Darkned Room upon a Paper, or Wall, that Diſappear as ſoon as a greater Light is admitted.

By theſe and other Conſiderations, I am more inclined to a belief of the *Viſional*, than of the *Real* Apparition of Spirits; the *Former* being accompanied with fewer Difficulties, and alſo being a thing that is

eaſily conceived; for one that thinks, will more eaſily admit an Angel can affect and ſtir the imagination, (which we ſee both many *Diſtempers*, and more *Meats* and *Drinks* can do;) than that it ſhould *Create* a Body, or aſſume one Created; or in fine, be able to alter its own Vehicle, ſo much from its proper *Dimenſion*, that the ſqueezing of an Elephant into that of a Mouſe, is of no Compariſon with it.

I confeſs, I ſhould be more inclined than I am to the *Real Hypotheſis*, if I could believe the *Spagirical Reſurrection* of Plants, or the *Reality* of Apparitions reſembling Men, that are ſaid to be ſeen in Diſtilling-Veſſels, upon the Diſtillation of Human Blood; of which *Peter Borellus* (a Curious, but too Credulous Author) tells us in his Obſervations, *Cent.* 4. *Obſ.* 62. I fear, with more preſumption, than certainty. For my part, I muſt acknowledge my unbelief as to it.

I will only add, for the fuller clearing of the Theory of the Apparition of *Spirits*, that what *Gravity* or weight is in reſpect of Elementary Bodies, That a ſtrong *Inclination* or *Habit*, and *Will* or Paſſion is unto Souls; and Conſequently, that we ſeldom hear of the Apparition of *Any* but of ſuch as went out of the Body with great *Reluctance*; with a violent Paſ-

ſion

ſion of *Revenge*; or with a ſtrong *Deſire* of having ſomething done, that was in their will, but not in their power. And of the appearing of *ſuch* we often hear; but *whether* the Apparition is of the Departed *Soul* it ſelf, or of its *Repreſentative* only, to wit, ſome *Genius Perſonating* the Deceaſed; and *why* (often times) it appears unto Perſons no way concerned, and not to thoſe that are, when it would have ſomething revealed; as *alſo* the Laws of the Spiritual World, (for Laws there muſt be, which do confine and regulate the motions of Spirits;) theſe, and many other points in the buſineſs of Spirits are all unknown unto me, and perhaps are only known unto God.

I ſhould now proceed to the *Diſtribution* of Spirits; but this entirely depends upon the Hiſtory of them, and we know but little of that Hiſtory: Beſides, there is in what we are thought to know, ſo much of Tale, Romance, and Invention, that, upon ſtrict inquiry, not one Relation of a hundred holds true, even of their Apparitions; an Obſervation which obliged *Lucian* of old, and *many* now, to Ridicule them all. Wherefore I reſolve to Omit, as a Task too hard for me, to diſcourſe of their *Kinds*, and their *Orders*; only in *General*,

General, I will adventure to affirm (if this be to Adventure, to ſay, what few will deny,) that that there are ſeveral *Species*; Angels in *Heaven*, and Devils out of it; and perhaps a *Lower ſort* of Spirits than thoſe we commonly call Devils. But for the *Celeſtial Hierarchy*, as *Dionyſius* (the True, or the Falſe) has ſet it out, and the *Diſtinction* in it, that he makes of *Seraphim*, of *Cherubim*, of *Thrones*, of *Dominations*, of *Vertues*, of *Powers*, of *Principalities*, of *Arch-Angels*, and of *Angels*; as alſo of the Politick *Government* of *Devils*, and the ſeveral *Orders* that are in *it*: One had need be a Saint, and as illuminated with Revelation as *Dionyſius* himſelf was, to underſtand the *Former*; and for the *Latter*, he muſt be a Conjurer of the Higheſt Claſs, and poſſibly more than a Conjurer, to have any, or any certain Account of it. One that is Curious may find many, and very ſtrange, things upon this Subject in *Cardan*, in his Books, *de varietate*, and *de ſubtilitate*; and in *Cornelius Agrippa*, in his, of Occult Philoſophy, *L.* 1. *C.* 11. *Fernelius* alſo has ſomething, which he has gathered out of *Plato*, and others, concerning the

Kinds

Kinds of Spirits, in his Treatiſe *De Abditis rerum Cauſis*, L. 1. C. 11. but all is but Gueſs and Conjecture. See *Gaſpar Schottus* his *Phyſica Curioſa*, L. 1. C. 12. *&c.*

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

Another Eſſay about the Nature of Animals and Spirits.

SECT. I.

The Subject farther Illuſtrated, by a Compariſon of the Univerſe with a particular Animal. The Univerſe a whole; Particular Animals but Members of that whole. A Particular Animal is as an Organ with its faculty; the Univerſe, as a Body compoſed of ſeveral Organs, with a Soul that endues theſe Organs with ſeveral Faculties. A Demonſtration even to ſenſe, of a common Principle that penetrates throughout the Univerſe. In what ſenſe a Soul is a faculty, and in what a Principle of Faculties. Two ſenſes of the word Soul, and how in both, it may be conceived as a Principle of Faculties. The Soul in its ſtate of ſeparation becomes a Spirit properly. Soul is the name of a part, a Spirit the name of a whole Subſtance. God the Central Sun, and Fountain of all Souls and Spirits. The Emanation of Souls and Spirits from God, or from his Spirit, ſet out in the Compariſon of Light and Colours. Not only Philoſophers, and Poets, but even many Chriſtian Doctors, and particularly St. Auguſtin, *compared God in reſpect of his influence in and over the Univerſe, unto the Soul in a Man.*

IN

IN the Precedent Chapter, I have offered to my Reader ſomething concerning the nature of *Animals*, as well thoſe that are Inviſible, called *Spirits*, as thoſe that are Viſible; but the ſubject being Obſcure, I think my ſelf obliged to turn it every way, to ſee what further Light may be Given to it; and therefore I will now Enlarge upon *one Point*, in Relation unto it, that I did but touch before, whereby I hope to Illuſtrate it.

It is Received on all hands, except by *Carteſians*, that in every viſible *Animal*, as well as in *Man*, there is a Body Compoſed of ſeveral Organs, and there are ſeveral Faculties or Powers, according to the ſeveral Organs; and there is a Common Principle (called a Soul) that Permeating throughout the Body, doth Furniſh it in its ſeveral Organs with thoſe ſeveral Faculties.

Now, As all the *Organs* of any Particular Animal, tho' being Compared *one with Another*, they are *ſeveral*, not Parts one of Another, but a kind of wholes, and have their ſeveral Faculties; yet in reſpect of the *Body*, they are but *Parts*, and all Influenced by a *Common Principle*, which giveth being to *its* ſeveral Faculties, but is none of them it ſelf. Why may not all

all the *Animals*, themſelves (as well the Inviſible as the Viſible,) that do Exiſt in the *Univerſe*, be, in reſpect of *this* but as ſo many *Parts*, ſo many Organs, (ſome more Simple, others more Compound) Actuated by ſome *Common Principle* that Penetrates throughout *it*; and yet, in Reſpect *one of Another*, be ſeveral *wholes*, that have their ſeveral Powers and Faculties? And then, *as* all the Particular Animals would, in truth, be but as ſo many ſeveral Organs Endued with ſeveral Faculties, in which the Organ or Syſtem of Organs would be the *Body*, the Faculty or Syſtem of Faculties the *Soul*; *ſo* all of them taken together, would be an Entire Body [of the *Univerſe*] Actuated by an Univerſal Principle, (as by a Common Soul) that ſhould Endow it with thoſe ſeveral Powers and Faculties. In ſhort; why may not the Univerſe Really be Body and Soul, and every Particular Animal (as a part thereof) be Organ and Faculty, in the ſame ſenſe that in our ordinary Common way of Conceiving, every Particular Animal is Body and Soul, and the Parts of it, Organs and Faculties? But to Proceed.

This is Certain, that what in Animals, and particularly in a Man, we do Commonly

monly call a *Faculty*, is neither that which commonly is called the Soul, nor is it meerly the Body, or any Part of the Body, but a *Reſult*; ſome Third thing Ariſing from them both in Conjunction. For the *Eye*, for Example, tho' never ſo well Qualified, doth not ſee, unleſs the Mind or Soul do Attend; and again, the *mind* or Soul, tho' never ſo Attentive, cannot ſee, unleſs it has the uſe of an Eye, to ſee with; ſo that the *Power* of ſeeing neither is in the Eye barely, nor in the Soul barely, but belongs to the *Animal*, which is Soul and Body: as ariſing from the preſence of the Soul in ſuch a Particular Part, or Organ, of the Body. And the like is to be ſaid of other Powers.

And yet if all the Faculties that are united in Man, were ſuppoſed *Separated* each from other, *with* their ſeveral Organs, and ſo to be in the Nature of *wholes*, and this without the ſuppoſal of any Thing elſe; for Example, that the *Eye* could ſee apart, the *Ear* hear apart, and the *Tongue* taſte apart from the Body; there would, to all Appearance, be ſo *many* ſeveral Animals, and Conſequently ſo many ſeveral Souls: So that what is called a *Faculty* only, while it is in a part, is Denominated a *Soul*, in the whole; and then, where the Body is a Compage, or Syſtem

of

of Organs, the Soul muſt be a *Syſtem* of Faculties: and yet be *one* ſtill, in the ſame ſenſe as the Body is.

But here I muſt expect it *ſhall be told* me, that the True and commonly Received Notion of a Soul is, that it is the *Principle* of the Faculties called Vital and Animal, and not any one of them it ſelf, or any Syſtem of them All: To which I *Anſwer*, that this is indeed the *Popular* and Common Notion, but how true it is, and how much Adjuſted to the Nature of the Soul, cannot be underſtood but by making ſome Diſtinction in the ſenſe of word [Soul.]

The word [Soul] may be taken *Two ways*, the one of which I will call the *Philoſophical*, the other the *Popular* ſenſe of the Word.

Firſt then, word [Soul] may be taken *Philoſophically*, as a Name of *all* the Cauſes together, that are neceſſary for the Producing of Vital and Animal Actions, in the ſeveral Species of Animals: and ſo, tho' it is commonly conſidered as if it were ſome *Subſtantial thing*, that Differ'd from them All, yet *indeed* it is nothing but a *Modification* of their Action, as they are All in Conjunction. And *Dicearchus*, who Affirmed there was no ſuch

ſuch thing as a Soul, if he meant but thus, was very Excuſable; for in this ſenſe, a Soul is nothing but a *Reſult*, that is, a *Mode of Conceiving* (for this I mean by Reſult) of all the *Cauſes* that muſt be Joyned for Animal, or Vital Actions, as *they* do either *Qualifie*, or elſe *Aid*, each others Influence. And in this ſenſe, as a *Soul*, in reſpect of the *Action*, of a Particular Organ, may be called a *Faculty*; ſo in reſpect of the whole *Body*, a *Soul*, is a *Syſtem* of Faculties. Thus *Life* in Animals, ariſes from the Concurrence of many things; which things therefore, in that *Concurrence*, as they are the *Prince* of Life, ſo they may be called the *Soul*; [for by *Soul*, is meant nothing, but the Principle of that, we call the Life;] if one of theſe is wanting (that are neceſſary,) the Life ceaſes, and we ſay, the Soul is *gone*; but then again, (ſuppoſing all the other Requiſites Remaining as they ought to be, and Ready to do their Parts,) if that *one*, which was wanting is Reſtored, there is again a Concurrence of *all* the Cauſes Requiſite to Life, and ſo, with the Life, the Soul is ſaid to *Return*, or come again. For Example, there is in Snakes, in Dormice, in Swallows, and in other *Dormitive Creatures* of that kind, and (if we

ſhall believe *Guagninus*, *apud Schottum*, Phyſ. Curioſ. *l.* 1. *part.* 2. *C.* 38. §. 4.) in ſome *Men* too, (for ſo he ſays of the Inhabitants of *Lucomoria*, a certain Country of *Ruſſia*, that there is) an Actual Suſpenſion of the Exerciſe of Life in all the Species of it during Winter, while their Spirits lie Congealed and un-active; ſo that tho' all the Organs of thoſe Animals, in other Reſpects, are duly Qualified and Diſpoſed, yet there being not, for that ſeaſon, ſufficient Heat Imparted to them from the Sun, to put their *Spirits* in Motion, *Theſe*, like *Mercury* while Cold, are wholly un-active, and ſo for ſeveral Months there is a Ceſſation of Life (for Life is a Sort of Action) in all the ſenſible Inſtances of it. But then again on the other ſide, nothing being wanting but a due *Heat*, (as unto *Mercury*, to put it in Actual Motion,) as ſoon as the Sun Returns, and with its warmth, Communicates that Motion that is Requiſite to the Spirits, and other Parts, for the Invigorating, and the ſtirring of them, there Reſults that Action, or Exerciſe of Organs, which *we* call *Life*, and which in many Places of Holy *Scripture*, is called the *Soul*, tho' *commonly* we call the Soul the *Principle*, not the *Exerciſe* of Life; but then by a Principle we muſt mean the Concourſe of all the Requiſite

Cauſes,

Cauſes, and ſo the Soul in Effect will be but a *Faculty*, or rather a Syſtem of Faculties. And ſo much for the *Philoſophical Senſe* of the Word Soul.

But beſides the *Former*, there is Another meaning of the word [Soul], which I call the *Popular*, becauſe it is the moſt uſual, and that is, when it is Taken not for *all* the Cauſes together, or the Reſult of them, as in the Former, but for the *Principal* and Chief Cauſe of Animal and Vital Actions, which in the Holy Scriptures is called the *Spirit*; [*who knoweth the Spirit of a Man that goeth Upward, or the Spirit of a Beaſt that goeth Downward?*] And ſo when a Perſon dies, he is ſaid to to give up his Spirit, to Give up the Ghoſt.

And thus a Soul may be Conceived, a Syſtem of very ſubtle Refined *Matter*, ſuch as *Light*, (but in ſome more, in others leſs Refined) that gives the laſt Diſpoſition to a Body and its Organs for the receiving of Vital *Cogitative Influence*, from the Original Mind; it is the *Texture* and Qualification of the *Body*, and the Organs that compoſe it, that is the Ligament and *Bond* of union between this ſubtle Matter or Spirit, and *That*; but it is the *Subtle Matter* or Spirit that is the *Vinculum* or Bond of Union between the Body and the *Original Mind*.

In this way of Conceiving; This Syſtem of Subtle Matter while it is in the Body, tho' it is called a *Spirit*, becauſe of its ſubtlety, in truth, may be but a *Soul*, that is, a *Means* only of Conveying the Vital Influence into the Body, from the Original Mind; but then again, out of the Body, as the Syſtem of it may be, it may become a *Spirit* properly ſo called; it being then no longer a Part, (as a Soul muſt be), which is only a Mediate Subject,) but a whole, and ſo a Terminative Subject, of the Influence of the Original Mind: in ſhort, it becomes a *Suppoſitum* or Subſiſtent by it ſelf. That the Soul is but a Mediate Subject while it is in the Body, and not a Terminative, ſo that properly the *Animal*, (which is Soul and Body,) and not the Soul only, is Agent in all that Paſſes, ſeems Probable, in that all the Ordinary *Actions* of the Man, that commonly are ſaid to be the Souls, are plainly *Organical*; nothing can be Inſtanced in, as Proceeding from the Soul while it is in the Body, that is not properly *Animal*: even *Intellection* it ſelf, is not an Action only of the Soul, or *Anima*, but (as the *Latins* would Expreſs it,) an Action of the *Animus* or Underſtanding; *which* is to be Conceived as an Animal and Organical Faculty, that is, as a thing a-

riſing

riſing Principally, but not only, from the Soul: for ſo does *Cotta* Diſtinguiſh, *apud Cicerol.* 3. *de nat. Deor.* when he ſays, *Probabilius videtur tale quiddam eſſe* Animum, *ut ſit ex Igne, atque Anima temperatum.*

It is true, the *Ordinary* way of Conceiving is much *otherwiſe*, for the *Soul* is Conſidered by the *Moſt*, as if it were an *Angel* or Spirit, that only dwelt in the Body as in a Houſe; and thus the Soul is the *man*, the Body but as a *Tabernacle*, or a Garment to it: nor is this a meer *Platonical* Notion; it is Conformable to the way of *ſpeaking* in the Holy Scriptures; as, where St. *Paul* ſays, *I Deſire to be Diſſolved, and to be with Chriſt*; Alſo, where he tells the Corinthians, *we know if our Earthly Houſe of this Tabernacle were Diſſolved*, &c. And for certain, if the Theory of the *Pre-exiſtence* of Souls is a True one, this Opinion is beyond diſpute. However, I will not Determine in this matter, ſince the Language of the Scripture is often Adapted but to the Conceptions of the Vulgar, and therefore cannot be the Standard of Philoſophical Truth; and it is certain, that even in our Saviours time a many *Pythagorean* and *Platonical Doctrines*, and *this* in particular of the Pre-exiſtence of Souls, and the Souls being the Man, had obtained to be Vulgar among the *Jews*; As appears by

that Queſtion of the *Diſciples*, which they put to our Lord, *was this Man* Born *Blind for his own*; or for *his Parents ſin?* for it ſuppoſes, that the Man might ſin, and therefore alſo ſuppoſes that he *was*, before he was Born, for he could not Sin, if he was not (in Being.) Beſides, the *Geneſis* or way of Generation of Animals, ſeems to Favour the former opinion more than the latter; for in the latter Opinion, the Soul is conceived as an *Aſſiſtant*, rather than an Informing *Form*, and ſo rather as an *Animal*, than as a *Part* of one: which doth not ſo well conſiſt with the Method of Generation. In fine, the Diſtinction between *Souls* and *Abſtract Spirits*, as to their Natures, cannot be ſet out with that Diſtinctneſs and clearneſs in the Latter, as in the Former Opinion.

But Take it either way; if we Diſtinguiſh *Soul* and *Faculties*, and do hold, that Animal *Actions* are the Effects of Faculties, but that the Soul is the Principal cauſe of thoſe Faculties; why may it not be Affirmed (as I Hinted before) that the *Moſaical Spirit* is, unto all the *Bodies* in the Univerſe, (thoſe of Invinſible, as well as of Viſible Animals) what the Soul Conceived of, after this manner, is in our ſelves unto *ours*? So that All particular Animals in reſpect of the Univerſe, ſhould

be

be but as the ſeveral Organs in any Particular Animal; and then Particular *Souls* ſhould be but as ſo many *Portions of the ſubtle Matter*, through which, and by means of which, the *Moſaical* Spirit (as a *Soul of the Univerſe*) ſhould Radiate into the ſeveral Bodies, and give them their *Faculties*. In ſhort, we may conceive particular Souls as ſo many *Animi* (for now I Diſtinguiſh, as *Cotta* do's, between *Animus* and *Anima*;) and that the *Anima*, that is the Sourſe of All theſe *Animi*, is but one, throughout the Univerſe. Why may not this be ſo? And if it may, it muſt, ſince then, the being of Subordinate *Anima* (other than *Animi*) would be ſuperfluous and unneceſſary; and Beings are not to be Multiplied but on Neceſſity.

Beſides, there is Reaſon to think there is but *one Soul* Diffus'd throughout the Univerſe, if it be Allowable to make the ſame Judgment in Reference to the whole, that, upon good Conſiderations, may be Framed of the Parts which come Diſtinctly within our View. For in this *Terreſtrial World*, as to the ſeveral *Regions* of it, the Animal, the Vegetable, and the Mineral, it is as certain, that all had but one *Plaſtic*, as that the Body of a Man, or any other particular Animal, had not

more. The Evidence is the ſame for Both. There is a ſenſible *Analogy* and Correſpondence in *Fabric* and Conformation, not only between the ſeveral *Species* of *Animals*, (which is very manifeſt in *Comparative Anatomy*;) but alſo, in a good degree, between *Plants* and *Animals*, and *Minerals* and *Plants*. Again, there is a like *Connexion* between the *Beings* that fill thoſe ſeveral Regions, as there is between the *Parts* that compoſe particular Animals; There are no *Vacuities*, or Gaps in *Nature*, in reſpect of *Species*, no Jumps or Leaps, but all in orderly *Gradation*: Extreams are Knit and United by *Participles* that partake of Both; and all is *full*, without any Chaſms. Thus (to touch it in an Example) *Minerals* and *Vegetables* are Joyned by *Lithodendra* or Stone-Plants, ſuch as Coral and the like; *Vegetables* and *Animals* by *Zoophytes* or Plantanimals, ſuch as the ſenſible Plant, the Scythian Lamb, and the like. And in the *General Kinds* of Animals, between *Fowls* and *Beaſts*, the *Bat*; Between *Fiſhes* and *Fowls*, the *Flying Fiſh*; between *Terreſtrial* and *Aquatic* Animals, thoſe that are called *Amphibious*, are Middle *Uniting Species*, &c. Farther, there is a *Conformity* in their *Origination*, as well as in their Structure and Fabrick; for Plants as well as Animals are Produced

by

by *Semination*; and even Minerals and Mettals have their *Matrices*; and tho' they have not what is properly called *Seed*, they have ſomething that is Analogous in their Production. In fine, the *Tranſmutation* of things, and the Eaſie Tranſition of them from one Region unto Another, evinces it. The *Tranſmutation* of Earthly and Aqueous Bodies into *Vegetables*, is ſo Obvious, as I need not to Inſtance; *That* of Vegetables into *Animal Concretes* is as certain, tho' not ſo Obvious and Uſual. The Animation of *Horſe-hairs* that fall into Pools in the Summer time, may be an Example; but thoſe are more Adequate, that are Given in the Generation of *Barnacles*; and in the Animation of the Branches of certain *Trees*. I Vouch not theſe Inſtances upon uncertain Report (tho' ſome will believe it no other,) but on the credit of a Perſon Grave and Unſuſpected, I mean the Excellent *Schottus*, who in his *Phyſica Curioſa*, l. 1. C. 20. among other Examples very pertinent to this purpoſe, relates thoſe I have mentioned, on his own Knowledge. *Pili*, (ſays he, *è caudis equorum in aquam pluviam, foſſis ac ſcrobibus exceptam decidentes Animantur, & in graciles ac Longos vermes inſtar Serpentum convertuntur, ut ipſemet non ſemel vidi. Aves Anatum formâ ex Ramis Arborum deciduis intra aquas in*

Scotiâ

Scotiâ & Hebridibus Inſulis naſci teſtantur multi Scriptores; Ipſemet vidi Ramorum extremitates paulatim animâ ſenſitiva Informatas decidiſſo & Avolaſſe.

Now, ſo much *Uniformity* even in difformity; ſuch *Connexion*; and ſo Eaſie *Tranſition* from one Region into Another, cannot be conceived to be in the World, without conceiving at the ſame time, that as it had but *one Author* or common Plaſtic at firſt; ſo ſtill it has but *one Principle*, that hath the ordering, the Diſpoſing the Framing and Actuating of it, in all its Parts.

But to make it more Conceivable, that *all* Particular Beings may be Animated by but *One*, and yet being ſuch Diverſity as they are, let us conſider that Glorious thing we call *Light*, which as it Proceeds and Iſſues from the Sun, is of *one* Nature, but meeting with divers *Objects*, and Receiving Different *Modifications*, according to thoſe of the Objects it meets with, is varied into a *Thouſand Colours*, of Different Natures from the Light, as well as one from Another. And it is even thus with the *Vital Energy*, or Light that flows from God (the Intellectual *Sun* and Father of Spirits,) for *This*, tho' as it Proceeds and flows from him, it is but of one Nature, yet, according to the Bodies it meets with,

(it)

(it) becomes Diverſified and Varied, into a Thouſand ſhall I ſay? or rather into Infinite *Faculties* and Powers, that, in their particular Natures, are as Different from the Original Vital Energy it ſelf, (taken in it ſelf,) as All are one from Another. In ſhort, the firſt Subject of Vital Energy is the *Moſaical Spirit*; but This, as it is Received in Bodies of ſeveral Fabricks, Diſpoſitions and Textures, (as well in Viſible, as in Inviſible Animals,) become *Diverſified* into ſeveral Powers and Faculties; or (which is the ſame in Effect,) becomes in *Each* a *Principle* of Actions that Differ one from Another, as much as the *Bodies* do that Inveſt it, and as the *Motions*, that, by means of thoſe Bodies, do Affect and Modifie it. Modifications of the Cogitative Faculties, or of the Immediate Principle that makes the Being Cogitative, are called *Ideas*, or *Images*, and are the ſame unto the Mind, in the *Senſe*, and the *Underſtanding*, that Senſible *Species* (as they commonly are called) are unto the Light in the Air: for as *Theſe* are nothing but Modification of the Light, ſo *Thoſe* are of the Mind.

SECT.

SECT. II.

Several Objections againſt the former Hypotheſis conſidered, Firſt, that it makes Souls to be Faculties or Powers, whereas indeed they are Actions, or Acts. This Objection Anſwered, and the notion of the Souls being a Principle and Faculty, rather than an Action, cleared. The Second Objection, that in this Hypotheſis the Deity is conſidered as an Immanent, and not (what he is) as a Tranſient cauſe of all things, Removed; and how he is both the one and the other, ſhewed, and Confirmed by the Authority of St. Auſtin, *and other Chriſtian Fathers; as well as of the Chiefeſt Philoſophers. The Third Objection, that hereby God and Nature are Confounded; Anſwered, by ſhewing how God and Nature are Diſtinguiſhed in this Hypotheſis. The Laſt and ſtrongeſt Objection, that if there were but one Original Perceptive Principle throughout the Univerſe, all Animals would have the ſame Perceptions, which they have not. This Objection Removed, and the Reaſon of Different Perceptions in Different Animals cleared.*

Tho'

THO' I have Endeavoured to Anticipate Objections in the Diſcourſe that I have made, all along as I made it, yet, to give them a farther clearing, and thereby elucidate more fully the *Hypotheſis* that I Eſpouſe, this Section ſhall be Employed in propoſing in expreſs Terms, ſuch *Objections* as do lye againſt it, and in giving them the neceſſary Anſwers.

The Firſt *Objection* againſt this Hypotheſis is, that it ſpeaks of Souls as of *Faculties or* Powers, and not as of things that are Eſſentially *Active*; whereas a Soul is a *Knowledge*, a Cogitation; or at leaſt a thing that is always Buſie and Doing; inſomuch, that even in ſleep it does not all Reſt, but that Men do always Dream when they ſleep, tho' perhaps they are not always ſenſible, that they do.

I know not how truly it is ſaid, that the Soul is always Buſie, and that Men do always *Dream* when they ſleep; but I could wiſh they did only Dream at that Time; for then we ſhould not be Troubled with ſo many Groundleſs Fantaſtick Opinions. But to come nearer the Matter, I know a Perſon who Affirms, that, to his Knowledge, he *never* Dreamt in his whole Life; and certainly, ſince we are always

always *Conſcious* that we Dream, when ever we do, we ought to believe we have not Dreamed at all, when we are not ſenſible we have. Beſides, *how* do they know that the Soul is always Doing? for my part, I am much miſtaken if I do not Experience in my ſelf (what I think any other may) that I am able to *ſuſpend* all Thought, or (as we commonly Expreſs it) think of nothing. To be ſure, every one who hath made the Leaſt Reflexion muſt needs know, that as we have Eyes, and Ears, and other ſenſitive Organs, and ſo do ſee, and hear, and are Conſcious of other Sentiments, in Caſe our Eyes and Ears and thoſe other Organs which we have, are Impreſſed by External Objects; ſo (ordinarily) we do neither ſee, nor Hear, or are Conſcious of any other ſentiment of any External *Objects*, if *theſe* do not Affect our Organs: without the preſence of Objects we are only ſaid to have the *Faculties* or Powers, that is, we are ſaid, only to be *Able* to ſee, to Hear, &c. but upon the preſence of Objects, and the Application of our Faculties or Powers, we are ſaid to have the *Exercife* of them, and actually to See and Hear, &c. Thus it is in the External *Senſe*. Now, ſince the *Mind* or Underſtanding is an Organical thing as well as the External ſenſe, I

ſee

ſee no Reaſon to think, but that as there is no Actual Senſation but when the Organs of the ſenſe are ſtirred, ſo there is no Actual Intellection but when that of the Underſtanding is; and that tho' we have always the Power of Underſtanding, as we have that of ſeeing, yet we do not actually Exerciſe that Power, but when it is *drawn into Act*, by ſome Impreſſion upon it, either from the *Will* within, or from *Objects* without; any more than we do Actually ſee, &c. but when the Eye, &c. is Affected. In fine, ſince nothing of Cogitation is done within us by the Soul *Immediately*, but only by *means* of the Underſtanding, or of the will, or of the ſenſe, External, or Internal, and All theſe are rather Faculties than Actions, I believe I have Reaſon to Conclude, that the Soul is rather a Syſtem of the Faculties, or elſe a Principle of them, than that it is a Perpetual never ceaſing Exerciſe or Action, It is rather *Actus*, than *Actio*, in the Language of the Schools. And tho' in the Opinion of theſe, it be Eſſentially an Act, *Actus Corporis*, an Informing *form* to the Body, yet, in other Reſpects it is but *Actus Primus*, not *Actus Secundus*; for tho' it be an Original Principle of Action, and ſo an Active Power, yet, in it ſelf, it is but a Power, and not Actually Active, or

Acting

Acting, but in the Requiſite Circumſtances. Thus we are Obliged to ſpeak, to wit, *inadequately*, in the Notions of *Power* and *Act*, or Faculties and Exerciſe. And thus much for the Firſt Objection.

The *Second* is, that in this *Hypotheſis*, in the laſt Reſult, God is made the *Immanent* cauſe, whereas Really, and according to the truth of Revelation, Gen. 1. he is only a *Tranſient* Cauſe of all things. But to this the *Anſwer* is Eaſie; for tho' in Gen. 1: God is Repreſented (as he is in Reality) to be the Almighty Creator of all, and ſo as a Tranſient Cauſe, yet in this ſenſe, he is alſo the *Immanent*, that, by the Moſaical Spirit, he giveth Life and Being, and Motion unto all; and this according to the *Apoſtle*, who ſays, that *in him* we live, and move, and have our being; as well as to Common *Metaphyſicks*, which tell us, that all Beings are either Firſt, or ſecond Beings; and that Second Beings are *Participations* of the Firſt. And however ſtrange it may Look now, it was certainly of Old, the Common ſentiment of all the Wiſer part of the World; the *Jewiſh* Doctors, as well as Gentile *Philoſophers*, and even of many *Ancient Fathers* of the Chriſtian Church; it would be Superfluous, as well as Tedious, to mention all (if I could,) and therefore to confine

confine my ſelf within Fitting Bounds, I will inſtance two or three of the Chief for Examples. The firſt ſhall be *Apuleius* in his Book *de Mundo* (a Book aſcribed to *Ariſtotle*, and by *Huetius* to *Poſidonius*, and for certain it was originally *Greek*,) where he ſays, *vetus opinio eſt, atque Cogitationes omnium hominum penitùs Inſedit, Deum Eſſentiæ originis haberi Auctorem, Deumque ipſum ſalutem eſſe & Perſeverantiam earum quas effecerit rerum, neque ulla Res eſt quæ viduata dei Auxilio, ſui naturâ contenta ſit. HancOpinionem vates ſecuti profiteri auſi ſunt, omnia Jove plena eſſe.* It is an Ancient Opinion, and imprinted on the hearts of all Mortals, *&c.* And afterwards he adds, *Sed cum credamus Deum per omnia permeare, & ad nos, & ad ultrà, poteſtatem ſui nominis tendere, quantum abeſt, vel Imminet, tantum Exiſtimandum eſt eum amplius minuſve rebus utilitatis dare.*

Tho' it is true, that in concluſion he compares God to a Great King, that does many things by his Miniſters.

The ſecond ſhall be *Seneca*, who in his 65*th* Epiſtle, among many other expreſſions to the ſame purpoſe, has this in ſo many words. *Quem in hoc Mundo Locum Deus Obtinet, hunc in homine Animus.* What God is, in reference to the World; that ſame the Soul is, in reſpect of a Man.

The third ſhall be the Emperor *Marcus Antoninus*, who in his 4*th* Book, *Sect.* 40 τῶν εἰς ἑαυτόν, ſays, ὡς ἓν ξῶον τὸν κόσμον, μίαν οὐσίαν, καὶ ψυχὴν μίαν ἔχοντα, συνεχῶς ἐπινοεῖν, &c. Be always minding that this World is like an Animal, that hath but one Subſtance or one Soul. I had not cited this Emperor, after I had cited *Seneca*, ſeeing both were *Stoicks*, but that in doing ſo I knew I ſhould have occaſion to refer my Reader to Mr. *Gataker*, who, in his Annotations on this paſſage of *Antoninus*, has made a large Collection of Authorities to the ſame intendment, which ſaves me a farther Labour.

The laſt that I will mention ſhall be a moſt Celebrated Father in the Chriſtian Church, the great St. *Auſtin*, (for I omit the Excellent *Origen*, tho' as Learned as he, for being more obnoxious,) and I will cite the Teſtimony he gives, as I find it in a Schoolman, to ſhow, that ſome even of the Schoolmen were in the ſame Opinion. *Orbellis* then (for he is the Schoolman I intend) upon the firſt of the Sentences, *Diſt.* 8. *Q.* 2. ſays (juſt as *Seneca*) *Sicut Deus in Majori Mundo, ſic Anima in Minori*; as God is in the greater World, ſo is the Soul in the leſſer: and then by a ſimple Converſion of the Sentences, what the Soul is in the leſſer World (of Man,) that

that God must be in the greater; and this he says is according to St. *Augustine*, *sicut enim* (says he) *Deus est in Majori Mundo, sic Anima in Minori, viz. in homine, secundum Augustinum.*

Only here it must be observed, that when *God* is compared unto a *Soul*, it must be understood with due limitation; to wit, as a Soul is taken only for a *Principle* of Powers and Actions, and not as it is an informing *Form*, or part of the Animal; for that God should be a Soul in this latter sense, is a notion no ways agreeing to him, who, in himself is all, and only perfection.

Another *Objection* is, that *God* and *Nature* are confounded in this Hypothesis, so that it is not easie to say what is the interest of *God* in things, and what is *Natures*, or how they differ; to which I *Reply*, that indeed in the Holy Scriptures all is ascribed to God, and the Spirit of God, without any mention of Nature; and yet since there are second Causes, as well as a first, and so there is a thing which we call *Nature*, (for by this I now mean nothing but *second Causes* and their working;) it will be very convenient to show *how* God, how Nature does operate, and how they differ: and *this* perhaps may be done upon the proposed *Hypothesis* better than on any

other. For in *this*, God and Nature are diſtinguiſhed, as the Soul of an Animal, and the Syſtem of Faculties; taking the Soul (as it is in the common Opinion) for the Principle of Faculties, and Faculties for the immediate Principles of all actions of Animals; and thus *Active Nature* is the Syſtem of all the Powers, all the Faculties of the Univerſe, and *God* the eſſential Principle of them. Or more plainly, ſince Faculties and Principles are notions rather than things, and ſome will be apt enough, without conſidering their grounds, to regard them only as meer notions, I ſhall therefore ſet out the difference that is between them, in more Real Expreſſions, by ſaying, that the *Influence* of God, or his active preſence in things by means of the Moſaical Spirit, is as *Light*, and that *Nature*, (the Syſtem of all the Powers in the Univerſe) is as a Complex of all *Colours*; ſo that as Colour is the Modification of Light, and Light the eſſence of Colour, ſo particular Powers and Actions (that are but Powers in act,) are Modifications of the Divine Energy, and the Divine Energy the ſubſtance both of the Act and the Power; and thus the influence of the *firſt* and *ſecond* Cauſes differ, as *Motion*, and *Modification* of Motion; the Motion ariſes from the *firſt*, the Modification from the *ſecond* Cauſe,

Cauſe, either as it is an *Organ*, or as an *Object*: and ſo too, the *Aberrations* of Nature in Monſters, and in other inſtances, are accounted for, either by the ill Texture of the Organs, the over-whelming of matter, or by ſome other vitioſity and defect in the ſecond Cauſes, without any impeachment of the firſt. As the ſcriblings of a bad miſhaping Pen, are not imputed to the hand that guides it, which perhaps may be skilful enough; but to the Inſtrument that depraves the motion; and this, tho' the Motion comes from the Writer. In fine, I do not ſee any reaſon why *vital* Energy may not be *Imparted* and Communicated, as well as *Local*, which our ſenſe evinces to be ſo: one Body that is in motion, ſtriking another that is not, thereby *Communicates* its Motion to it; and *thus* a Cogitative vital *Energy* may *come* from God, and being *diffuſed* as Light is throughout the Univerſe, may be catched by agreeable Organs, and *Modified* by Objects, in the way that I have ſhewed before. I only hint this by way of Anticipation, to ſuch as will inquire, whether this Cogitative vital Energy, diffus'd throughout the World, be *God* himſelf or no, or what it is; for there I ſtick, and call in the aſſiſtance and united force of greater underſtandings, mine beginning to be dazled

with the luſtre, or the ſubtilty of the Object: as yet I take it to be the *Moſaical Spirit*. So much for this *Objection*.

The *laſt* I ſhall propoſe is the Herculean one, that is inſiſted upon by many Great and very Judicious Men, which is, that if there is *but one* Original Perceptive throughout the Univerſe, all Animals would have the *ſame* Perceptions, ſo that what is known by *one*, could be ignored by *none*; ay, the ſame ſentiments, the ſame Reſentments, the ſame Pains, the ſame pleaſures, that are in *any* one, would be in *every* one; and there could be no *Numerication*, no individuation of Spirits, or Souls, becauſe *no ſeparate*, particular Perceptions.

But this Objection as it is greater in appearance than in reality, ſo it can have little effect, if we conſider, that it does equally deſtroy the *diverſity* of Perceptions in the ſeveral Organs and Parts of *one* Animal, which yet our own Experience atteſts unto, as *that* of the perceptions of *ſeveral* Animals in the Univerſe; ſince, as there is but one Original Perceptive throughout the Univerſe, in the propoſed Opinion; ſo in the common, there is but one in every Animal; and yet, tho' the *Soul* is but *one*, the *Faculties* are *many*, and the *exerciſes* of them *ſeveral*. For if but

one

one Eye is inflamed, the ſenſe of Pain is *not* in *both*; and when but one Arm, or one Hand is wounded, the ſmart thereof is *only* in one; ay, the pains and ailments of the *Superior* Parts, are not felt in the *Inferior*, nor the ſufferances of *theſe* in *thoſe*; ſo that though the Animal it ſelf may be ſaid to have the Perception of all thoſe of its ſeveral parts, yet theſe cannot be truly ſaid to have one anothers. I acknowledge, that as the Soul may be ſaid to have a common ſenſe of all perceptions, but the ſeveral Members, each to have but a private ſenſe for it ſelf; ſo anſwerably, tho' the *Original Perceptive* is ſenſible of *all*, (and needs muſt, for he that made the Eye muſt needs ſee, and he that planted the Ear, muſt needs hear; and he that gave an heart unto man muſt needs underſtand,) yet *Particular Percipients*, particular Animals, as ſo many particular Organs muſt have *but* their ſhare: one Animal can no more pretend to have the perceptions of another, (tho' the Original perceptive is the ſame in both, and is conſcious to the perceptions of both) than in the ſame Animal the *Eye* can pretend to *Hear*, or the *Ear* to *See*, or either of them to *Smell*.

Hence it is evident, that the *Individuation* and Numeration of *Perceptions*, and

quently of Perceptive *Powers*, ariſes from the *Bodies*, or Organs, by means of which ſuch perceptions are made; for where the *Bodies* are *ſeparated*, or the Organs *diſtinct*, there the *Perceptions* made in thoſe Bodies, and by means of ſuch Organs are likewiſe *ſo*. In ſhort, as I hinted before, perceptions and perceptive powers are individuated by *Bodies*, in the ſame ways as *Images* are by *Looking-Glaſſes*, or *Eccho's* by the contrivance of *Objects*.

But to demonſtrate it in *Experience*. as well as by diſcourſe, I will add a Hiſtory or two of Monſters, that will do it plainly. The firſt ſhall be out of *Trivet*, and in his own Terms, (as I read them in an Ancient Manuſcript) who reports the Accident juſt as *Sigebert* alſo does in his Chronicle add, *An.* 396. 'In the time of this *Valentinian* 'ſays he (but it ſhould be as others ſay, 'in the time of *Theodoſius*) at the Town of '*Emaus* in *Jewry*, there was a *Child* bore, 'the which from the Navel upward, had '*double* Body, that is to ſay double Breaſt, 'and double Head, and *proper* feeling of 'all parts; and ſometimes the *one* ſleepeth, 'and eateth, and drinketh, when the o-'ther *doth* nought, and otherwiſe they 'eat, and drink, and ſleeep *together*; and 'ſometimes they *weep* and *ſmile* together, 'and ſometimes *ſtrived* and chid together,

'and

'and when they were almoſt of two year 'Age, the one of them died four days be-'fore the other.

Schenckius the Son, Reports another, but reſembling ſtory, and with more Particularity and Circumſtance, and Conſequently more to our purpoſe, out of *Buchanan* his Scottiſh Hiſtory; *Monſtrum novi generis* (ſays he) *in Scotiâ natum eſt, inferiore quidem corporis parte ſpecie Maris, nec quicquam à communi hominum formâ diſcrepans, Umbilicum vero ſupra, trunco corporis ac reliquis omnibus membris geminis & ad uſum atque ſpeciem diſcretis; id Rex diligenter & Educandum, & erudiendum curavit, ac maxime in muſicis, quâ in re mirabiliter profecit, quin & varias Linguas edidicit, & variis voluntatibus duo Corpora ſecum diſcordia diſſentiebant, ac interim Litigabant, cum aliud alii placeret, interim veluti in communi conſultabant. Illud etiam in eo memorabile fuit, quod cum inferna crura lumbive offenderentur, commune Corpus utrumque dolorem ſentiret, cum vero ſuperne Pungeretur, aut alioqui Læderetur, ad Alterum corpus tantum doloris ſenſus perveniret. Quod diſcrimen in morte fuit magis Conſpicuum. Nam cum alternum corpus complures ante alterum dies extinctum fuiſſet, quod ſuperſtes fuit, dimidio ſui Computreſcente paulatim contabuit. Vixit id monſtrum Annos Viginti Octo, ac deceſſit,*

ceſſit, Adminiſtrante rem Scoticam Joanne Prorege. Hac de re ſcribimus eo Confidentius, quod adhuc ſuperſint homines honeſti Complures, qui hæc viderint. So *Buchanan*, and *Schenkius* from him.

I will not give my ſelf the trouble to tranſlate the Relation, becauſe I find it in Mr. *Roſs* his continuation of Sir *Walter Rawleigh*'s Hiſtory of the World, who thus tells the Story, *ad An.* 1490. About this time (ſays he) a ſtrange Monſter was born in *Scotland*, which *beneath* the Navel was *one* Body, but *above*, *two* diſtinct Bodies, having *different Senſes*, Souls, and Wills; any hurt *beneath* the Navel is equally felt by *Both* Bodies above, but if any of the *upper* Members were hurt, *one* of the Bodies *only* felt the pain. This Monſter the King cauſed to be inſtructed in Muſick, and divers Languages. One of the Bodies died ſome days before the other, which alſo ſhortly after pined and conſumed away. It lived Eight and Twenty years.

I might inſtance in many other Stories of this kind, but theſe ſuffice to evince what I induce them for, that the *numeration* of Souls, and conſequently of other Spirits, depends upon *that* of Bodies; for in the alledged Examples, eſpecially the latter, it is plain, that where the *Bodies* were

were *divided* and ſeparated, the *Powers* of Perception *likewiſe were*; ſo that the offences of but one, were not felt by both, but by one only; and yet again, in the parts beneath the Navel, common unto both the Bodies, any hurts in theſe were equally perceived by both. I take the *Theodoſian* and *Scottiſh* Monſters to be evident illuſtrations of my Hypotheſis. And ſo much for Subſtance, Harmonically conſidered.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

Of Subſtance in the Scholaſtical Conſideration of it. Subſtance what, that it is Firſt or Second. Second Subſtance is called a ſingular, a ſuppoſitum, or a ſubſiſtent. Of the Principle of Individuation, or that which makes a ſingular to be ſo. Dr. Sherlock's *Notion of the Individuation of Spirits. Of a Perſon. The true Idea of it.* Laurentius Valla *his notion of a Perſon, the unuſefulneſs of it to the ſalving of the Holy Trinity ſhewed. The Trinity a Myſtery, and Doctrine of Faith; not a Point of Philoſophy; and ſo the Idea of it to be derived only from Revelation in the Holy Scriptures, and not from bare Diſcourſes of Reaſon.*

I Have Diſcourſed of *Subſtance* after the *Harmonical* way, in the Precedent Chapters. It now remaineth that I add ſomething concerning it in the *Scholaſtical*; and thus, Subſtance is defined to be a thing that is by it ſelf, or that is under others called Accidents; and is divided into *Firſt*, and *Second*. The Second Subſtance is that which is not in a Subject, but may be Prædicated of it, and ſuch are Generical and Specifical Subſtances; as for

for example, Living Creature, and Man; neither of which is in a ſubject, as an Accident is, but both are Prædicated of it; for Living Creature is Prædicated of *Man*, and Man of *Peter*, *James*, *John*, &c.

As for firſt Subſtance (which is the ſubſtance I deſign to ſpeak of more particularly,) it is defined to be that which neither is in a Subject (as an Accident is,) nor is Prædicated of it, as the ſecond ſubſtance is; it is alſo called a *Suppoſitum*, a ſubſiſtent, or a ſingular, in which is wont to be diſtinguſhed *Nature* and *Subſiſtence*; *Subſiſtence* is a mode of Exiſtence, to which it adds Perſeity, and *Exiſtence* is Eſſence in Act; the *Nature* is the Idea or Definitive Conception of a Subſtance. Or thus, the *Nature* is the Thing or Subſtance as it is defined; a *Suppoſitum*, is the Thing or Subſtance that hath that Nature or Definition. Nature and Subſiſtence differ but as Eſſence and Exiſtence; Subſiſtence being but the Exiſtence of a ſubſtantial Nature. But Nature and a Suppoſitum Differ, as *Eſſentia* and *Ens*, the Former ſignifying (as the Schools ſpeak) *ut Quâ*, the latter *ut Quod*.

In a ſingular Subſtance or *Suppoſitum*, that which comes particularly into Conſideration, is the *Principle* (as Schollars call it) of *Individuation*; or that which makes

a ſingular to become a ſingular, for the *Nature* is ſuppoſed to belong to one particular no more than to another, but to be a thing abſtracted from all Particulars, and thence the queſtion ariſes, what that is that *ſingularizes* the Nature; (for example, that of Man,) and makes it to belong to *Peter*, or to *John*, or to *James* in particular. This Principle of Individuation, (be it what it will,) may (as is thought by ſome,) be called the individuating *difference*; as well as that which does divide the *Genius* and conſtitute the Species, is called the ſpecifical, ſince this indiuiduating Principle doth as much divide the *Species*, and conſtitute the individual, as the ſpecifical difference divides the *Genius*, and conſtitutes the ſpecies. Much ado there is what this Principle ſhould be; but after all, they ſeem to me to come neareſt to the Truth, who do affirm, that a ſingular or individual becomes ſo, not by any diſtinct Principle of individuation, but immediately and *per ſe*, and in that, that it is in being; juſt as *Quantity* is *Terminated* by ſelf, and not by mediation of another Thing, that ſhould confine and bound it; and in like manner is *Figured*, not by any thing ſuperadded to it, but barely in that it is thus and thus Terminated.

I am

I am already almoſt tired with this idle fruitleſs way of talking, and ſhould not overcome my ſelf to proceed any farther in it, but that the *Notion* a Learned Perſon has of late delivered to the World, about the *Individuation of Spirits*, will oblige me to Conſider *it*, and by affording matter of more intelligible Diſcourſe, make ſome amends for the dryneſs and barrenneſs of the former. It is Dr. *Sherlock* I mean, who in his vindication of the Trinity, *S.* 4. *p.* 48. tells us, 'that in Created '*Finite Spirits* their numerical oneneſs can 'be nothing but every Spirits *Unity*, 'within it ſelf, and diſtinct and ſeparate 'ſubſiſtence from all other Created Spirits; 'now this ſelf-unity of the Spirit can be 'nothing elſe but *ſelf-Conſciouſneſs*; that it 'is Conſcious to its own *Thoughts*, Reaſo-'nings, Paſſions, which no other Spirit is 'Conſcious of but it ſelf. This makes a 'Finite Spirit *numerically one*, and ſepa-'rates it from all other Spirits, that every 'Spirit *feels* only its own *Thoughts* and *Paſ-'ſions*, but is not Conſcious to the Thoughts 'and Paſſions of any other Spirit; and 'therefore if there were *three* Created Spi-'rits ſo United as to be Conſcious each to 'others Thoughts, I cannot ſee any Rea-'ſon why we might not ſay that three 'ſuch Perſons were *not* numerically one.

He

'He adds, let any Man, who can give me 'any other notion of the numerical One-'neſs of an *Infinite Mind* but ſelf-conſciouſ-'neſs.

Thus this Learned Perſon.

It muſt be confeſſed, that the *Numerical Oneneſs* of Spirits can be nothing elſe but (as this Learned Author ſays it is) every Spirits *Unity* (he might as well have ſaid Oneneſs) with it ſelf, and its diſtinct and ſeparate ſubſiſtence from all other Created Spirits. But this is not the oneneſs of *Spirits* only, but of *every* thing elſe that is one; for as *omne ens eſt unum*, ſo *unum eſt, quod eſt indiviſum in ſe, & Diviſum a quolibet Alio*; and therefore it doth hold in *Bodies* as well as in Spirits, and perhaps in the Infinite firſt Being, as well as in all Created Finite Beings. But to confine my ſelf, (as this Learned Author does) to the *Numerical Oneneſs of Spirits*, I cannot ſay farther of it, as he has, that it can be nothing elſe but *ſelf-Conſciouſneſs*, in the ſenſe of the word as he unfolds it, I ſay as he *Unfolds* it; for elſe, taking ſelf-conſciouſneſs for a Spirits ſelf-being, ſo I take it the numerical oneneſs of a Spirit is nothing but its ſelf-conſciouſneſs, for then the meaning is, that a Spirit (which is a Cogitative Being) is *it ſelf*, and not any other thing; but taking Conſciouſneſs as he does,

does, for a Spirits Being *ſenſible* of its own *Actions* and Paſſions, ſo its numerical oneneſs cannot be its ſelf-conſciouſneſs. For as a Being (and even a Cogitative Being as a Being) muſt be conceived to *be*, before it can be conceived to *Act*; ſo again, it muſt be conceived to act, that is to *Think*, to *Reaſon*, to *Love*, to *Hate*, (for theſe are the Actions he inſtances in) for ſome moment of Reaſon *before* it can be conceived to be *Conſcious* of theſe its actings. Now for that *Moment* of Reaſon, in which a Spirit is conceived *in Being*, without being conceived to be acting, and in which it is conceived *Acting* before it becomes *Conſcious* of its actings, in that precedent moment, (which ſpeaks *order*, not *duration*,) it muſt be conceived to be *one with it ſelf*, and numerically different from every thing beſides; and therefore that it is *ſo*, cannot ariſe from ſelf-conſciouſneſs, or its being conſcious of its own actings. So that if there were (as in the Authors ſuppoſal) *three* created Spirits, that were as conſcious to each others Thoughts and Paſſions, as each of them unto his own, there would yet be no reaſon, that we ſhould ſay (as he ſays we muſt) that three ſuch perſons would be numerically one; for if they were, how could they be Three? ſince the number Three, is not the number One, and they

cannot be Three in number, if they are but one in number; to be Three is to be more than One; to be but One is not to be more than one. All that could be ſaid of them is, that upon that ſuppoſal they would be *intimate* with one another, but with numerical diſtinction; for ſtill one of them would not be the other, and ſo they would remain Three Perſons ſtill, not one Perſon. Self-Unity is before Self-Conſciouſneſs, and may conſiſt with Conſciouſneſs of others. *Again*, in Dr. *Sherlock*'s way of Diſcourſing, which is, that Three Perſons ſo intimate to one another as he ſuppoſes, would become numerically one, I do not ſee but that inſtead of the *Three* Perſons of the Bleſſed *Trinity*, (which doubtleſs he will own to be really as intimate to one another, as he ſuppoſes his Three Finite ones to be,) we ſhall have but *one* Perſon (in number.) *In fine*, if Perſons by being ſo intimate to one another do become numerically one, I do not ſee but that, by this reaſoning, God who is as conſcious to all the Actions, Paſſions, and Thoughts, of all Finite Created Spirits, as theſe are to their own, and as the Doctors Imaginary Perſons are to one anothers, he muſt be numerically one with them all. But perhaps the Doctor will tell me, that he affirms the Three Eternal Minds (for ſo he calls them) are numerically

cally one *God*, not one *Perſon*, [Three Perſons, one God;] but then it will be demanded of him, ſince Three are *thrice one*, what that is that makes each Perſon one in it ſelf, and diſtinguiſhes it from both the others? for it muſt be ſomething that is not *Common*, which ſelf-conſciouſneſs is, (in his ſenſe of the word,) all being as conſcious to one anothers Thoughts and Actings, as each unto its own: whereas, *that* which makes a thing numerically one, muſt be *Differencing* and Particular. Not to inſiſt, that to be an Eternal Mind is the true *Idea* or notion of God, and then if there be (as he owns there be) Three Eternal Minds (really diſtinct,) it will I confeſs, be no great difficulty to evince them Three Perſons, but I doubt it will, intelligibly to make it out, that theſe Three (Three Eternal Minds, really diſtinct from one another,) are not Three *Gods*, as well as Three Perſons. So that methinks the knot remains untied. For my own part, I believe as the Scriptures inſtruct me, that there is but *one God*, tho' *Three Perſons*; each of which is *God*; which I ſay only to prevent Miſtakes. But I reſolve to Diſcourſe more fully of *Unity* or Oneneſs, when I come to treat of the notions of *Whole* and *Part*.

As for the name [Perſon] it properly belongs to *Men*; we do not commonly ap-

Ply it to *Beasts*, or unto *Angels*, or other Spirits, but by Translation and Metaphor, when they do appear in the Figure or shape of Men. Nor is [Person] a name of *Nature*, taking nature in the sense of the Schoolmen; for Nature is *Common* unto all of the kind, but that only is *Personal* which is distinguishing and peculiar among those in the same kind. Thus, *Man* is a name of the *kind*; or specifical Nature, the Nature in common; *A* Man an expression of the Nature as *singularized*; but *Person* properly is the name of that which differences Men from one another. When we speak of the Person of a Man, we mean by it that Cumble of Accidents, External, Internal, of Body, of Mind, Adventitious and Extrinsical, Absolute or Relative, whereby he is distinguished, and known from others. Hence *Persona* in Latin, is πρόσωπον in *Greek*, and πρόσωπον signifies the Countenance or Face, in the first place; and from thence, a Person, in the second (place,) because the Countenance or Face is that by which we do chiefly distinguish Men. In conformity to this Idea or notion of Person, I understand *Levit.* 19. 15. *Thou shalt not favour the* Person *of the Poor, nor honour the* Person *of the Mighty*; the word for Person is προσωπον in the Septuagint Translation, and the meaning of the Text is plainly

This,

This, thou ſhalt not in giving Judgment have regard to the Poverty of the one, or to the Riches of another; for theſe concern the *Perſon*, not the *Cauſe*. In this ſenſe alſo is God ſaid to be Ἀπροσωπολήπτης no *Accepter of Mens Perſons*, for that he in judgement reſpects not (as Men too often do) the foreign *Qualities* and Accidents that do diſtinguiſh them from one another, as, their wit, or their weakneſs; their comelineſs, or their deformity; their riches, or their Poverty; their Grandeur or their Littleneſs of Figure in the World. But all is as one to him, when he enters into Judgement; for he judges uprightly, according to the *merits of the Cauſe*, without regard to the Perſon, ſave where the Conſideration of the Perſon is of moment (as ſometimes it is) in the merits of the Cauſe. But as *the* Perſon of a Man is that bundle of Qualities that do diſtinguiſh him from others; ſo *A* Perſon is a Man with thoſe Qualities, that is, a Perſon is a *Diſtinguiſhed* Man; and ſo the word comes to be taken, not only for the *Qualities* that do diſtinguiſh, but for the *Man* that is diſtinguiſhed, by thoſe qualities; in which ſenſe the word is uſed, not only by the *Schoolmen*, who after *Boetius*, define a Perſon to be a rational ſubſiſtent, *Rationalis Naturæ Individua ſubſtantia*; but by the *Apoſtle*, when he

ſpeaks

ſpeaks, 2 Cor. 1. 11. *of Thanks being given by many* Perſons *for him.*

By what I have ſaid (and I have ſaid the more for that the cauſe of late has had a freſh Rehearing) we may judge of the juſtice of *Laurentius Valla*, who in his Elegance, *l.* VI. *c.* 34. ſeverely, (or rather inſolently) reflects upon *Boetius* for aſſerting that a Perſon was not a Quality, or in any other Predicament but that of Subſtance; he ſhows in many inſtances, that [Perſon] ſignifies *Quality*, and thence infers, that the ſame man may ſuſtain a hundred Perſons; [*Quo fit*, ſays he, *ut Aſſit mihi Multiplex Perſona ac Diverſa, ſed una tantum ſubſtantia;*] and to give an Example, he fancies himſelf a *Hector*, and ſays [*ad Priamum ſum Perſonâ Filii, ad Aſtianactta perſonâ Patris, ad Andromachan perſonâ Viri, ad Paridem perſonâ Fratris, ad Sarpedonem perſonâ Amici; ad Achillem perſonâ Inimici.*] In fine, making application of what he ſays unto the *Deity*, he thinks that he has carried the Prize, by demonſtrating *how* God may be but *one Subſtance*, and yet be *Three Perſons*; But 'tis in a way in which his *Hector* may be a *Hundred*, and God as *many*, and more. So that I had not believed it worth my while to mention this Opinion, but that an *Excellent Perſon* of our own has given it freſh reputation, by going the ſame way; for the Learned Author of the *Three Sermons concerning the Sacred Triny*, ſhews, as *Laurentius Valla* does, that the word [Perſon] was uſed of old to ſignifie the *State*, Quality, or Condition of a Man, as he ſtands related to other Men, either as a *King*, or a *Subject*, or as *Father*, or a *Son*, &c. Thus he obſerves the Latin Phraſe is *Perſonam Imponere* when a Man is put

put into Office or a Dignity Conferred upon him; *Indutere perſonam*, when he takes upon him the Office; *Suſtinere perſonam*, when one bears, or Executes an Office, &c. In ſhort, he tells us, (as *Laurentius Valla* has) that 'tis nothing ſtrange for the *ſame* man to ſuſtain *Divers* Perſons, inſtancing in *Tully*, who ſays; *ſuſtineo unus Tres Perſonas, Meam, Adverſarii, Judicis*, I being but one, do yet ſuſtain Three Perſons, my own, that of an Adverſary, and that of a Judge. *In fine*, he makes the ſame application of it to the Divine Trin-unity that *Laurentius Valla* doth, for (ſays he) if Three Perſons may be one man, what hinders but that Three Divers Perſons may be one God? and that the *ſame God* as Maker of the World, or God the Creator may be God the *Father*; and as Author of our Redemption be God the *Redeemer*, or God the *Son*; and as working effectually in the hearts of his Elect, be God the Sanctifier or God the *Holy Ghoſt*.

I confeſs if this is *all* that is in the Myſtery, it is very Conceiveable, and (which will be an unvaluable happineſs to the Chriſtian World) there will need to be no more diſpute about it: but as the *Received Doctrine* of the Divine Trinunity is quite another thing, ſo muſt it have a very different *Expoſition*. Beſides, *Laurentius Valla* ſeems to ſuppoſe that the difficulty is only about the *word* [Perſon.] But this is his miſtake; for the word [Perſon] as applied to the Trinity is but of a *later* uſe, and of the *Schoolmen*, rather than of the *Fathers*, whoſe word is *Hypoſtaſis*, which is alſo the *Apoſtles* word: So that unleſs it can be found, that one Man can be three *Hypoſtaſes*, or Subſiſtents, and that for God to be a Creator, a Redeemer, and a Sanctifier, is,

to

to be three *Hypoſtaſes* in the *Fathers* ſenſe, as well as Three *Perſons* in *Cicero's*, the *Difficulty* is not removed, but only avoided. *In fine*, it is not the ſame thing to ſay that one *ſuſtains* Three Perſons, as to ſay that one *is* Three Perſons: For he that only ſuſtains a Perſon, doth but *Act* the part of that Perſon which he is ſaid to ſuſtain; and thus *Cicero* ſuſtained Three Perſons, when he acted as if he had been Three ſeveral Men under different Characters: To *Perſonate* a Judge is not *to be* one: And in this ſenſe of the word Perſon *Seneca* ſays, *Ep.* 24. *non hominibus tantum, ſed & Rebus PERSONA Demenda eſt, & reddenda facies ſua.*

I ſay not this with any intention to enter into a Diſcourſe of the Divine Trin-unity, the doing of which would be improper, in a Treatiſe that pretends but to Metaphyſicks: I have only mention'd it on occaſion, as an inquiry after the Idea and notion of a *Suppoſitum*, and that of a *Perſon*, obliged me. The *Doctrine* of the *Trinity* is a point of pure *Revelation*, not of *Philoſophy* or Science; all Diſcourſes and explications of it, not derived from the Holy Scriptures, and grounded upon them, but on Analogies and Reſemblances in *nature*, or on Principles of Human *Diſcourſe* and meer Reaſon, are as Foreign unto it, as Earth is to Heaven. It is an Article of Faith, and a Fundamental one too; indeed the chief of all thoſe of which the *Apoſtle* ſays, they are ſuch as *neither Eye ſaw, nor Ear heard of, nor entred into the heart of man to conceive*, before they were brought to light in the Goſpel. Wherefore, 'tis there only that we are obliged to ſeek it, and there only, in the *Analogy* of Faith, that we can hope to diſcover it, in its true Idea and Notion. And ſo much for Subſtance as Scholaſtically Conſider'd.

FINIS.